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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Inmates are dying in Florida’s prisons, victims of torture and 
brutality.”1  As eloquently stated by the Miami Herald, “inmates are being 
killed by people Floridians pay to keep the peace in a charged, stressful 
environment.”2  Incredibly, Florida has been characterized in recent years as 
ground zero for prison deaths.3  Despite such alarming accusations, formal 
criminal charges have never been brought against any of the suspected 
Florida prison employees.4  In fact, the situation has become so egregious 
that former Department of Corrections head, James McDonough, stated in an 
e-mail, “‘I am revolted by what I am hearing, just as I am by what I am not 
hearing. . . . [t]hese cases did not end tragically . . . they ended in horrific and 
suspicious deaths.’”5  “With the third largest prison system in the country,” 
over one hundred thousand inmates are housed in Florida “at a cost of $2.3 
billion per year.”6  Recently, in 2014, there are more than five inmates for 
every ten thousand Florida residents being housed within the seven privately 
run facilities and forty-eight public state run facilities.7   Despite alleged 
reform attempts within the Florida prison system, former Charlotte 
Correctional Institute Inmate No. 196374, Joseph Cardenas, described his 
experience in the facility by saying, “[y]ou have no rights . . . [i]f they beat 
your ass, [they will] hide you [until] [you are] healed.  [That is] their world 
and you need to accept that.”8 
In the wake of serious allegations against the State, the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement has opened investigations into nine inmate 
1. Editorial, Break the Silence, MIAMI HERALD (July 10, 2014), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/article1974845.html. 
2. Id. 
3. Shaun King, Record 346 Inmates Die, Dozens of Guards Fired in Florida 
Prisons, DAILY KOS (Jan. 14, 2015, 11:20 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/01/14/
1357661/-Poisonings-beatings-gassings-Record-346-inmates-die-dozens-of-guards-fired-in-
Florida-prisons. 
4. Editorial, Break the Silence, supra note 1. 
5. Id. 
6. Evan Williams, Our Inmates, Our Burden, FLA. WKLY.: FORT MYERS 
(June 25, 2014), http://fortmyers.floridaweekly.com/news/2014-06-25/Top_News/OUR_
INMATES_OUR_BURDEN.html. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
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deaths, in addition to the Miami-Dade homicide investigation into the death 
of Darren Rainey. 9   Supplementing these investigations, the Florida 
Department of Corrections introduced an “online database cataloging all 
inmate deaths over the past [fourteen] years.”10  This database catalogues the 
three thousand four hundred inmates who have died in the Florida prison 
system as well as the roughly one hundred cases that remain under 
investigation by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.11 
Although a majority of inmate deaths are classified as accidental or 
natural—like that of Randall Jordan-Aparo—this is often a mistake.12  In the 
case of Aparo, his death was ruled an accident until multiple sources at the 
prison forced the case to be reopened, at which point, it was discovered that 
he was likely gassed to death by prison guards.13  His fate was sealed when 
prison nurses refused to transport him to the hospital to receive life saving 
treatment.14  Conditions have become so outrageous in Florida prisons that 
convicted murderer, Richard Mair, hung himself in September 2013 leaving 
behind a suicide note, “accusing guards of sexually abusing inmates and 
forcing black and white inmates to fight each other for the entertainment of 
staff.”15  It has even been reported that if an inmate spoke about filing a 
complaint, the guards would threaten twenty-four hour cell confinement or 
issuance of inmate citations for infractions that were not actually 
committed.16 
II. INHUMANE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 
A. Matthew Walker 
Matthew Walker was an inmate at the Charlotte Correctional 
Institution in Punta Gorda, Florida when he was killed on Friday, April 11, 
9. Julie K. Brown, 3 More Florida Inmate Deaths Prompt 3 More 
Investigations, MIAMI HERALD (July 9, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/
article1974747.html [hereinafter Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt Investigations]. 
10. Julie K. Brown, Florida Prison System, Under Fire, Releases Data on 
Inmate Deaths, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
community/miami-dade/article2084652.html. 
11. Id. 
12. See id. 
13. Id. 
14. See id. 
15. See Julie K. Brown, Staff at a Miami-Dade Prison Tormented, Abused, 
Mentally Ill Inmates, Former Worker Says, MIAMI HERALD (May 19, 2014), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1964709.html 
[hereinafter Brown, Miami-Dade Prison Abused Inmates]. 
16. Id. 
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2014.17   Officers allegedly handcuffed Matthew Walker and beat him to 
death because he would not put away a magazine and a cup that he had in his 
cell.18  Even more appalling, Matthew Walker’s brutal murder at the hands of 
ten prison employees occurred while he was restrained in handcuffs. 19  
Officially, nine officers and a lieutenant were placed on leave pending 
investigation after the officers involved allegedly tried to cover up the crime 
by blaming Walker’s death on his cellmate. 20   In light of the incident 
involving Matthew Walker, former employees of the Charlotte Correctional 
Institution came forward to reveal the unsafe conditions of the facility.21  
Incredibly, Joe Facenda—a corrections officer at the facility—stated, “‘I 
came home, I [do not] know how many times, dumbfounded at what went on 
there . . . other officers telling you when, where, and how you can get away 
with roughing up an inmate.’”22 
B. Darren Rainey 
Darren Rainey was a fifty-year-old mentally ill inmate who “was 
placed in a small, enclosed, scalding-hot shower by guards and left 
unattended for more than an hour.  He collapsed and died amid the searing 
heat, suffering severe burns when he fell [with] his face up atop the drain.”23  
Astonishingly, Rainey was placed in the shower “with water temperature 
exceeding [one hundred and sixty] degrees as punishment for defecating in 
his cell.  He died in that shower with his skin peeling off, while he begged 
for help . . . .”24  An anonymous correctional officer at the Dade Correctional 
17. Lucas Seiler, Inmate at Troubled Prison Killed After Confrontation with 
Guards, NBC 2 (Apr. 18, 2014, 4:51 PM), http://www.nbc-2.com/story/25285565/inmate-
charlotte-county-correctional-institution-killed-matthew-walker [hereinafter Seiler, Inmate at 
Troubled Prison Killed After Confrontation with Guards]. 
18. Lucas Seiler, State Question CCI Staff About Prisoner Death, NBC 2 
(Apr. 22, 2014, 6:12 PM), http://www.nbc-2.com/story/25313044/state-question-cci-staff-
about-prisoner-death#.Vd8el7R4FUQ [hereinafter Seiler, State Question CCI Staff About 
Prisoner Death]. 
19. FDLE Investigating Another Inmate Death at CCI, NBC 2, 
http://www.nbc-2.com/story/25590023/fdle-investigating-another-inmate-death-at-charlotte-
correctional-institution#.Vd8ckbR4FUQ (last updated May 22, 2014). 
20. Seiler, Inmate at Troubled Prison Killed After Confrontation with Guards, 
supra note 17; Seiler, State Question CCI Staff About Prisoner Death, supra note 18. 
21. Seiler, Inmate at Troubled Prison Killed After Confrontation with Guards, 
supra note 17. 
22. Id. 
23. Brown, Miami-Dade Prison Abused Inmates, supra note 15. 
24. Nicole Flatow, Florida Inmate Reportedly Gassed to Death, Another 
Killed by Scalding Water, THINK PROGRESS (July 11, 2014, 12:07 PM), 
http://www.thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/07/11/3458959/florida-gassed-to-death-killed-by-
scalding-hot-water. 
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Institution stated that mental health unit guards repeatedly threaten trouble-
causing inmates with this shower treatment.25 
A medical document regarding Rainey’s death states that he suffered 
from a condition referred to as slippage where the skin is so dead that it 
shrivels away from the body.26  Florida Department of Corrections Secretary 
Michael Crews fired thirty-two guards in the wake of scrutiny given to 
inmate deaths across the state of Florida in recent years and specifically to 
the death of Rainey.27  In regards to situations like Walker and Rainey’s, 
Howard Simon, Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”) of Florida stated, “[t]hese revelations that are coming out are not 
about incompetence.  [They are] about guards killing people and public 
officials working feverishly to cover it up.”28  Jerry Cummings, the warden 
of the prison in which Rainey was held, is on paid administrative leave, 
while the two correctional officers involved in his suspected murder remain 
on the job in the facility.29  As of July 9, 2014, Darren Rainey’s family had 
still not been provided with an official cause of death.30 
Demanding justice for those unable to obtain justice alone, the 
Miami Herald has spent more than a year investigating prison abuses within 
the Florida Department of Corrections. 31   In particular, the newspaper 
reported that, “Rainey’s death nearly three years ago, along with subsequent 
stories about rampant inmate abuse as well as a record number of deaths in 
Florida’s prisons, has spawned demands for an overhaul of the Florida 
Department of Corrections.”32  These demands have yet to be met, but hopes 
remain high as individuals like Inspector General Jeffery Beasley fall under 
investigation “after four of his subordinates stated under oath this year that 
he asked them to sideline cases that would give the agency a black eye.”33 
25. Brown, Miami-Dade Prison Abused Inmates, supra note 15. 
26. Ashley Lopez, Miami Herald:  Allegations of Abuse of Mentally-Ill in 
Florida Prison, FLA. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (May 21, 2014), 
http://www.fcir.org/2014/05/21/miami-herald-allegations-of-abuse-of-mentally-ill-in-florida-
prison. 
27. 32 Florida Prison Guards Fired Amid Outrage Over Inmate Abuse, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2014, 1:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/21/
florida-prison-system-fir_n_5856354.html. 
28. Id. 
29. Editorial, Break the Silence, supra note 1. 
30. Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt Investigations, supra note 9. 
31. Julie K. Brown, Scalding-Shower Death in Dade Prison Prompts Federal 
Probe, MIAMI HERALD (May 19, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/special-reports/
florida-prisons/article21429693.html. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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III. ABUSE OF DISABLED PRISONERS 
A. Federal System 
The Department of Justice receives more than sixteen hundred 
complaints a year from inmates alleging discrimination on the basis of 
disability. 34   The most common allegations include “denial of access or 
unequal access to the facility’s programs and activities; lack of effective 
communication for inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing [as well as] those 
who are blind or have low vision; and denial of access to disability-related 
medical services and devices.”35  A vast majority of access complaints allege 
lack of accessible toilets, showers, and cells, along with steep floors that 
prevent disabled inmates from accessing areas like the dining hall or the 
library.36  Prisoners are also detrimentally prevented from participating in 
drug treatment programs required for parole eligibility if they are taking 
medication to treat mental illness, or they are excluded from obtaining a job, 
and thus unable to earn credits towards early release. 37   Effective 
communication complaints surround circumstances where prisoners are 
denied access to sign language interpreters, books on tape, large print, Braille 
reading materials, or extended length for telephone calls when using special 
devices to communicate with family.38  Finally, a large number of complaints 
are received upon denial of mandatory devices or equipment such as 
eyeglasses, hearing aids, wheelchairs, walkers, necessary medical equipment 
such as catheters or urine bags, prescribed orthopedic shoes, and necessary 
medications like insulin or seizure medication.39 
B. Florida System 
The Florida Department of Corrections has systematically generated 
an environment of fear and hopelessness among disabled prisoners.40  “For 
34. Justice Project Improves Conditions for People with Disabilities in 
Prisons and Jails, DISABILITY RTS. ONLINE NEWS (Aug. 11, 2008), http://www.ada.gov/
newsltr0208.htm. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Justice Project Improves Conditions for People with Disabilities in 
Prisons and Jails, supra note 34. 
40. Talila Lewis, Opinion, Other View:  Deaf Inmates Need to be Seen and 
Heard, SUN SENTINEL, May 1, 2013, at 10A. 
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any person who is deaf, prison is a horror.”41  Unfortunately, “[t]he abuse 
experienced by deaf prisoners housed in the Florida Department of 
Corrections defies imagination.”42   The Helping Educate to Advance the 
Rights of the Deaf (“HEARD”) organization runs the National Deaf and 
Deaf-Blind Prisoner Database, and for three years, the organization has been 
reporting extreme violence and sexual abuse against these vulnerable 
prisoners to the Governor, the Department of Corrections Secretary, the 
Office of the Inspector General, and the ADA Coordinator yet to no avail.43  
Being that deafness is one of the least understood and most neglected 
disabilities in prisons, such prisoners are “totally compromised . . . in the 
dangerous, treacherous environment of rape, abuse, and violence that 
characterizes most prisons.”44 
1. Elliott “Bud” Yorke 
Elliott “Bud” Yorke is a ninety-year-old deaf and non-verbal inmate 
at Florida’s Columbia Correctional Institution Annex at Lake City, who was 
placed in isolation for his own protection after showing signs of being 
assaulted.45  Even in solitary confinement Yorke wrote a letter to a friend 
stating, 
There are no grab and hold bars on [the] wall to help me up and 
down on [the] toilet.  They [will not] let my walker stay in my cell 
to help, [although] I am [a] solo occupant in this cell while [I am] 
in this present hell place.  At 13:10 [hours] on June 25, 2014, the 
confinement guard has taken my walker wheels.  He rode it out 
like a scooter with one knee on the seat.  It was parked outside my 
cell.  It has my jar of topical allergy skin salve under [the] seat, 
and I [can not] walk without a walker!!46 
Yorke has served close to thirty years in Florida for a sex offense 
and has been denied transfer to a prison that teaches American Sign 
Language.47  He has, however, been granted transfer to a facility better suited 
41. McCay Vernon, ADA Routinely Violated by Prisons in the Case of Deaf 
Prisoners, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, July 2009, at 14, http://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/
issues/07pln09.pdf. 
42. Lewis, supra note 40 (emphasis added). 
43. Id. 
44. Vernon, supra note 41. 
45. Adelyn Baxter, Ninety Years Old, Deaf, and in the Hole in a Florida 
Prison, SOLITARY WATCH (July 10, 2014), http://www.solitarywatch.com/2014/07/10/ninety-
years-old-deaf-hole-florida-prison. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
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for his age and disability, but due to limited availability, transferring is a 
lengthy process.48  Incredibly, Yorke will be forced to remain in solitary 
confinement throughout the remainder of the transfer process despite his 
vehement objections.49 
2. Richard Jackson 
Richard Jackson, an inmate suffering from partial paralysis of his 
lower limbs, was denied the use of a wheelchair inside of his cell in Santa 
Rosa.50  In lieu of using his wheelchair, Jackson was forced to drag himself 
between his bed and the toilet using only his hands and arms to assist him in 
navigating the cell.51  Even more astonishing, after filing a discrimination 
lawsuit, Jackson lost thirty pounds in one month from being beaten and 
having his food withheld as means of retaliation.52  Richard Jackson filed his 
second amended complaint with the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Florida in the Pensacola Division on March 26, 2014, 
naming Michael Crews as the Secretary of the Florida Department of 
Corrections, Richard Comerford, James White, Dr. Rummel, Marsha Nicols, 
Officer Locklear, and Does 1-8 as Defendants.53  The Complaint reiterates 
that when Jackson sought relief from the court, he was transferred to another 
prison facility where the staff welcomed him by retaliating against him for 
seeking justice.54   Final disposition of this matter is still pending as the 
Complaint was filed on March 26, 2014.55 
3. Complaints from Within 
George Mallinckrodt was a psychotherapist assigned to the Dade 
Correctional Institution Psychiatric Unit from 2008 through 2011.56   Dr. 
Mallinckrodt reported that guards “‘taunted, tormented, abused, beat, and 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Kathy M. Foster, ACLU of Florida and FJI Defend Disabled Man 
Subjected to Prison Abuse, FOSTER FOLLY NEWS (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.fosterfollynews.com/2014/04/02/aclu-of-florida-and-fji-defend-disabled-man-
subjected-to-prison-abuse. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Second Amended Complaint at 1, Jackson v. Crews, No. 3:13-CV-00174 
(N.D. Fla Mar. 3, 2014). 
54. Id. at 2. 
55. See id. at 1. 
56. Brown, Miami-Dade Prison Abused Inmates, supra note 15. 
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tortured chronically mentally ill inmates on a regular basis.’”57  Employees 
allege that guards shockingly “made sport of agitating the mentally ill 
inmates.” 58   Disability Rights Florida is an organization empowered by 
federal law to protect the rights of mentally ill individuals in Florida, 
including those confined by the State at Dade Correctional Institution.59  As 
such, they have filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against 
the Florida Department of Corrections and Wexford Health Sources for 
subjecting mentally ill prisoners to abuse and discrimination by correctional 
officers. 60   The lawsuit “alleges systematic and regular abuse and 
discrimination, including brutality, deprivation of food, and physical and 
verbal harassment by Dade C[orrectional] I[nstitution] correctional officers 
against inmates with serious mental illness.”61 
The Dade Correctional Institution has 176 Transitional Care Unit 
beds and twenty Crisis Stabilization Unit beds, with a majority of inmates 
residing in solitary confinement conditions.62  The complaint alleges that 
despite actual knowledge of the abuse of inmates in the inpatient mental 
health unit, correctional officials—including supervisors—have failed to take 
action to stop the abuse of inmates including the scalding hot shower 
treatment, physical beatings, deprivation of food, physical harassment, and 
verbal harassment. 63   Notwithstanding numerous verbal and written 
complaints to prison officials and to the Florida Department of Corrections 
Inspector General’s office from former treatment staff as well as inmates—
including the deaths of two inmates on the Dade Correctional Institution 
inpatient unit within the past two years—defendant Michael D. Crews failed 
to rectify the deplorable behavior.64  Moreover, Wexford supervisory staff at 
Dade Correctional Institution not only failed to investigate or report the 
allegations of abuse, but they did not even attempt to stop the abuse.65 
Specific allegations include a psychological counselor’s termination 
in 2011 after he “reported several instances of physical abuse by correctional 
officers on inmates in the Dade [Correctional Institutions];” all of which 
57. Id. 
58. Id.; Lopez, supra note 26. 
59. Complaint at 1, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. v. Crews, No. 1:14-CV-23323 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2014). 
60. Id. at 1–2. 
61. Press Release, Disability Rights Fla., Department of Corrections Sued 
over Inmate Abuse at the Dade Correctional Institute (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/newsroom/story/department_of_corrections_sued_over
_inmate_abuse_at_the_dade_correctional_i. 
62. Complaint at 5–6, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323). 
63. Id. at 6–7. 
64. Id. at 7–8. 
65. Id. at 8. 
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were ignored.66  The complaint also details the incidents leading up to the 
death of Darren Rainey, including the horrific detail that he was found dead 
lying in the shower with burns over ninety percent of his body.67  It is further 
alleged that despite the number of abuse allegations, none of the inmates 
referenced in the grievances were ever interviewed.68  The complaint even 
identifies two living inmates, D.G. and M.A.—both suffering from serious 
mental illness and a diagnosis of schizophrenia—who were subjected to the 
shower treatment, in addition to various other brutal physical attacks.69 
Richard Mair is additionally listed within the complaint.70  Mr. Mair 
was an inmate at Dade Correctional Institution until he committed suicide on 
September 11, 2013 after multiple suicide attempts—including ingestion of 
batteries and razor blades—due to his major depressive disorder.71  After 
making several allegations of physical and mental abuse by correctional 
staff, Mair left a note in his cell indicating that he committed suicide in part 
because of the continual abuse against him by the correctional staff. 72  
Incredibly, when the Florida Department of Corrections Inspector General’s 
office reopened review of Darren Rainey’s death, it was only on whether the 
shower was functioning properly and did not address the wide spread abuse 
of mentally ill inmates.73 
Counts one and two of the complaint allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 against Michael D. Crews in his official capacity as the Secretary of the 
Department of Corrections and Wexford Health Sources, Inc.74  The Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution mandates that reasonable 
measures be taken to guarantee the safety of inmates by ensuring humane 
conditions of confinement, preventing use of excessive force against inmates, 
and ensuring that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and 
medical care.75  Finally, count three alleges violations of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act as well as the Rehabilitation Act.76  Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 
66. Id. 
67. Complaint at 8–9, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323). 
68. Id. at 10. 
69. Id. at 11–12. 
70. Id. at 12. 
71. Id. 
72. Complaint at 12, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323). 
73. Id. at 13–14. 
74. Id. at 2–3, 15–16; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
75. Complaint at 15–16, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323); see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
76. Complaint at 18, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323); see 
also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)–(b) (2012). 
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12131 and § 12132 prohibit disability-based discrimination by any public 
entity.77 
IV. REMEDIES FOR PRISONERS 
A. Administrative Remedies 
Section 944.331 of the Florida Statutes mandates the creation of an 
inmate grievance procedure in the state of Florida.78  The entirety of the 
statute states, “[t]he department shall establish by rule an inmate grievance 
procedure that must conform to the Minimum Standards for Inmate 
Grievance Procedures as promulgated by the United States Department of 
Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e).  The department’s office of general 
counsel shall oversee the grievance procedures established by the 
department.”79   Florida has developed such a procedure through Florida 
Administrative Code Rule 33-103.80  This procedure is in place to provide 
inmates with a channel for the administrative settlement of a claim against 
the facility of incarceration.81  The Bureau of Policy Management and Inmate 
Appeals not only address such grievances, but the division is also responsible 
for developing a standardized grievance plan to be implemented by the 
Bureau of Staff Development in training employees.82 
Importantly, inmates are required to utilize the informal grievance 
process before initiating a formal grievance, except in the case of an 
emergency grievance, medical grievance, or grievance alleging violations of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act. 83   Inmates are instructed to place 
informal grievances in a designated lock box, which will then be distributed 
to the staff member in charge of the problem area—after it is logged into the 
system, which is then required to provide a response.84  The inmate must 
indicate that Form DC6-236 is being used as an informal grievance in order 
to meet the requirement of proper filing necessary prior to the submission of 
a formal grievance.85  Upon completion of the informal grievance process, an 
inmate can file a formal grievance by completing Form DC1-303 Request for 
77. Complaint at 18, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132. 
78. FLA. STAT. § 944.331 (2014). 
79. Id. 
80. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-103.001–.019 (2015). 
81. Id. r. 33-103.001. 
82. Id. r. 33-103.001, .003. 
83. Id. r. 33-103.005. 
84. Id. r. 33-103.005(a)–(b). 
85. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 22-103.605(2)(b). 
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Administrative Remedy or Appeal and submitting it to the warden.86  If a 
formal grievance is found to be an emergency, action to alleviate must be 
taken and a formal response must be provided to the inmate within fifteen 
calendar days.87  Alternatively, if an emergency is not found, the inmate must 
be notified of the non-emergent status within seventy-two hours of receipt.88  
In the event that an inmate is not satisfied with the outcome of the grievance 
procedure, there is also an appeals process in place that the inmate can 
utilize.89 
B. Civil Remedies 
1. Section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes 
Section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes addresses waiver of sovereign 
immunity in tort actions, stating specifically that, “the state, for itself and for 
its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability 
for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act.”90  Importantly, 
[t]he state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort 
claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not include 
punitive damages or interest for the period before judgment.  
Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to 
pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the 
sum of [two hundred thousand dollars] or any claim or judgment, 
or portions thereof, which, when totaled with all other claims or 
judgments paid by the state or its agencies or subdivisions arising 
out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the sum of [three 
hundred thousand dollars].91 
This limit on the liability of the Department of Corrections as an 
agency or subdivision of the State of Florida allows prison officials to 
commit heinous crimes—including brutal murders—against inmates with a 
two hundred thousand dollar cap on civil liability in state court.92  This is 
utterly outrageous.  Heightened financial liability against the Department of 
Corrections would likely lead to an increase in accountability and a decrease 
86. Id. r. 33-103.006(1). 
87. Id. r. 33-103.006(3)(a)(3). 
88. Id. r. 33-103.006(3)(a)(4). 
89. Id. r. 33-103.007(1). 
90. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (2014). 
91. Id. § 768.28(5) (emphasis added). 
92. See id. § 768.28; Seiler, State Question CCI Staff About Prisoner Death, 
supra note 18. 
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in inmate brutality at the hands of prison officials.93   As it stands, it is 
possible to seek punitive damages in Florida state courts for the wrongful 
death of an animal—for example, a pet rabbit—yet not possible to do the 
same in when an inmate is viscously murdered at the hands of a prison 
guard.94 
2. Prison Litigation Reform Act 42 U.S.C. § 1997e 
Due to caps placed on recoverability based on state sovereign 
immunity, civil lawsuits brought against the state or its subdivisions for 
actions arising out of publically run prison facilities do not yield just 
results. 95   As a result of this injustice, civil lawsuits filed on behalf of 
prisoners against state entities regulating incarceration facilities are often 
brought under the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with limitations pursuant to the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act.96  Unfortunately, the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
makes it seemingly difficult for prisoners to file lawsuits in federal court, 
primarily by mandating that all administrative remedies be exhausted, which 
includes taking every single step in the particular facility’s grievance 
process.97  Pertinently, this statute provides that, “[n]o action shall be brought 
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 
[f]ederal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”98  
Additionally, the following physical injury requirement must be satisfied for 
a claim to be ripe under the Prison Litigation Reform Act:  “No [f]ederal 
civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody 
93. See Barnini Chakraborty, Florida Prison System Under Fire Amid 
Allegations of Abuse, Fatal Shower Scalding, FOX NEWS (Apr. 9, 2015), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/04/09/florida-prison-system-under-scrutiny-as-
lawmakers-fight-to-keep-feds-out-and. 
94. See FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5); Nathan J. Winograd et al., Damages for 
Death or Injury of an Animal, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND (Feb. 2001), http://www.aldf.org/
resources/when-your-companion-animal-has-been-harmed/damages-for-death-or-injury-of-an-
animal. 
95. See Complaint at 17, Land v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:14-CV-00347-
WS-CAS (N.D. Fla. July 7, 2014); infra Section IV.B. 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012); see also Complaint at 1–2, Disability Rights 
Fla., Inc. v. Crews, No. 1:14-CV-23323 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2014) (bringing a suit against the 
Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of mentally ill inmates that 
suffered abuse and discrimination). 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), ACLU, 
http://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/images/asset_upload_file79_25805.pdf (last updated 
Nov. 2002). 
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
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without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual 
act—as defined in [§] 2246 of [T]itle 18.”99 
Finally, in accord with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, all prisoners must pay the 
filing fees in full without exception.100  It is, however, permissible to pay the 
filing fee over time in monthly increments taken directly from the prisoner’s 
commissary account. 101   Importantly, punitive damages are recoverable 
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which is why—despite the detailed 
pre-suit requirements—filing suit in federal court is far superior to filing suit 
in state court, in terms of remedies.102 
C. Punitive Damages 
In addition to the availability of punitive damages in federal court 
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the increase in privatization of state 
prison facilities has opened the possibility of suits against companies like the 
GEO Group.103  Instances of egregious abusive behavior towards Florida 
inmates can be rectified through punitive damages if an inmate is lucky 
enough to be housed in a privately operated prison facility.104  For example, 
Roy Hyatt was awarded $1.2 Million as a result of the way he was treated at 
South Bay Correctional Facility.105  Hyatt was awarded one million dollars 
for pain and suffering after being blinded in one eye when another inmate 
threw boiling water in his face.106  The incident resulted from private prison 
company, GEO Group, allowing inmates in the South Bay Correctional 
Facility unfettered access to microwaves in their cellblocks.107 
99. Id. § 1997e(e). 
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2012); The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 
supra note 97. 
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), supra 
note 97. 
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (allowing inmates to file an action for prison 
conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or any other federal law, as long as available 
administrative remedies are exhausted); FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (2014) (establishing that 
punitive damages shall not be included in the liability of the state and its agencies and 
subdivision for tort claims). 
103. See Jane Musgrave, Injured Inmate Awarded 1.2 Million; Prison Firm 
Was Wrong to Give Access to Microwave, Jury Says, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 14, 2012, at 
B.1.; Florida Prisoner Awarded $1.2 Million for Burn Injuries, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, June 
2014, at 13, http://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/issues/06pln14.corrected2.pdf. 
104. See Musgrave, supra note 103. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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On August 28, 2007, Roy Hyatt was watching football on television 
in the dayroom of his unit at the South Bay Correctional Facility. 108  
Following an argument with Hyatt, fellow inmate Rodney Smith used a 
microwave to boil a container of water, which he then threw on Hyatt 
causing first and second-degree burns to around thirty percent of Hyatt’s 
body.109  The incident also resulted in the loss of the use of one of Hyatt’s 
eyes.110  Such negligent behavior—arguably far less negligent than murder 
committed at the hands of prison employees—warranted a jury finding of 
over a million dollars to restore justice to Hyatt.111 
V. WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 
Accountability is maintained in private and public Florida entities 
alike through whistleblowers that bring fraud, misconduct, and corruption to 
light.112  In addition to the aforementioned horrors that have been exposed in 
publicly run incarceration facilities, “[t]ens of thousands of inmates 
nationwide are housed in privately run prisons.”113  “The operators of those 
facilities—Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”), the GEO Group 
(“GEO”), and Management and Training Corporation (“MTC”)—are all for-
profit entities.”114  Like most for-profit businesses, the private prison industry 
needs to turn a profit to satisfy investors. 115   Studies show that such 
necessities sometimes lead to cutting corners, over billing, or inadequate 
staffing.116  “Each of [these] . . . scenarios are ideal for whistleblowers in . . . 
states that have enacted a false claims law.”117 
Florida law relating to whistleblower protection is codified in section 
448.102 of the Florida Statutes, which governs private whistleblower 
108. Florida Prisoner Awarded $1.2 Million for Burn Injuries, supra note 103. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Musgrave, supra note 103, see also Seiler, Inmate at Troubled Prison 
Killed After Confrontation with Guards, supra note 17. 
112. Nathan A. Adams IV, Distinguishing Chicken Little from Bona Fide 
Whistleblowers, 83 FLA. B. J. 100, 100 (2009). 
113. Corrections Corp of America Settles Claims — Whistleblower Post, 
MAHANY & ERTL (Feb. 17, 2014, 3:02 PM), http://www.mahanyertl.com/mahanyertl/2014/
corrections-corp-america-settles-claims-whistleblower-post; see also Musgrave, supra note 
103; Florida Prisoner Awarded $1.2 Million for Burn Injuries, supra note 103. 
114. Corrections Corp of America Settles Claims — Whistleblower Post, supra 
note 113. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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protection and section 112.3187 of the Florida Statutes, which governs 
public officers and employees.118   
The legislative intent behind section 112.3187 of the Florida Statute 
is stated within the statute as, 
It is the intent of the Legislature to prevent agencies or 
independent contractors from taking retaliatory action against an 
employee who reports to an appropriate agency violations of law 
on the part of a public employer or independent contractor that 
create a substantial and specific danger to the public’s health, 
safety, or welfare.  It is further the intent of the Legislature to 
prevent agencies or independent contractors from taking retaliatory 
action against any person who discloses information to an 
appropriate agency alleging improper use of governmental office, 
gross waste of funds, or any other abuse or gross neglect of duty 
on the part of an agency, public officer, or employee.119 
“To state a claim under the private Florida Whistleblower Act,” the 
employee must prove that the employee, 
1) disclosed or threatened to disclose to an agency under oath and 
in writing; 2) an activity, policy, or practice of his or her employer; 
3) that was in violation of law, rule, or regulation; 4) that the 
employer retaliated against his or her because of the disclosure or 
threat to disclose; and 5) he or she had given written notice to the 
employer of its activity, policy, or practice; 6) thereby giving the 
employer reasonable opportunity to correct the activity, policy, or 
practice.120 
The most important distinction between the Florida laws regulating 
public and private entities is that “a public employee may state a claim under 
the act” so long as they believe that the actions of the public employer are 
illegal, while a private employee must actually “prove [that the] conduct is 
illegal.”121  Furthermore, a private employee is required to give notice under 
oath, while a public employee can give notice in any form “as long as [the 
notice] is written and signed.”122  Based on the publically known instances of 
horrific inmate abuse within Florida prisons, it is clear that public and 
118. Compare FLA. STAT. § 448.102 (2014), with FLA. STAT. § 112.3187 
(2014). 
119. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(2). 
120. Adams IV, supra note 112, at 100 (quoting Taylor v. Mem’l Health Sys., 
Inc., 770 So. 2d 752, 753–54 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). 
121. See id. 
122. Id. 
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privately operated facilities alike are ripe for whistleblowers with the ability 
to meet the criteria under either Florida Statute.123 
VI. INVOCATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN FLORIDA 
PRISONS 
“The [Whistleblower Protection Act] protects federal employees 
from retaliation after reporting a wrongdoing.”124  “Whistleblowers may not 
be transferred, denied a raise, have their hours reduced, be fired, or be 
punished in any other way because they have exercised any right afforded to 
them under the law.”125  “[A] whistleblower must have ‘original source’ 
information of a fraud involving a government-funded project.”126  Because 
of the nature of the relationship between privately operated incarceration 
facilities and the federal government, “a private prison facility . . . [can] be 
the subject of a federal whistleblower [investigation].” 127   Despite the 
presence of legislation to support, if not encourage, those aware of 
wrongdoing to come forward, Florida prison employees have nevertheless 
been retaliated against.128  John Pisciotta filed suit in 2011 against the Florida 
Department of Corrections for “back pay, reinstatement of his job, damages, 
and attorney fees” under Florida’s whistleblower act.129  On May 21, 2008, 
“[Pisciotta] was one of eight guards involved in the cell extraction of 
[inmate] Kelly Bradley” that left “Bradley’s eye . . . hanging from its 
socket.”130  Bradley was an inmate at Charlotte Correctional Institution and 
“Pisciotta was the only prison employee to report that [fellow] guard, 
William . . . Wilson”, was responsible for the catastrophic injuries sustained 
by Bradley.131  Pisciotta was not praised for his strength; rather, the Florida 
Department of Corrections retaliated against him by falsifying an incident of 
abuse.132 
123. See FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3187(5), 448.102(1–3); Crystal Shepeard, After 
Horrific Death in Florida Prison, Investigator is Denied Whistleblower Protection, CARE2 
(July 20, 2014, 11:30 A.M.), http://www.care2.com/causes/after-horrific-death-in-florida-
prison-investigator-is-denied-whistleblower-protection.html. 
124. Shepeard, supra note 123. 
125. Id. 
126. Corrections Corp of America Settles Claims — Whistleblower Post, supra 
note 113. 
127. Id. 
128. See Former Florida Prison Guard Sues for Reinstatement Under 
Whistleblower Act, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 2011, at 34, http://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
media/issues/10pln11.pdf. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. See id. 
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A. Randall Jordan-Aparo 
Randall Jordan-Aparo was a Florida inmate who was “gassed to 
death in his cell over the course of five hours.”133  “Aparo . . . was serving 
[eighteen] months . . . at Franklin Correctional Institution in Carabelle, 
Florida [for check fraud].”134  After denying Aparo’s requests for medical 
treatment, “he threatened to report [the guards] for [medical] neglect,” at 
which point, “they placed him in solitary confinement.”135  He remained in 
solitary confinement until he subsequently died five days later after guards 
repeatedly sprayed gas into his cell, which led to his ultimate suffocation.136  
“In the hours before his death, he pleaded with the guards and . . . prison[] 
nurses to take him to the hospital because he [could not] breathe.”137  “When 
his body was found, he was coated in yellow residue, his face was pressed up 
against the bottom of the steel door and a Bible was next to his head.”138  
While investigating common allegations of prison corruption, Florida 
Department of Corrections inspector, Aubrey Land, found that Randall 
Jordan-Aparo “was the victim of force or discipline made either maliciously 
or sadistically for the purpose of causing harm and for retaliation for 
threatening to bring a lawsuit.”139  Land is of the impression that Aparo 
“never made it home because they let him [just] lay there and die.”140 
B. Land v. Florida Department of Corrections Complaint 
Following the death of Randall Jordan-Aparo, Florida Department of 
Corrections inspector Aubrey Land and other colleagues were denied 
whistleblower status and faced retaliation as a result of exposing the brutal 
death.141  Despite thirty-five years of experience in the industry, Aubrey 
Land was shocked by the events that unfolded involving Aparo. 142   In 
addition to the denial of whistleblower protection as a means of retaliation, 
Land and his colleagues were the subject of an internal affairs investigation 
133. Flatow, supra note 24; see also Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt 
Investigations, supra note 9. 
134. Shepeard, supra note 123. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt Investigations, supra note 9. 
138. Id. 
139. Flatow, supra note 24. 
140. Id. 
141. Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt Investigations, supra note 9; Shepeard, 
supra note 123. 
142. Shepeard, supra note 123. 
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based on false and unwarranted allegations. 143   After being denied 
whistleblower status, Florida’s Chief Inspector General, Melinda Miguel, 
referred them to the State Commission on Human Relations to file a 
complaint against their boss, Florida Department of Corrections Inspector 
General Jeffery Beasley.144  As a result, Aubrey Land, David Clark, Doug 
Glisson, and John Ulm filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Florida against the Florida Department of 
Corrections as well as other defendants in their individual capacities.145 
Aubrey Land, Doug Glisson, and John Ulm were acting within the 
course and scope of their employment while investigating a variety of prison 
guard misconduct at Franklin Correctional Institute.146  During the Kassidy 
Hill investigation, the Plaintiffs became aware of the aforementioned 
situation regarding Randall Jordan-Aparo.147  Throughout their investigation, 
the investigators obtained “evidence that inmate Aparo died as a result of 
force or discipline made either maliciously or sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm by the [Florida Department of Corrections] 
employees in retaliation for Aparo threatening to sue Defendant Florida 
Department of Corrections for Florida Department of Correction’s failure to 
take Aparo to a hospital for treatment.” 148   Such evidence included 
statements from inmates as well as video and audio footage shot on the date 
of Aparo’s death showing that he was in extreme physical danger in 
conditions that were not properly documented in the 2010 Aparo Death 
Investigation; in fact, such conditions were completely falsified within the 
report.149  The Complaint additionally alleges “that Lieutenant Austin . . . 
caused Sergeant James Hamm to sign a Use of Force Report [that] both 
[officers] knew [was] [blatantly] false.”150 
Furthermore, this report failed to mention that Aparo suffered from a 
rare lung disease that had previously confined him to the infirmary and that 
the use of chemical agents leading to Aparo’s death was cruel and unusual 
punishment within the confines of the Eighth Amendment.151  In the end, 
“[A]paro was left to suffocate in his contaminated cell without medical 
intervention for approximately five hours and his death pose indicated his 
143. Id. 
144. Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt Investigations, supra note 9. 
145. Complaint at 1, Land v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:14-CV-00347-WS-CAS 
(N.D. Fla. July 7, 2014). 
146. Id. at 9. 
147. Id. at 9–10. 
148. Id. at 10. 
149. Id. at 10–13. 
150. Complaint at 11, Land (No. 4:14-CV-00347-WS-CAS). 
151. U.S. CONST. amend VIII; Complaint at 11, Land (No. 4:14-CV-00347-ws-
cas). 
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mouth and nose were lodged in the small gap in the door of his isolation unit, 
attempting to breathe.”152 
Based on principles of sovereign immunity granted to the Florida 
Department of Corrections as well as the Inspector General of the State of 
Florida, the Plaintiffs in this suit solely sought whistleblower protection 
including injunctive relief preventing continuance of retaliation in the form 
of false and unfounded internal affairs complaints. 153   In terms of the 
Complaint against Defendants Beasley, Sumpter, Miguel, and Case, the 
Plaintiffs sought “all compensatory damages allowable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
1983” for retaliation against the Plaintiffs for disclosing “matters of 
substantial public concern” in violation of the First Amendment and the 
Petition Clause.154 
On March 4, 2015, the Northern District Court of Florida granted the 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint—as 
to Plaintiffs Aubrey Land, David Clark, Doug Glisson, John Ulm, and James 
Padgett—with prejudice for failure to state a claim under the First 
Amendment.155 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Lack of criminal prosecution of offending employees, limited civil 
liability for prisoners in state courts, and denial of whistleblower protection 
serve as the framework for the travesty that is the current Florida prison 
system.156 
Interestingly, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, 
Michael D. Crews, issued a Press Release on August 20, 2014, in response to 
the media coverage of recent inmate deaths in Florida facilities.157  Secretary 
Crews specifically announced the expansion of Crisis Intervention Training 
programs that will teach correctional officers the right and wrong ways to 
handle inmates suffering from mental illness.158  Perhaps most importantly, 
he announced that the Florida Department of Corrections would be 
“developing a clear and consistent policy that will outline the initiation of 
disciplinary action up to and including dismissal against any employee 
152. Id. at 13. 
153. Id. at 17–18. 
154. Id. at 18–19; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
155. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 16, Land v. Fla. Dep’t 
of Corr., No. 4:14-CV-00347-WS-CAS (N.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2015). 
156. See supra Section IV.B., Part VI. 
157. Press Release, Michael Crews, Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Everything We 
Do Is Moving Us Down a Path Toward Safer Facilities and a Safer Florida (Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/secretary/press/2014/08-20-Crews.html. 
158. Id. 
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whose conduct violates any criminal statute.”159  Promisingly, a criminal 
conviction will not be a condition precedent to enforcement of disciplinary 
action.160  Finally, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement has been 
granted full investigative authority on the eighty-two non-natural deaths 
currently being investigated by FDOC inspectors.161 
While it appears that the Florida Department of Corrections has 
developed good intentions in the wake of the media attack highlighting 
inmate brutality, planning and implementation are very different concepts.162  
For the Florida prison system to rise up out of the ashes, Florida Department 
of Corrections insiders must be afforded whistleblower protection.163  Denial 
of whistleblower protection to Aubrey Land, David Clark, Doug Glisson, and 
John Ulm, in regards to the Randall Jordan-Aparo case, represents the height 
of the Florida prison problem.164  In addition to the Plaintiffs listed in the 
Land Complaint, a Florida Department of Corrections probation officer was 
also denied protection upon report of suspicious aspects of Aparo’s death 
before being fired for absenteeism.165  To ensure unfettered access to the 
statistics and details of inmates who die within prison walls from unnatural 
causes, the Florida Department of Corrections must do more than issue a 
press release.166 
As stated by American Civil Liberties Union of Florida 
spokesperson Baylor Johnson, “‘[t]he only way to fix the toxic culture in the 
Department of Corrections is to hold people responsible for their actions—
including criminal charges for criminal behavior.’”167  Johnson further warns 
that any future regulation will only be effective if enforced by “people 
committed to rigorous oversight and capable of resisting political 
pressure.”168  Perhaps most importantly, as eyewitnesses to the interworking 
of the Florida prison system, public and private corrections employees must 
be guaranteed protection under the Florida Whistleblower Protection 
statutes—to the extent that their conduct qualifies—to create a system of 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Press Release, Michael Crews, supra note 157. 
163. See Shepeard, supra note 123; supra Part VI. 
164. See Complaint at 7–9, Land v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:14-CV-00347-
WS-CAS (N.D. Fla. July 7, 2014). 
165. Gary Fineout, Report:  Scott’s Top Inspector Told About Cover-Up, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 26, 2014. 
166. See Press Release, Michael Crews, supra note 157. 
167. Chakraborty, supra note 93. 
168. Id. 
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accountability free from appalling abuse and violations of fundamental 
constitutional rights of Florida inmates.169 
169. See FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3187, 448.102 (2014). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled in this survey year on two very 
important cases arising from the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2012 
opinion in Miller v. Alabama,1 which held unconstitutional the “sentencing 
scheme[s] . . . mandat[ing] life in prison without [the] possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders.”2  A series of Florida intermediate appellate court cases 
followed during this survey year, applying the Florida holdings as to Miller.3  
The Florida appellate courts continued to rule on a number of issues involving 
dependency and termination of parental rights (“TPR”), focusing in large part 
on rudimentary violations of procedural due process by the trial courts.4  In the 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of 
Law.  This Survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 
2015.  The author thanks research assistants Michael Costello, Andree Quaresima, and Samantha 
Scheff and Research and References Services Librarian, Rob Beharriell, for their assistance in 
writing this Survey. 
1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
2. Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 960 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2469); Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 394 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469). 
3. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 958; Horsley, 160 So. 3d 
at 394, 397. 
4. See Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 566, 569–70 
(Fla. 1991); Dep’t of Children & Families v. T.S., 154 So. 3d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2015). 
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delinquency area, restitution is a common dispositional alternative.5  There, the 
appellate courts have on a number of occasions been obligated to reverse trial 
court decisions for improperly applying the restitution statute.6 
Finally, and most importantly, the decades long shortcomings in the 
Florida dependency system—based in significant part on the lack of 
representation of children by lawyers, and the failure of Florida’s Guardian ad 
Litem (“GAL”) Program to both adequately and properly carry out its statutory 
role despite massive funding—have yet again remained a very serious problem 
during this survey year.7 
II. DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 
In dependency proceedings, there must be competent and substantial 
evidence to form a basis for a finding of dependency.8  Thus, a mother’s 
homelessness and unemployment, standing alone, are insufficient to support a 
finding of prospective harm or neglect in a situation where the mother has not 
previously rejected services offered under Florida law, according to the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal in E.R. v. Department of Children & Families.9 
In N.J. v. Department of Children & Families (In re Interest of 
A.W.J.),10 the Second District Court of Appeal reversed a finding of dependency 
premised upon a head injury to a child.11  The only individual who testified at 
the adjudicatory hearing that the child’s head injury was the result of abuse was 
a medical doctor.12  However, first, the doctor was not asked whether she could 
provide her opinion within a reasonable degree of medical probability and, 
second, the doctor’s opinion of abuse was not substantiated by record evidence 
but was simply a subjective opinion, which was thus not legally sufficient to 
support the trial court’s adjudication of dependency.13 
                                                 
5. See L.W. v. State, 163 So. 3d 598, 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.D. v. 
State, 152 So. 3d 798, 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); C.W. v. State, 150 So. 3d 882, 883 (Fla. 
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
6. See FLA. STAT. § 985.437(2) (2014); L.W., 163 So. 3d at 601; A.D., 152 So. 
3d at 799; C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883. 
7. See Michael J. Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, 39 NOVA L. REV. 37, 62–
63 (2014) [hereinafter Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law]; Michael J. Dale & Louis M. 
Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights 
Proceedings in Florida:  The Issue Updated, 35 NOVA L. REV. 305, 310, 329–31 (2011) 
[hereinafter Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children]; infra Section V.B. 
8. J.A.B. v. State, 148 So. 3d 151, 151–52 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
9. 143 So. 3d 1131, 1133, 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  See generally 
FLA. STAT. ch. 39. 
10. 143 So. 3d 1109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
11. Id. at 1110–11. 
12. Id. at 1111. 
13. Id. at 1111–12. 
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In Department of Children & Families v. T.S.,14 the intermediate 
appellate court reversed on a more fundamental ground.15  The Department and 
the child appealed the dismissal of a petition for dependency and arraignment, 
arguing that the trial court had committed a fundamental error violating a 
child’s due process rights by dismissing the petition without notice or an 
opportunity to be heard.16  Recognizing the basic due process violation 
involving notice and an opportunity to be heard, the appellate court reversed.17 
Case plans are an important part of dependency proceedings resulting, 
as they do, from the implementation of the federal Child Abuse Protection and 
Treatment Act, commonly known as CAPTA.18  In M.P. v. Department of 
Children & Families,19 the appellate court noted that generic case plans that do 
not relate to the individual needs and circumstances of the particular family are 
in violation of section 39.603 of the Florida Statutes.20  In the case at bar, there 
being no evidence of the father’s use of drugs, a case plan that ordered the 
father to submit to random drug screenings as part of the case plan constituted 
reversible error.21  A similar result occurred in M.B.W. v. Department of 
Children & Families (In re Interest of M.W.).22  In that dependency case, the 
Department conceded error in part as tasks were required beyond a parenting 
class, which had no relationship to the dependency as to the father.23 
The issue of nexus—the tie between a parent’s problem and risk of 
danger to the children—has perplexed the Florida dependency courts for almost 
twenty-five years since the Supreme Court of Florida decided Padgett v. 
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services24 in 1991.25  In E.H. v. 
Department of Children & Families,26 the appellate court affirmed the trial court 
finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
imminent abuse to a child in a dependency case.27  In E.H., there were incidents 
of domestic violence, unemployment with an eviction from the home, and a 
mother with a mental health issue that had gone untreated, which was 
responsible for her previous child being removed from her care after she heard 
                                                 
14. 154 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
15. Id. at 1224. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 1226. 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 622 (2012). 
19. 159 So. 3d 341 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
20. Id. at 343–44; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.603(1)(f) (2014). 
21. M.P., 159 So. 3d at 344. 
22. 163 So. 3d 1229 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
23. Id. at 1229. 
24. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991). 
25. Id. at 570–71; Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 60–61. 
26. 147 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
27. Id. at 620–21. 
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voices encouraging her to shake that child.28  In E.H., the appellate court 
established that the mother’s failure to recognize her mood disorder and her lack 
of participation in services, along with multiple domestic violence incidents 
between the mother and the father where the mother continued to engage in the 
relationship with the father despite the parent-involved nature of their 
relationship, constituted evidence of a substantial risk of imminent abuse to the 
child.29 
An important technical procedural issue was before the First District 
Court of Appeal in W.W. v. Guardian ad Litem Program.30  The issue was 
whether an order entered on a post-dependency motion seeking relief fully 
resolving the issues that were raised in the motion is reviewed by appeal rather 
than writ.31  Applying a recent amendment to Rule 9.130(a)(4) of the Florida 
Rules of Appellate Procedure,32 the appellate court concluded that orders 
entered on post-dependency motions seeking relief that fully resolve the issues 
raised in the motion are to be viewed as final orders under the appellate rule.33 
Cases involving immigrant children are becoming more commonplace 
in the Florida dependency courts as a result of the influx of such children 
nationally.34  In In re Y.V.,35 a private petition for dependency was filed on 
behalf of a minor “living in Florida after illegally emigrating alone from 
Honduras.”36  The petition was dismissed by the trial court because the harm 
relating to the dependency took place outside of Florida, and “the court viewed 
the petition as an attempt to circumvent federal immigration law[].”37  The 
appellate court reversed, finding that there was jurisdiction and that Florida 
                                                 
28. Id. at 617. 
29. Id. at 620–21; see also W.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 137 So. 3d 
1078, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that substantial evidence of harm to one child 
alone was not sufficient evidence to find substantial risk of imminent abuse to another child); 
E.M.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 795 So. 2d 183, 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(finding that a substantial risk of harm can be met without past acts of harm where a mental 
illness is the type that would impact the parent’s “judgment and ability to perform basic daily 
caretaking tasks”). 
30. 159 So. 3d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
31. Id. 
32. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 2014 WL 
5714099, at *7–8 (Fla. Nov. 6, 2014) (specifying the amendment to Rule 9.130(a)(4)). 
33. Id.; W.W., 159 So. 3d at 1000–01. 
34. See, e.g., WENDI J. ADELSON, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS IN 
FLORIDA: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CHILD ADVOCATES 5, 7 (2007), 
http://media.law.miami.edu/clinics/children-and-youth/pdf/2007/special-immigrant-juvenile-
manual-2007.pdf. 
35. 160 So. 3d 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
36. Id. at 577. 
37. Id. 
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dependency law applies.38  Although the appellate court reversed, it did note 
that “the trial court [was] not alone in its misgivings about the use of the 
dependency [proceedings] as a conduit to achiev[e] a favorable immigration 
status.”39  The appellate court also pointed to two provisions in chapter 39 of the 
Florida Statutes that applied to this child:  abandonment, abuse or neglect by the 
parent and having no parent capable of providing supervision and care.40  The 
appellate court then noted that the only reason the child was not in imminent 
risk of injury was because there is a responsible adult caring for the child on a 
voluntary basis.41 
Domestic violence can be the source of dependency court jurisdiction.42 
 Issues of domestic violence can also arise in the context of petitions to protect 
and against domestic violence pursuant to section 741.30 of the Florida 
Statutes.43  In Hair v. Hair,44 the appellate court reversed and remanded the trial 
court’s decision with instructions to vacate a final judgment of injunction for 
protection.45  The appellate court found that the petitioner did not possess 
“sufficient evidence that she was a victim of domestic violence or was in 
imminent danger [to become] a victim” as provided in the Florida Statutes.46  
Specifically, it found that the daughter did not wish to see or interact with her 
mother and that was not a basis for the issuance of a domestic violence 
restraining order.47 
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Under Florida law, the petitioner must prove: first, that there are 
statutory grounds for termination of parental rights; second, that termination is 
in the “manifest best interest of the child;” and third, that termination is the least 
restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm.48  In B.K. v. 
Department of Children & Families,49 the appellate court addressed the 
application of the three standards in a case in which the father was 
                                                 
38. Id. at 581. 
39. Id. at 579, 581. 
40. In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 578; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(a), (e) (2014). 
41. In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 579. 
42. See Michael J. Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33 NOVA L. REV. 
357, 357 (2009). 
43. FLA. STAT. § 741.30. 
44. 159 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
45. Id. at 986. 
46. Id. at 985; see also FLA. STAT. § 741.30. 
47. Hair, 159 So. 3d at 985. 
48. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.806, .810; Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 
So. 2d 565, 570–71 (Fla. 1991). 
49. 166 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
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incarcerated.50  Under Florida law, the substantive standard regarding 
incarceration is that the incarceration be for a significant portion of the child’s 
life.51  In B.K., the father was scheduled for release after nearly eight and a half 
years of the child’s life.52  Here, the father would be “incarcerated for nearly 
fifty percent of [the child’s] minority” at the point the father is to be released 
from prison.53  The child had also been in foster care for a period of time, and 
“at the time of trial, the child was nearly six years old.”54  On the question of 
manifest best interest, the trial court found no bond with the child, no relative 
placement and that the child did not know who her father was.55  Finally, the 
trial court found and the appellate court agreed based upon clear and convincing 
evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child.56  Citing that 
termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the child, the appellate 
court noted that merely sending letters and cards to a child is not enough 
because “then it would be difficult indeed to terminate the rights of any parent 
incarcerated for a lengthy period of time, regardless of the child’s lack of a real 
relationship with her parent.  This [would] leave the child without any 
[parenting] at all, which would not be in her best interest.”57  The appellate court 
thus affirmed.58 
On the other hand, in D.S. v. Department of Children & Families,59 the 
court reversed a finding of termination of parental rights arising out of a father’s 
incarceration.60  In D.S., “[i]n percentage terms, the father’s incarceration 
amount[ed] to approximately 27[%] to 33[%] of the children’s minorit[y].”61  In 
doing so, the appellate court cited B.C. v. Florida Department of Children & 
Families,62 in which the Supreme Court of Florida held that the percentages in 
D.S. would “not constitute a substantial portion of the children’s minorit[y].”63  
While terminating the parental rights of the father to one of the three children, 
                                                 
50. Id. at 873. 
51. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(d)(1). 
52. B.K., 166 So. 3d at 873. 
53. Id. at 874. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 872. 
56. Id. at 872–73.  “[T]he State must show by clear and convincing evidence that 
reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child. . . . [and 
that] termination of those rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious 
harm.”  Padgett v. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991). 
57. B.K., 166 So. 3d at 877. 
58. Id. 
59. 164 So. 3d 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
60. Id. at 36. 
61. Id. at 34. 
62. 887 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2004). 
63. Id. at 1054–55; D.S., 164 So. 3d at 34. 
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the court did not find termination as to the other two.64  Those children were in a 
stable home, not in the custody of the Department, and the father maintained a 
close relationship, given the father’s incarceration, with the children.65  
Specifically, they knew who their father was and had “regular interaction with 
him, [which included] regular phone calls, letters, and visits.”66  At the time of 
his release, the children would be eleven and six.67  Because they were with 
relatives and still had contact with their father, and there being no evidence of 
harm to the children, termination was not the least restrictive means to prevent 
harm, and the appellate court reversed.68 
Whether termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of 
protecting the child from harm, the third question before the trial court in any 
termination of parental rights case, was on appeal in two separate cases during 
this reporting cycle.69  In A.H. v. Department of Children & Families,70 a parent 
appealed termination of her parental rights as to her son on the ground that 
termination was not the least restrictive means of protecting the child from 
harm.71  The State conceded error on this point.72  The appellate court reviewed 
the record in which the trial court created a permanent guardianship for the 
child.73  However, “there [was] no evidence that the mother’s irregular 
contact[s]” caused harm to the child, although there was evidence “that the child 
had a strong bond with the permanent guardian and was doing . . . well” there, 
the child “also enjoyed his visits with [his] mother and his siblings and [wanted] 
to maintain a relationship with them.”74  Under those circumstances, termination 
of parental rights was not the least restrictive means of protecting the child from 
harm.75  Interestingly, the GAL program apparently did not concede error.76  
The GAL program, although the record does not reflect whether the individual 
was qualified as an expert, testified that the parents were not “‘bonded to [the 
child] at all. . . . Emotionally and mentally it would be devastating to take him 
                                                 
64. D.S., 164 So. 3d at 34–36. 
65. Id. at 35. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 36. 
69. See C.D. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 164 So. 3d 40, 41 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 144 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014). 
70. 144 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
71. Id. at 664. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 664, 666. 
74. Id. at 666. 
75. A.H., 144 So. 3d at 666. 
76. Id. at 665. 
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out of his home [with the permanent guardian].’”77  On the basis of this opinion, 
“[t]he GAL recommended termination of parental rights [based on] the . . . best 
interests of the child so [that] he could receive permanency through adoption.”78 
 By reversing, the appellate court rejected this lay opinion.79  In fact, contrary to 
what occurred in this case, the GAL guidelines state that guardians ad litem 
shall not offer expert opinions.80 
In C.D. v. Florida Department of Children & Families,81 the appellate 
court reversed in part on the basis of the trial court’s misinterpretation of A.H.82 
 The appellate court held that first, the trial court ruling was in error because it 
was at odds with its own factual finding that the children did have a bond with 
their parents, and second, the trial court misconstrued age, which the “court held 
that TPR [could be] the least restrictive means of protecting a child from harm 
despite the fact that there was little or no bond between the child and [the 
parent].”83 
Here, again, the appellate court rejected the opinion of the GAL who 
argued that TPR was the least restrictive means of preventing harm to the 
children.84  The appellate court held that the GAL’s opinion on appeal was 
“diametrically opposed to the position it took below in which it argued that the 
children would not be harmed by TPR because their aunt would allow them to 
have contact with the [m]other.”85 
The interplay of rights of putative fathers and termination of parental 
rights based upon abandonment was before the Fourth District in A.S. v. 
Department of Children & Families.86  The father, whose paternity was 
established approximately a year after the child was born, appealed from a 
termination of parental rights adjudication.87  The mother had played a 
nonexistent role in the child’s life and termination had been entered against 
her.88  The father did not know that he was the parent of the child until a 
                                                 
77. Id. (alterations in original). 
78. Id. 
79. See id. at 666. 
80. See A.H., 144 So. 3d at 664–65; FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, 
FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS 9 (2015), 
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Standards_Final_2015.pdf 
[hereinafter 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS]. 
81. 164 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
82. Id. at 43–44; see also A.H., 144 So. 3d at 666. 
83. C.D., 164 So. 3d at 43–44. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 44. 
86. 162 So. 3d 335, 336–37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
87. Id. at 337. 
88. Id. at 336. 
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paternity test was taken a year after the child was born.89  Even then, he did not 
learn that he was the father for another approximately four months.90  Once it 
was determined that he was the father, he began taking “steps to begin forming 
a relationship with [the child].”91  Despite this, the trial court entered an order 
terminating the father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment.92  The 
appellate court recognized that the definition of parent “does not include . . . an 
alleged or prospective parent unless the parental status falls within the terms of 
[section] 39.503(1) or [section] 63.062(1).”93  Because the Department of 
Children and Families (“DCF”) failed to utilize the proper provisions of chapter 
39 of the Florida Statutes to locate the father and because the court could only 
consider whether the father abandoned the child once the father’s paternity was 
established, the trial court erroneously relied upon the failure to take affirmative 
steps to establish paternity prior to that time.94  The appellate court held that the 
trial court was not presented with clear and convincing evidence of 
abandonment.95  And finally, the appellate court held that the father “was never 
offered a case plan despite [the fact that there was] no indication in the record 
that he was unable to comply with [it].”96  On these bases, the appellate court 
reversed.97 
Periodically, cases appear concerning the proper procedures for appeals 
in child welfare cases.98  R.W. v. Department of Children & Families99 involved 
the question of whether “the trial court erred in denying [a] post-judgment 
motion to set aside the surrender” of parental rights for lack of jurisdiction.100  
In R.W., an expedited petition was filed by DCF to terminate the mother’s 
parental rights to her child where the mother had executed a sworn consent to 
surrender those rights.101  However, after receiving the order, the mother filed a 
motion claiming “that the judgment was inconsistent with the trial court’s oral 
ruling on the mother’s visitation rights pending adoption of the child.  The trial 
court denied the motion, and the mother thereafter timely filed a notice of 
                                                 
89. Id. at 337. 
90. Id. 
91. A.S., 162 So. 3d at 337. 
92. Id. at 337–38; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(1), 39.503(1), 63.062(1) (2014). 
93. A.S., 162 So. 3d at 338 (first alteration in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 
39.01(49)); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 39.503(1), 63.062(1). 
94. FLA. STAT. § 39.803(8); A.S., 162 So. 3d at 339. 
95. A.S., 162 So. 3d at 339. 
96. Id. at 340. 
97. Id. 
98. See, e.g., R.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 164 So. 3d 15, 17–18 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
99. 164 So. 3d 15 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
100. Id. at 16. 
101. Id. 
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appeal.”102  However, “[p]rior to filing her initial brief, the mother filed a 
motion asking [the appellate] court to ‘relinquish partial jurisdiction [so that] the 
trial court’” could consider the mother’s motion for reconsideration.103  The 
appellate court viewed the motion as one for relief from judgment and granted 
the motion, relinquishing jurisdiction.104  After an evidentiary hearing, “the trial 
court . . . entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration.”105  The 
mother did not file a notice of appeal challenging that order but instead filed a 
status report to the appellate court.106  The appellate court entered the filing and 
instructed the mother to have her initial brief filed.107  Because “the mother did 
not file a notice of appeal seeking review of the order denying her motion for 
reconsideration,” the court on appeal refused to interpret the status report as a 
notice of appeal.108  Having “relinquished jurisdiction [for] the trial court to rule 
on the motion for reconsideration” in the absence of an appeal from the order on 
the motion for relief in judgment, the appellate court had no preserved issue 
before it and thus, affirmed the final judgment terminating the mother’s parental 
rights.109 
IV. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
On March 19, 2015, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two cases 
involving application of the Supreme Court of the United States’ opinions in 
Graham v. Florida110 and Miller.111  In Graham, the Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled that the Eighth Amendment does not allow a juvenile 
defendant to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for non-homicide 
crimes.112  In Miller, the Supreme Court of the United States held that juveniles 
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing based upon 
their diminished capacity and greater prospects for reform, and it held that the 
Eighth Amendment forbids the courts from sentencing juveniles to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole in capital cases.113 
                                                 
102. Id. at 17. 
103. Id. 
104. R.W., 164 So. 3d at 17–18. 
105. Id. at 17. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. at 18. 
109. R.W., 164 So. 3d at 18. 
110. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
111. See id. at 82; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2475 (2012); Falcon 
v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 956, 959–60, 963–64 (Fla. 2015); Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 394, 
405–06, 409 (Fla. 2015). 
112. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 82; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
113. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2474–75; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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Two Supreme Court of Florida cases followed the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ rulings.114  In Falcon v. State,115 the Supreme Court of Florida 
held that Miller should be read retroactively.116  In Horsley v. State,117 the 
Supreme Court of Florida held that the remedy in terms of a sentencing option 
in order to comply with Miller does not require revival of the Florida statute 
regarding life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.118 
The Horsley case involved post-Miller and Graham convictions of 
juveniles as adults based upon the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
conclusion that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that 
mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile 
offenders.”119  The Supreme Court of Florida rejected the doctrine of statutory 
revival, which had been argued by the State.120  The State took the position that 
the only possible sentencing options to comply with Miller were life without 
parole or the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.121  The Supreme Court 
of Florida concluded that the recent change in the Florida Statute was effective 
on July 1, 2014, and should apply to those juvenile offenders whose sentences 
were for crimes committed prior to July 1, 2014, but after Miller and 
Graham.122  The Florida Statute from 2014 governed those who did the killing 
and those who did not actually kill or attempt to kill.123  The Legislature then 
added a detailed value process in the same statute.124 
In Falcon, the Supreme Court of Florida undertook an analysis of 
whether Miller should be applied retroactively to juveniles who were convicted 
of capital offenses prior to the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in 
that case.125  The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that Miller should be given 
retroactive effect based upon its retroactivity test set forth in Witt v. State.126  
The Court relied upon the principle set out in Witt, finding that Miller 
                                                 
114. See Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 955, 959, 964; Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394, 397, 
408–09. 
115. 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015). 
116. Id. at 956, 963–64; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
117. 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015). 
118. Id. at 395, 409; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(b)(2)(a) (2014); Miller, 132 
S. Ct. at 2475. 
119. Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. VIII; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2475; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 82 
(2010). 
120. Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395. 
121. Id.; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
122. See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394–95, 406, 408–09. 
123. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1); see also Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 406. 
124. Act effective July 1, 2014, ch. 2014-220, § 7, 2014 Fla. Laws 2869, 2876–77. 
125. Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 955 (Fla. 2015); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
126. 387 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980); Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 956; see also Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
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constitutes a “development of fundamental significance and therefore, must be 
given retroactive effect.”127 
The issue of retroactivity under Miller initially was to be before the 
Supreme Court of the United States this term in a pair of cases, State v. 
Montgomery128 and State v. Toca.129  Although the Supreme Court of the United 
States granted a writ of certiorari in both cases, Montgomery was the only case 
heard due to the procedural issues that resulted in the dismissal of Toca.130  
Montgomery had been in prison for nearly fifty years after a guilty without 
capital punishment verdict was returned by the jury.131  This verdict 
automatically imposed a life sentence without possibility of parole.132  
Montgomery sought collateral relief from the State of Louisiana for his 
conviction, arguing that Miller should retroactively apply to his sentence 
because of the automatic life sentence without parole that was attached to his 
conviction.133  The trial court denied his motion and the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana denied his writ because the court had previously held that Miller did 
not retroactively apply.134  However, the Supreme Court of the United States 
held in Montgomery that Miller does retroactively apply because the rule 
established in Miller was “a new substantive rule of constitutional law.”135  New 
substantive rules “alter[] the range of conduct or the class of persons that the 
law punishes” and must apply retroactively.136  The Court found that although 
the rule in Miller was substantive, an individual affected by it is afforded the 
procedural opportunity to demonstrate that he or she belongs to the given 
protected class.137  Given the Supreme Court holding in Montgomery, the 
decision in Falcon, holding that Miller applied retroactively will be upheld.138 
This Survey has repeatedly discussed restitution as one of a number of 
dispositional alternatives in delinquency cases in addition to commitment, 
probation, community service, revocation of driver’s license and attendance at 
                                                 
127. Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 956 (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at 931); see also Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
128. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), rev’g 141 So. 3d 264 (La. 2014). 
129. 141 So. 3d 265 (La. 2014). 
130. Toca v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015) (dismissing certiorari). 
131. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725–26. 
132. Id. at 726. 
133. Id. at 726–27. 
134. Id. at 727. 
135. Id. at 732–35. 
136. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 
353 (2004)). 
137. Id. at 735. 
138. See Montgomery, slip op. at 14; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Falcon v. State, 
162 So. 3d 954, 956 (Fla. 2015). 
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school.139  Despite what would appear to be a statute clear on its face, this past 
year the appellate courts dealt with seven separate cases involving the 
restitution provision provided in section 985.437 of the Florida Statutes.140  In 
J.A.B. v. State,141 the child appealed a $460 restitution award.142  “At the 
restitution hearing, the victim stated that . . . it would cost between $460 and 
$490 to repair the damage to [the] vehicle” while giving no basis for his 
opinion.143  No document was introduced demonstrating the actual repair cost.144 
 Thus, as “the award was not supported by competent [and] substantial 
evidence,” the appellate court reversed.145 
In K.R. v. State,146 a child appealed from a $479 restitution adjudication 
arising out of the theft of an automobile.147  Because the victim simply testified 
that the amount “was like [$479] plus like there would be no tax,” and there was 
no further evidence, the court on appeal reversed based upon the speculative 
amount testified to by the victim.148 
In S.M. v. State,149 the juvenile had been ordered to pay $8629 in 
restitution arising out of the theft of an automobile.150  The appellate court 
affirmed on the grounds that the victim of the automobile expressed an opinion 
as to the value of the automobile basing the opinion on information obtained 
from a website, such as the Kelley Blue Book.151  However, in so ruling, the 
appellate court held that taking judicial notice of an online Kelley Blue Book 
evaluation, although it did not occur in this case, would not comply with the 
Florida Rules of Evidence.152  The appellate court explained that there needed to 
be evidentiary demonstration that the Kelley Blue Book website had the “level 
                                                 
139. FLA. STAT. § 985.455(1)–(2) (2014); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, 
supra note 7, at 53. 
140. K.R. v. State, 155 So. 3d 507, 509 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015); L.W. v. 
State, 163 So. 3d 598, 599–601 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); S.M. v. State, 159 So. 3d 966, 967–
68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.D. v. State, 152 So. 3d 798, 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); C.W. v. State, 150 So. 3d 882, 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); J.A.B. v. State, 148 So. 
3d 151, 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); M.K. v. State, 143 So. 3d 428, 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.437(1)–(2). 
141. 148 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
142. Id. at 151. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 151–52. 
146. 155 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
147. Id. at 508–09. 
148. Id. 
149. 159 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
150. Id. at 967. 
151. Id. at 967, 969. 
152. S.M., 159 So. 3d at 967, 969; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.202(12) (2014). 
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of accuracy [contradicted] with that of a court-recognized appraiser” or was 
“relied upon by a high percentage of car traders.”153 
A case involving both the competence of a victim to testify to the value 
of stolen goods and the failure of the State to demonstrate that the value of the 
stolen goods reached the statutory minimum was before the Fourth District in 
M.K. v. State.154  In this delinquency case, the respondent appealed the order 
finding him guilty of first-degree petty theft, arguing that there was no 
competent evidence of the value of the stolen necklace so that the respondent 
could be charged with third-degree grand theft, which required that the property 
be “valued at $300 or more [or] . . . less than $5,000.”155  Because the twelve-
year-old victim could not provide competent evidence as to the value of the 
stolen necklace and that the victim was not competent to testify as to the value 
required, the appellate court reversed.156  Specifically, “because the necklace 
was a gift, the victim was unable to testify [as] to [the] . . . purchase price or 
replacement cost beyond” testifying as to what the victim was told by a parent 
based upon research on the Internet.157 
Two cases, C.W. v. State158 and L.W. v. State,159 dealt with the question 
of whether the court could properly enter an order of restitution in a 
delinquency case where the respondent was not present.160  In the C.W. case, the 
court ordered $664 in restitution at the rate of $25 per month.161  However, the 
respondent was not present and the court failed to find that the child had the 
ability to pay.162  Because the child was not present and there was no showing 
that the child had waived his presence, the court reversed.163  However, in L.W., 
where the child was ordered to pay $321.61 in $30 monthly installments based 
upon a damaged window, the court found at first the child had waived his right 
to attend, as the lawyer withdrew his objection based upon the child not being 
present.164  However, the trial court failed to make the requisite factual findings 
of the child’s or the family’s ability to make payments of $30 per month.165 
                                                 
153. S.M., 159 So. 3d at 967. 
154. 143 So. 3d 428, 430–31 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
155. Id. at 430; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.014(3)(c)(1). 
156. M.K., 143 So. 3d at 431–32. 
157. Id. at 431. 
158. 150 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
159. 163 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
160. Id. at 599; C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883. 
161. C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. L.W., 163 So. 3d at 599–600. 
165. Id. at 601. 
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In A.D. v. State,166 the trial court entered a restitution order regarding a 
camera even though there was no reference to it “as an item stolen in the grand 
theft count contained in [the] . . . petition for delinquency.”167  On that simple 
basis, the court held that the trial court lacks the authority to require restitution, 
as the only restitution allowable is that of which arises out of the offense 
charged as reflected in the information or factual basis for the plea.168 
In a delinquency case, it is not unusual for the State to be unable to 
serve a respondentalleged delinquentwith a summons to appear.169  In State 
v. C.W.,170 the State appealed a trial court final order entered sua sponte, 
dismissing the petition in a delinquency case for failure to serve.171  The 
appellate court ruled quite simply that the trial court improperly ruled on an 
issue that was not before it and that it interfered with the State’s discretion to 
bring charges against the child.172  However, oddly, because the State had not 
preserved the argument for appeal, the appellate court dismissedalbeit, 
writing to emphasize that where no motion to dismiss had been filed by the 
child, the trial court was without authority to dismiss the prosecution sua 
sponte.173 
Discovery is an important matter in delinquency and adult criminal 
cases often reaching constitutional dimensions.174  In M.H. v. State,175 a child 
appealed from an order that withheld “adjudication of delinquency and 
impos[ed] probation for [the] burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and [petty] 
theft.”176  The claim on appeal was a discovery violation in which the State 
listed the victim of the charged offenses as a Category B witness rather than a 
Category A witness under Florida law.177  As a result, the trial court failed to 
hold a Richardson Hearing.178  Failure to conduct a hearing under the facts of 
the case constituted reversible error.179 
The question of a proper search and seizure, in the context of a child 
who was not in school and thus a possible truant, was before the Fourth District 
                                                 
166. 152 So. 3d 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
167. Id. at 798. 
168. Id. at 798–99. 
169. See State v. C.W., 166 So. 3d 950, 950 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
170. 166 So. 3d 950 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
171. Id. at 950. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 773, 777 (Fla. 1971). 
175. 151 So. 3d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
176. Id. at 33. 
177. Id. 
178. Id.; see also Richardson, 246 So. 2d at 773–77. 
179. M.H., 151 So. 3d at 37. 
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in J.R. v. State.180  The child was found guilty of possession of marijuana after 
the trial court denied the child’s motion to suppress.181  The police officer had 
initially observed the child from the officer’s patrol car on a school day at about 
8:15am.182  In reversing the denial of the child’s motion to suppress, the 
appellate court held that the officer had begun the stop for truancy without 
reasonable grounds to believe that the child was absent from school.183  
Florida’s status offense statute does not authorize a police officer to 
preemptively detain a child who may be plotting to skip school later.184  The 
appellate court thus reversed, upholding the motion to suppress.185 
Florida’s method for determining whether a juvenile charged with an 
act of delinquency should be held in secure detention is determined on the basis 
of something known in Florida as the Risk Assessment Instrument (“RAI”).186  
In A.M. v. State,187 a juvenile filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking 
release from secure detention because his offense was improperly determined to 
be a violent third-degree felony.188  The trial court found that a robbery by 
sudden snatching of a cell phone qualified as a violent third-degree felony, 
which raised A.M.’s RAI to the level of secure detention.189  The Third District 
Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s finding and held that the proper 
designation of robbery by snatching under the facts of the case was a non-
violent third degree felony, which would have resulted in a lesser RAI 
determination.190  In D.L. v. State,191 a juvenile filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus on the basis that the court incorrectly scored the RAI by double scoring 
possession of a firearm and failing to address whether an unrelated felony 
charge was concurrently pending against the child.192  The Fifth District Court 
of Appeal reversed, finding as it had in other appeals that it is improper to 
include three additional points for possession of a firearm where the possession 
is already given the maximum ten points for the third degree felony charge 
under Florida law.193 
                                                 
180. 149 So. 3d 1196, 1196 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 1197–98. 
184. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 984.13(1)(b) (2014). 
185. J.R., 149 So. 3d at 1198. 
186. FLA. STAT. § 985.255(3)(a). 
187. 147 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
188. Id. at 99. 
189. Id. at 99–100. 
190. Id. at 101–02; FLA. STAT. § 812.131. 
191. 147 So. 3d 653 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
192. Id. at 654. 
193. Id. at 655; see also M.W. v. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 15 So. 3d 782, 783–84 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
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V. OTHER MATTERS 
A. Due Process Shortcomings in the Dependency Court 
It is clear beyond peradventure that basic due process rights apply in 
dependency and termination of parental rights cases.194  Nonetheless, repeated 
failures to comply with the basic due process constitutional protections arise in 
the dependency court in Florida and, most recently, cases in Miami demonstrate 
this shortcoming.195  First, in R.C. v. Department of Children & Family 
Services,196 a termination of parental rights case, a parent sought “certiorari 
relief from a sua sponte order of the trial court [obligating the mother] to submit 
to a pregnancy test.”197  The appellate court quashed the trial court order due to 
the complete failure to accord the mother notice and because there was also no 
showing of good cause as applied by law.198  In so doing, after quoting at length 
from the trial court proceeding and describing it as being “patently obvious 
from the record in this case that the trial [court] acted for reasons of its own 
rather than any rule of law,” the appellate court concluded by citing to 
Alexander Hamilton.199  “As Alexander Hamilton long ago warned us, ‘it can be 
of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may 
substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the 
legislature.”200  The appellate court then added “[t]he principle bears an 
occasional reiteration, even—and perhaps especially—[with]in our children’s 
court.  There was no pretense made of following any legislative directives or 
intentions in this case.”201 
A second Miami case is R.W. v. Department of Children & Families.202 
 In that case, in a short opinion, the appellate court reversed on the grounds that 
the same trial court’s termination of parental rights decision was based upon a 
determination that continued involvement of the father in the family relationship 
“threaten[ed] the safety or well-being of the child[ren] [regardless] of 
                                                 
194. FLA. STAT. § 984.01(1)(a); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, 
at 45; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
195. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; A.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 147 
So. 3d 621, 622–23 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); R.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 150 
So. 3d 1277, 1279–80 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); R.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 147 
So. 3d 631, 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
196. 150 So. 3d 1277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
197. Id. at 1277. 
198. Id. at 1279–80. 
199. Id. 
200. R.C., 150 So. 3d at 1280 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 452–53 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009)). 
201. Id. 
202. 147 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
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services.”203  However, the amended petition did not allege such a statutory 
basis but pleaded only abandonment, and thus, the appellate court reversed.204 
The third Miami case is A.A. v. Department of Children & Families.205  
Here, the appellate court reversed because the mother was denied due process as 
a result of the same trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing before 
denying her motion for modification.206  In that case, there was a combined 
failurefirst, to hold an evidentiary hearing and then, to make a written factual 
finding addressing the requisite factors enumerated in the statute.207  Those 
failures constituted a basic violation of due process rights.208  These cases 
follow on the heels of earlier appellate court rulings reversing the same trial 
court in Miami for its failure to comply with basic constitutional principles in 
G.W. v. Department of Children & Families209 and F.M. v. State Department of 
Children & Families.210 
B. The Ongoing Failure to Provide Counsel for Children in Child Welfare 
Cases in Florida and Shortcomings in the GAL Program 
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Florida held in In re D.B.211 that children 
are not entitled to counsel in termination of parental rights cases.212  Until July 
of 2014, the only way that children received counsel in dependency and 
termination of parental rights cases in Florida was through volunteer lawyer 
appointments or in several counties legal aid representation.213  Thus, while all 
parties to these cases were represented by counsel—DCF, the parents, and the 
GAL Program—the only unrepresented party was the child unless a volunteer 
attorney or legal aid lawyer took the child’s case.214  The GAL Program’s role, 
                                                 
203. Id. at 632. 
204. Id. 
205. 147 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
206. Id. at 622, 624. 
207. Id. at 623; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10) (2014). 
208. A.A., 147 So. 3d at 622–23. 
209. 92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
210. 95 So. 3d 378, 381–82 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); G.W., 92 So. 3d at 309–
10; see also Michael J. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, 38 NOVA L. REV. 81, 86–87 (2013) 
[hereinafter Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law].  The same trial court was reversed in R.L.R. v. 
State, a case in which the trial court had held that chapter 39 somehow preempted the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar on the confidentiality of the lawyer child client relationship.  116 So. 
3d 570, 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also FLA. STAT. ch. 39. 
211. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980). 
212. Id. at 91. 
213. Id. at 92. 
214. Id. at 87–88, 92–93. 
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as discussed below, is not to represent the child as a lawyer would do but to 
represent the child’s best interests.215 
During its 2014 session, the Legislature passed a statute authorizing the 
expenditure of $5 million to pay for lawyers to act as attorneys ad litem to 
represent children before the dependency court in five categories of cases that 
are based upon the children’s special needs.216  The serious shortcomings in the 
statute are detailed in last year’s survey article, including the ethical issues 
relating to the roles of the GAL Program and DCF and their attorneys in 
requesting the appointment of and choosing the lawyers for the five categories 
of children.217  The problem with the law is exacerbated by the fact that literally 
hundreds of other children with serious physical, mental, and educational 
problems do not have the right to counsel because they do not fit within the five 
categories of the statute as determined by these possibly opposing parties.218 
In 2014, the General Counsel for the GAL Program prepared a 
document titled Children with Certain Special Needs Attorney Registry that 
directly illustrates the underlying problems that arise when applying the 2014 
amendment to section 39.01305 of the Florida Statutes.219  First, the document 
states that “[t]he appointing court is required to consult with the GAL [Program] 
in attempting to locate a pro bono attorney.  If a pro bono attorney cannot be 
located or a recommendation is not provided with[in] [fifteen] days, the court is 
authorized to appoint compensated counsel.”220  A 2011 study demonstrates the 
inability of the Florida Bar to provide pro bono lawyers to children in 
dependency proceedings,221 thus making it both futile and time consuming to 
locate pro bono attorneys and necessitating the use of compensated attorney 
                                                 
215. Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 63; Michael J. Dale & 
Louis M. Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright:  Every Child Should Have an Attorney in Child 
Welfare Proceedings in Florida, 36 NOVA L. REV. 345, 352–53 (2012) [hereinafter Dale & 
Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright]. 
216. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3)(a)–(e); see also Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, 
supra note 7, at 62. 
217. Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 61–63; see also Dale & 
Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 330; Dale & Reidenberg, The Kids 
Aren’t Alright, supra note 215, at 353. 
218. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3)(a)–(e). 
219. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305; DENNIS MOORE, GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, 
CHILDREN WITH CERTAIN SPECIAL NEEDS ATTORNEY REGISTRY (2014), available at 
http://www.slideplayer.com/slide/4327595. 
220. MOORE, supra note 219. 
221. See UNIV. OF FLA. & FLORIDA’S CHILDREN FIRST, LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF 
DEPENDENT CHILDREN: A 2012 REPORT ON FLORIDA’S PATCHWORK SYSTEM 2–4 (2012), 
https://www.law.ufl.edu/_pdf/academics/centers-clinics/centers/legal-rep-of-dep-children-12.pdf 
(demonstrating the Bar’s inability to provide a substantial number of pro bono lawyers for 
children in dependency cases). 
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representation.222  Second, according to the document prepared by the GAL 
General Counsel, it is possible to be registered to represent children for a fee in 
dependency cases even if the attorney has never actually handled such a case.223 
 The attorney merely needs to demonstrate one of the following prerequisites set 
out in the document:  that the attorney has “observed at least thirty hours of 
hearings in dependency cases including at least one shelter hearingone 
dependency adjudicatory hearing, one judicial review hearing, one hearing 
pursuant to rule 8.350 [of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure] and one 
termination of parental rights trial.”224  Contrary to this prerequisite, attorneys 
for children “must have the requisite skill and competence to represent children 
in [these complex] cases that involve, among other matters,” a variety of federal 
statutory rights as well as myriad, medical, psychological, educational, 
“cultural, racial, moral, and religious issues.”225 
A review of the application of the 2014 amendment to section 39.01305 
of the Florida Statutes in its first year demonstrates additional ongoing problems 
with the law, leaving aside the issues of the attorney qualifications necessary to 
handle these cases and the ethical issues of the GAL Program’s role in choosing 
the lawyers for children as a separate party in the proceeding.226  First, during 
the first fifteen months of operation, only 1236 children were appointed counsel 
with an expenditure of $900,000 out of a budget of $5 million, leaving $4.1 
million unspent.227  Unfortunately, this data does not distinguish between 
volunteer and paid lawyers.228  As explained above, the Florida law requires an 
attempt to find volunteers before hiring a lawyer.229  Yet, during the initial 
fifteen-month period, more than twenty-eight thousand children were before the 
dependency court.230  Second, the appointment of lawyers for children varied 
dramatically among the circuits with no correlation to their population.231  In the 
                                                 
222. See id. 
223. MOORE, supra note 219. 
224. Id.; see also FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.350. 
225. Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 351. 
226. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014). 
227. JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 
39.01305, F.S.: COUNT BY CIRCUIT AND CASE DESCRIPTION, APPOINTED JULY 1, 2014–SEPTEMBER 
21, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S.] (data on 
file with author); JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, PAYMENTS ON SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 
39.01305, F.S.: COURT APPOINTED BY CIRCUIT AND APPROPRIATION FISCAL YEAR, JULY 1, 2014–
SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter COSTS PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 
39.01305, F.S.] (data on file with author); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 62. 
228. See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
COSTS PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227. 
229. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(4)(a). 
230. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  
NOVEMBER 2014 (Dec. 2014) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  NOVEMBER 2014]. 
231. See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227. 
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Sixth Circuit—Pasco and Pinellas Counties—with a population of 1.4 million, 
there were 254 paid appointments of attorneys ad litem at a cost of $199,000.232 
 In the Seventeenth Circuit—Broward County—with a population of 1.8 
million, there were 37 appointments at a cost of $25,000.233  In the Thirteenth 
Circuit—Hillsborough County—with a population of 1.3 million, there were 
138 appointments at a cost of $106,000.234  In the Eleventh Circuit—Miami-
Dade County—with a population of 2.6 million, 130 lawyers were appointed at 
a cost of $57,000.235  These statistics do not account for the appointment of pro 
bono lawyers who under the 2014 statute are to be assigned first and found by 
the GAL Program.236  Nor does it account for the availability of legal aid 
lawyers to represent some of these children in some of the circuits.237  However, 
the population differences among the circuit courts raises the question of why 
the process of paid appointments differs so dramatically from circuit to 
circuit.238 
The historical role of the GAL Program is also problematic for reasons 
unrelated to the 2014 amendment to section 39.010305 of the Florida 
Statutes.239  First, data produced during this survey year as well as recent reports 
                                                 
232. Id.; JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, PAYMENTS ON SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT 
TO S. 39.01305, F.S.: COURT APPOINTED BY CIRCUIT AND APPROPRIATION FISCAL YEAR, JULY 1, 
2014–SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES 
PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S.] (data on file with author); State & County Quickfacts: Pasco 
County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12101.html (last revised 
Dec. 2, 2015); State & County Quickfacts: Pinellas County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12103.html (last revised Dec. 2, 2015). 
233. APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232; 
State & County Quickfacts: Broward County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12011.html (last revised Dec. 2, 2015). 
234. APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232; 
Total Population in Hillsborough County Zip Codes, TAMPA HILLSBOROUGH ECON. DEV. CORP., 
http://www.tampaedc.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Hillsborough-County-Population-by-
ZIP-Code.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2016). 
235. APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232; 
Miami-Dade County, SOUTHFLORIDAFINDS.COM, 
http://www.southfloridafinds.com/county/miami-dade (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).  
236. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014); APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 
39.01305, F.S., supra note 227. 
237. See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232. 
238. See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232. 
239. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305; Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for 
Children, supra note 7, at 330. 
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from the GAL Program demonstrate ongoing serious flaws in the program.240  
First, the budget of the GAL Program now exceeds forty-two million dollars not 
including federal funds and in-kind services.241  Yet, the GAL Program was 
only able to represent approximately 76%242 of the children before the 
dependency court in 2014, despite employing more than 145 attorneys, 
including an appeals unit.243  It is hard to be certain of the accuracy of these 
figures because the Statewide GAL Program—Performance Advocacy 
Snapshot—only provides percentages.244  Thus, it would appear that as of June 
2015, the court appointed the GAL Program to 84.3% of the children in 
dependency proceedings.245  Of the 84.3%, 77.5% had an Active Certified 
Volunteer.246  Thus, it would appear that 65.3% of the children before the 
dependency court last June had an active certified GAL volunteer.247  One 
cannot tell from the GAL website whether the remaining 34.7% of the children 
had GAL best interest representation or if they were simply left with nothing.248 
 A recent announcement from the GAL Program in Palm Beach County seeking 
donations stated that it could only represent the best interests of about 800 of 
the 1200—66%—children before the dependency court in that Circuit.249  In 
                                                 
240. See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  
MAY 2015 (June 2015) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  MAY 2015]; GAL 
REPRESENTATION REPORT:  NOVEMBER 2014, supra note 230; FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, 
GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  MAY 2014 (June 2014) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION 
REPORT:  MAY 2014].  GAL are the lowest paid state attorneys, and the amount of cases they take 
exceeds the American Bar Association’s recommended number, according to a study authorized 
and paid for by the GAL Program.  FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
ATTORNEY COMPENSATION ANALYSIS 3 (June 30, 2014), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/GAL-Attorney-Compensation-Study-Final-Version.pdf.  One might 
surmise the study was prepared and paid for to a Florida based company for fundraising purposes. 
 See id.  Significantly, the lawyers at the Offices of Regional Counsel, albeit without a study to 
support their problems, are also paid at low salaries with caseloads far exceeding professional 
norms.  See id. at 15–16. 
241. Justice Administrative Commission: Guardian ad Litem Program, FLA. OFF. 
PROGRAM POL’Y ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, 
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/profiles/1016 (last updated June 11, 2015). 
242. GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  NOVEMBER 2014, supra note 230. 
243. Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency 
Proceedings, supra note 7, at 330. 
244. Statewide Guardian ad Litem Program — Performance Advocacy SnapShot 
(PASS), GUARDIANADLITEM.ORG (June 2015), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/GAL-SnapShot-June-2015.pdf. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. See id. 
248. See id. 
249. Michelle Piasecki, Nonprofit to Help Kids in Need Is Restarted, PALM BEACH 
POST, Dec. 4, 2014, at N4. 
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Broward County, matters appear to be worse.250  A June 2015 report from the 
GAL Program stated that the GAL Program was appointed for 82.23% of the 
children before the dependency court, and 56.06% of those children received a 
volunteer GAL.251  Thus, less than half of the children in Broward County had a 
GAL Program representative.252 
Second, the GAL Program seems to be confused about its proper role or 
continues to choose to misstate it.253  The GAL Program in Florida is under the 
supervision of a state agency in the executive branch that is statutorily 
authorized to collect and provide information to the court when appointed by 
the court as to what in certain limited situations it believes is in the best interest 
of the children.254  It does not represent the child as an attorney does, although 
its literature at times says it does.255  GAL volunteers and paid staff may not 
practice law, as is the case with any other non-lawyer.256  Thus, they may not 
provide legal advice to the child, just as the GAL Program lawyers may not, 
leaving no confidential relationship between any GAL representative and the 
child.257 
Third, GALs cannot provide expert opinions to the court, although as 
the case law discussed earlier in this survey demonstrates, they have done so.258 
 The guidelines for the GAL Program, however, are disingenuous in this 
regard.259  They state 
“[v]olunteers are not being used as experts in a case and will testify 
as lay people, however this does not take away the fact that they may 
be credentialed and should be permitted to identify themselves as 
                                                 
 250. See GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  MAY 2015, supra note 240. 
251. Id. 
252. See id. 
253. See Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 
330. 
254. FLA. STAT. § 39.8296 (2014); FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM, IMAGINING THE 
FUTURE:  35TH ANNIVERSARY 1980–2015 7, 15–17 (2015), 
http://www.issuu.com/liz338/docs/annual_report-web. 
255. Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 330. 
256. FLA. STAT. § 61.403(7); see also Volunteer FAQ, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD 
LITEM PROGRAM, http://www.guardianadlitem.org/faq (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
257. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, STANDARDS OF OPERATION 15 
(2006), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/StandardsOfOperation.pdf 
[hereinafter STANDARDS OF OPERATION]; see also 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM 
STANDARDS, supra note 80 at 19. 
258. See A.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 144 So. 3d 662, 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014). 
259. See 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80, 
at 9. 
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such [and] . . . [t]he court report should not reiterate their credentials 
to bolster their credibility.”260 
The simple outstanding question—as any lawyer would immediately 
recognize—is:  What is the relevance of the credential, if not to add to the 
credibility of the witness and thus bolster the witness’ testimony?261 
Finally, the confusion in the operation of the GAL Program is only 
exacerbated by its articulation of the role of its lawyers.262  Despite calls by this 
author in this Article and in other articles for the GAL Program to properly state 
the role of its lawyers—to represent the GAL Program—it does not do so.263  It 
continues to conflate its role with that of the attorney who actually represents 
the legal interest of the child.264  For example, the Dependency Practice 
Manual, apparently written by GAL Program special counsel, in the 
introduction states that “[i]t is hoped that attorneys will use this manual to 
ensure that children are the focus of dependency proceedings, that their voices 
are heard, and that their legal interests [are] protected through proactive legal 
advocacy.”265  That statement defines the role of a child’s lawyer.266  It does not 
define the role of a GAL lawyer whose sole ethical obligation is to represent his 
or her client, which is the GAL Program.267  To do otherwise would violate the 
Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility.268  The GAL guidelines as 
redrafted this year only makes matters worse.  They refer once again to the 
“Child’s Best Interest Attorney” and describe the role as “the attorney employed 
by the [department] to protect [the] child’s best interest either in the circuit 
dependency courts or the appellate courts.  There is no attorney-client 
relationship between the CBI attorney and the child; however, representing the 
best interest of the child is the sole purpose of their advocacy.”269  This 
                                                 
260. Id. 
261. See id. 
262. See id., at 7. 
263. See id.; Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 
7, at 324. 
264. See 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80, 
at 7; FLA. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, DEPENDENCY PRACTICE MANUAL 2 (2014), 
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/The_Practice_Manual_Final.pdf; 
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 331. 
265. FLA. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, supra note 257, at 2 (emphasis 
added). 
266. See id. 
267. See id.; Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, 
at 331–32. 
268. Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 331–
32; see also STANDARDS OF OPERATION, supra note 257, at 6, 20. 
269. 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80, at 
7. 
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statement can only be described as legal nonsense.270  The GAL Program lawyer 
represents the GAL Program, a statutory party in a dependency case.271  It is 
impossible for a lawyer to represent an idea.  The GAL Program literature 
describes a form of legal representation that simply does not exist.272  
Attempting to apply these GAL guidelines is inconsistent with the law and 
defies logic.273 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Florida decided two major cases this survey 
year.274  First, it set forth the procedure for applying the Supreme Court of the 
United States holdings in Graham and Miller that rendered life without parole 
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles who committed capital and non-capital 
offenses.275  Second, it held that Miller should apply retroactively.276 
The Florida intermediate appellate courts were active in deciding 
delinquency matters primarily involving proper application of restitution 
standards.277  The appellate courts were also busy implementing the Horsley 
decision, which set out the test for how to determine the proper sentence for a 
juvenile previously incarcerated for life without parole.278  In the dependency 
and TPR areas, the issue of proper application of the nexus problem was once 
again before the appellate courts.279  Another common issue involved the 
dependency court rights of immigrant children.280  Also, a pattern of failure to 
comply with basic due process rights of parents in child welfare cases appears to 
be developing in the juvenile court in Miami as this survey and surveys over the 
past two years have illustrated.281 
                                                 
270. See id. 
271. Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 63; Dale & Reidenberg, 
The Kids Aren’t Alright, supra note 215, at 353. 
272. See 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80, 
at 6–7. 
273. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(b) (2014). 
274. See Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963–64 (Fla. 2015); Horsley v. State, 
160 So. 3d 393, 408–09 (Fla. 2015). 
275. Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 408; see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 
(2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
276. Horsley, 160 So. 3d. at 408–09; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
277. See supra Part IV. 
278. See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 408–09; supra Part IV. 
279. See supra Part III. 
280. See In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 577 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015); supra Part 
II. 
281. See Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 62; Dale, 2013 
Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 210, at 86–87; supra Section V.A. 
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Finally, all children in Florida should be entitled to counsel in 
dependency and TPR proceedings.282  The 2014 amendment to section 39.01305 
of the Florida Statutes, giving some children some lawyers in some cases access 
to counsel, is grossly inadequate.283  The GAL Program, with a budget in excess 
of forty-two million dollars, consistently and without restraint, mistakes its role 
to the detriment of the children.284  The establishment of consistent guidelines 
across the board is crucial in providing adequate legal representation that 
children not only need, but deserve, in all juvenile proceedings, whether dealing 
with delinquency, TPR, or dependency.285 
                                                 
282. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014); supra Section V.B. 
283. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3); supra Section V.B. 
284. See supra Section V.B. 
285. See supra Parts II–V. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Florida has long been a hotbed of baseball activity.1  Today, the state 
is home to two Major League Baseball (“MLB”) teams, fourteen minor 
league teams, fifteen spring training sites, both of the schools that train future 
big league umpires, and numerous amateur and youth teams.2  As a result, its 
case reporters are filled with baseball opinions that stretch back more than a 
century.3  Collectively, these judgments chronicle the significant role that 
                                                          
1. KEVIN M. MCCARTHY, BASEBALL IN FLORIDA 5 (1996) (tracing Florida’s 
baseball roots back to 1874).  Although McCarthy’s text remains definitive, useful 
examinations of Florida’s baseball history also appear in a number of other works.  See, e.g., 
SCOTT BROWN, BASEBALL IN PENSACOLA:  AMERICA’S PASTIME & THE CITY OF FIVE FLAGS 
(2013); A.M. DE QUESADA JR., BASEBALL IN TAMPA BAY (2000); ALEJANDRO M. DE QUESADA, 
SPRING TRAINING IN CLEARWATER: FENCEBUSTERS AND FASTBALLS FROM THE PHILADELPHIA 
PHILLIES AND THE CLEARWATER THRESHERS (2007); RODY JOHNSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
DODGERTOWN: 60 YEARS OF BASEBALL IN VERO BEACH (2008); JEFF LAHURD, SPRING 
TRAINING IN SARASOTA, 1924–1960: NEW YORK GIANTS AND BOSTON RED SOX (2006); JOHN 
PHILLIPS, A SHORT HISTORY OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL IN MIAMI AND MIAMI BEACH 
(1997); WES SINGLETARY, FLORIDA’S FIRST BIG LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS: A NARRATIVE 
HISTORY (2006); RAYMOND SINIBALDI, SPRING TRAINING IN BRADENTON AND SARASOTA 
(2013); Joe Connor, Baseball History Rich in Sunshine State, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nbcsports.com/baseball-history-rich-sunshine-state#page=1. 
2. Batter Up!  A Visual History of Baseball in Florida, FLA. MEMORY, 
https://www.floridamemory.com/photographiccollection/photo_exhibits/baseball; see also 
Amateur & Semi-Pro:  Florida, JOHN SKILTON’S BASEBALL-LINKS.COM, http://www.baseball-
links.com/links/Amateur_&_Semi-Pro/Florida; Florida’s Grapefruit League Is Home to 
Major League Baseball’s Pre-Season, FLA. GRAPEFRUIT LEAGUE, 
http://www.floridagrapefruitleague.com (hover over “Teams”); Team-by-Team Information, 
MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/team/index.jsp; Teams by Geographical Location, MILB.COM, 
http://www.milb.com/milb/info/geographical.jsp Umpire School Information, MLB.COM, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/umpires/camp/schools.jsp 
3. Lawsuits that did not result in a precedential opinion are not included in 
this survey.  See, e.g., Nix v. Major League Baseball, No. 3D14–2967, 2015 WL 1930327 
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015) (unpublished table decision); Burch v. Little League 
Baseball, Inc., 33 So. 3d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (unpublished table decision); Young 
v. City of Dunedin, 974 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (unpublished table 
decision); Bochtler v. Florida Marlins LP, 961 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) 
(unpublished table decision); Ogletree v. Fitzpatrick, 935 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2006) (unpublished table decision); Del Valle v. Major League Baseball, Inc., 901 So. 2d 131 
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished table decision); S. Fla. Stadium Corp. v. Klein ex 
rel. Klein, 789 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (unpublished table decision); 
Toronto Blue Jays, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 717 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
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Florida’s bench and bar have played in the development of America’s 
national pastime.  To make these decisions more accessible, they are briefly 
summarized below. 
II. ANTITRUST LAW 
In 1922, the Supreme Court of the United States granted MLB 
immunity from the nation’s antitrust laws.4  The Eleventh Circuit has applied 
this ruling twice—first in a case involving the scheduling of minor league 
baseball games,5 and then in a case investigating the proposed elimination of 
the Minnesota Twins and Montreal Expos.6  In contrast, the Supreme Court 
of Florida has read the exemption as applying only to player contracts.7  
Accordingly, the Second District reinstated a lawsuit in which the plaintiffs 
claimed that numerous parties had conspired to keep them from buying the 
Minnesota Twins and moving them to Florida.8 
III. BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Two cases from the Middle District have examined baseball through 
the prism of the country’s bankruptcy laws.9  In the former, a group of 
creditors objected to the debtor’s proposal to sell his interest in the Fort 
Wayne Wizards and use the proceeds to pay his attorneys.10  In affirming the 
                                                                                                                                         
1998) (unpublished table decision); Chiamparino v. Florida Marlins Baseball Club, 668 So. 2d 
605 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Tolar v. Chicago White Sox, 
Ltd., 684 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Wiggins v. 
City of Plant City, 633 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (unpublished table decision); 
Leasefirst v. Baseball Cards Unlimited, Inc., 550 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 
(unpublished table decision); Pro Baseball Clubs & Sch., Inc. v. Baseball Enters., Inc., 522 So. 
2d 390 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (unpublished table decision); Pinkston v. Little League 
Baseball, Inc., 365 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (unpublished table decision). 
4. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 
259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922). 
5. Prof’l Baseball Sch. & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085, 1085 (11th 
Cir. 1982). 
6.  Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
7. Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 
1025 (Fla. 1994). 
8. Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 739 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999). 
9. Van Buren Indus. Inv’rs v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 341 B.R. 783, 
786 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Major Sports Fantasy, Ltd. v. Dowdell (In re Dowdell), 406 B.R. 106, 
108–09 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009). 
10. In re Henderson, 341 B.R. at 786–87. 
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bankruptcy court, the district court found the debtor’s plan to be a reasonable 
one.11 
In the latter, the owners of two fantasy baseball camps sold their 
businesses.12  Despite a non-competition agreement, they soon opened 
several new camps.13  After the purchasers obtained a $241,000 judgment 
from a Texas state court, the sellers filed for bankruptcy in Florida and 
sought to discharge the judgment.14  Agreeing with the purchasers, the 
bankruptcy court held the sellers could only discharge so much of the 
judgment as was not attributable to their willful misconduct.15 
IV. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 
In a pro se complaint, a federal prisoner claimed the Tampa Bay 
Devil Rays were plotting to kill him when he got out of jail.16  Finding this 
allegation to be delusional, the Middle District dismissed the case.17 
V. CONTRACT LAW 
In 1949, the City of Miami opened Miami Stadium and hired Florida 
Sportservice, Inc. (“Sportservice”) to run the concession stands.18  For the 
next five years, the Miami Sun Sox, a Brooklyn Dodgers farm team, called 
the field home.19  In 1954, however, the Sun Sox folded.20  Following two 
seasons without baseball, Sidney Salomon, Jr., Sportservice’s owner, 
purchased the Syracuse Chiefs and moved the team to Florida, where they 
became the original Miami Marlins.21 
After having the Marlins sign a one-sided concession agreement with 
Sportservice, Salomon sold the club to media mogul George B. Storer.22  
                                                          
11. Id. at 791. 
12. In re Dowdell, 406 B.R. at 110. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 112. 
15. Id. at 115. 
16. Riches v. Schiavo, No. 8:07-CV-1644-T-30TGW, 2007 WL 2729681, at 
*1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2007). 
17. Id. 
18. Storer v. Fla. Sportservice, Inc., 115 So. 2d 433, 434–35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1959); SAM ZYGNER, THE FORGOTTEN MARLINS:  A TRIBUTE TO THE 1956–1960 
ORIGINAL MIAMI MARLINS 325 (2013). 
19. ZYGNER, supra note 18, at 131–32. 
20. Id. at 132. 
21. Storer, 115 So. 2d at 435; ZYGNER, supra note 18, at 14. 
22. Storer, 115 So. 2d at 434–35; ZYGNER, supra note 18, at 64. 
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When Storer found out about the sweetheart deal, he moved to set it aside.23  
The trial court dismissed his complaint but the Third District reversed.24 
A short time later, the City of Miami informed Sportservice it had 
decided not to renew its contract.25  Sportservice responded by suing the 
City, arguing that the absence of baseball from 1954 to 1956 entitled it to a 
two-year extension.26  The Third District rejected this contention because 
other events had taken place at Miami Stadium at which Sportservice had 
been able to sell concessions.27 
Several contract cases have involved the current Miami Marlins.  
When the engineering company building the team’s spring training complex 
was fired, for example, it sued Brevard County to recover the cost of various 
change orders.28  Because the orders were issued orally rather than in writing, 
the Supreme Court of Florida found collection on them barred by sovereign 
immunity.29 
In 1997, the Marlins delighted their fans by winning their first World 
Series; as a result, CFI Sales & Marketing, Ltd. (“CFI”) purchased premium 
stadium seats and advertising for the 1998 season.30  When the club then held 
a fire sale and wound up finishing in last place, CFI, believing it had been 
duped, sued for a refund but lost.31  On appeal, the Third District affirmed.32 
At a 2008 charity auction, Marlins president David Samson jokingly 
announced he was putting the team up for bid.33  The Pomeranz & Landsman 
Corporation (“P & L”) immediately offered $10 million.34  When the Marlins 
refused to go through with the “sale,” P & L sued.35  After P & L dropped its 
                                                          
23. Storer, 115 So. 2d at 435–36. 
24. Id. at 434, 438. 
25. Fla. Sportservice, Inc. v. City of Miami, 121 So. 2d 450, 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 1960). 
26. Id. at 452. 
27. Id. 
28. County of Brevard v. Miorelli Eng’g, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 
1997). 
29. Id. at 1051. 
30. E-mail from Richard W. Epstein, Esq., attorney for CFI Sales & 
Marketing, Ltd., to Professor Robert M. Jarvis (Sept. 24, 2014, 6:47 p.m. EDT) (on file with 
the authors). 
31. CFI Sales & Mktg., Ltd. v. Florida Marlins Baseball, Ltd., 837 So. 2d 423, 
423 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
32. Id. 
33. Complaint at 1–2, Omeranz & Landsman Corp. v. Miami Marlins 
Baseball Club, L.P., 143 So. 3d 1182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (No. 12-03405). 
34. Id. at 2. 
35. Jeff Sullivan, Marlins Being Sued by Would-Be Owners, SB NATION (Feb. 
22, 2012), http://sbnation.com/2012/2/22/2817036/miami-marlins-sued-action. 
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lawsuit, the Marlins moved for attorneys’ fees.36  In issuing a prohibitory 
writ, the Fourth District explained the trial court had lost its power to impose 
sanctions when the case was dismissed.37 
In an action involving considerably less drama, the City of Winter 
Haven filed a three-count complaint against the Cleveland Indians over the 
team’s failure to pay the City for using its Chain-O-Lakes baseball 
complex.38  Agreeing with the Indians, the Middle District held the first 
count (breach of contract) necessitated dismissal of the second and third 
counts (open account and account stated).39 
Two contract cases have involved baseball memorabilia.40  In one of 
them, the plaintiff accused an out-of-state defendant of selling him a fake Joe 
DiMaggio jersey.41  The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, but the Southern District found the defendant had sufficient 
contacts with Florida.42 
In the other case, the plaintiff claimed the defendants had issued a 
grossly inflated appraisal for a “Hall of Fame Baseball Montage.”43  The trial 
court dismissed for failure to state a claim, but the Fourth District reversed.44 
VI. CRIMINAL LAW 
Florida’s two earliest reported baseball decisions arose from the 
state’s 1905 ban on Sunday baseball.45  In the first, the Supreme Court of 
Florida upheld the newly-enacted law against multiple constitutional 
attacks.46  In the second, it set the defendant free after finding that the 
complainant, a minister, lacked standing.47 
                                                          
36. Pomeranz & Landsman Corp. v. Miami Marlins Baseball Club, L.P., 143 
So. 3d 1182, 1182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
37. Id. at 1183. 
38. City of Winter Haven v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., No. 8:09-CV-
00190-T-17EAJ, 2009 WL 1107670, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2009). 
39. Id. at *1–3. 
40. Pathman v. Grey Flannel Auctions, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320 (S.D. 
Fla. 2010); Blumstein v. Sports Immortals, Inc., 67 So. 3d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2011). 
41. Pathman, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 1320–21. 
42. Id. at 1321–22, 1324, 1326. 
43. Blumstein, 67 So. 3d at 439. 
44. Id. at 438–39. 
45. See Act of June 5, 1905, 1905 Fla. Laws ch. 5436, § 1.  The statute was 
repealed in 1969.  See Act effective July 1, 1969, ch. 69–87, 1969 Fla. Laws 322. 
46. West v. State, 39 So. 412, 415 (Fla. 1905). 
47. Nickelson v. State ex rel. Blitch, 57 So. 194, 196 (Fla. 1911). 
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In a more typical criminal case, a con man created a fictitious 
baseball team (the Gainesville All Stars) and convinced a local jeweler to be 
its sponsor.48  A jury convicted him of forgery for cashing the jeweler’s 
check.49  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.50 
In a somewhat similar scheme, Vincent Antonucci, the owner of a 
Crystal River souvenir shop called Talkin’ Baseball, swindled Ted Williams, 
the legendary Boston Red Sox left fielder and the business’s silent partner.51  
When the State of Florida and Williams both went after Antonucci, the trial 
judge continued the State’s criminal case to allow Williams’ civil case to 
finish first.52  On appeal, the Fifth District found this to be error.53 
In another case involving a famous major leaguer, former Detroit 
Tigers pitcher Denny McLain had his federal racketeering conviction 
overturned by the Eleventh Circuit because the actions of the prosecutor and 
the trial judge had denied him a fair trial.54 
More recently, a woman convinced a bank that two World Series 
baseballs—one signed by the New York Yankees and the other by the 
Detroit Tigers—were worth $8 million.55  The jury found her guilty of bank 
fraud, but the Northern District threw out the verdict for lack of evidence.56  
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit ordered it reinstated.57 
In two separate incidents, a New York Mets minor league player and 
a little league coach were convicted of sexual misconduct.58  The Fourth 
District upheld the player’s conviction,59 but the First District reversed the 
coach’s conviction because the prosecutors had relied on an improper 
theory.60 
                                                          
48. Green v. State, 76 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 1954). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 648. 
51. State v. Antonucci, 590 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); 
BEN BRADLEE, JR., THE KID: THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF TED WILLIAMS 624 (2013). 
52. Antonucci, 590 So. 2d at 999. 
53. Id. at 1000. 
54. United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1459, 1462, 1468 (11th Cir. 
1987). 
55. United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1321 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004). 
56. Id. at 1320. 
57. Id. at 1326. 
58. Palmer v. State, 838 So. 2d 579, 579–80 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002); 
Gonzalez v. State, 745 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
59. Gonzalez, 745 So. 2d at 543. 
60. Palmer, 838 So. 2d at 579. 
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In yet another case, an off-duty police officer at a St. Lucie Mets 
game had too much to drink.61  When he was asked to leave, he became 
hostile and was taken into custody.62  Following his release, he sued for false 
arrest and false imprisonment, but the Southern District dismissed his 
complaint.63 
VII. DISABILITY LAW 
There are two reported cases involving disabled baseball fans.64  In 
the first, the plaintiff sought to force the Florida Marlins to make Pro Player 
Stadium more accessible.65  The Southern District dismissed because the 
plaintiff’s proposed modifications were not readily achievable.66 
In the second, involving similar claims against the St. Lucie Mets at 
Tradition Field, the Southern District put off ruling on the team’s motions to 
dismiss for lack of standing and mootness until a full record could be 
developed.67 
VIII. EDUCATION LAW 
The baseball coach at Coconut Creek High School was disciplined 
for failing to prevent hazing during a team trip to Orlando.68  On appeal, the 
Fourth District reversed the Broward County School Board’s decision 
because the coach had been unaware of the players’ activities.69 
In four cases, high school baseball players challenged decisions of 
the Florida High School Athletic Association.70  In the first, a Hialeah Miami 
Lakes High School player who had used up his eligibility and had been 
                                                          
61. Magielski v. Sheriff of St. Lucie Cty., No. 2:11-CV-14235-KMM, 2012 
WL 292285, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2012). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at *2, *4. 
64. Wein v. St. Lucie Cty., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2006); 
Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
65. Access Now, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1361. 
66. Id. at 1371. 
67. Wein, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1262, 1265. 
68. McMillan v. Broward Cty. Sch. Bd., 834 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2003). 
69. Id. 
70. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Marazzito, 891 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Lee v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, Inc., 291 So. 2d 636, 638–39 
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Coletti v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 23 Fla. L. Weekly 
Supp. 38 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. May 11, 2015); White v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 9 Fla. L. 
Weekly Supp. 536 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. May 8, 2002). 
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denied a hardship waiver had his case dismissed by the trial court.71  On 
appeal, the Third District reversed and held he was entitled to a hearing.72 
In the second, four home-schooled players sued after school officials 
declared them ineligible to play for the Chattahoochee High Magnet School 
baseball team.73  Finding that no rules had been broken, the trial court 
ordered them reinstated.74 
In the third, a catcher at All Saints Academy in Winter Haven 
petitioned for an extra year of eligibility.75  The trial court granted his 
request, but the Second District reversed after concluding the record did not 
support such an extraordinary remedy.76 
In the fourth, a Nova High School player argued that his team’s 
regional semi-final game against St. Thomas High School should not have 
been called due to rain.77  The trial court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of 
standing, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to state a 
cause of action.78  It also found that the umpires had been right to give the 
victory to St. Thomas.79 
IX. FAMILY LAW 
Just before going on a team trip, Boston Red Sox pitching coach 
Dennis Rasmussen signed a note leaving all of his property to his wife Jan 
“in the event of death or separation.”80  The couple later divorced.81  Relying 
on the note, the trial court ruled that Rasmussen’s individual retirement 
account and MLB pension were marital assets.82  The Second District 
reversed because the note, being conditional, failed to create a valid gift.83 
                                                          
71. Lee, 291 So. 2d at 638. 
72. Id. at 638–39. 
73. White, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 536. 
74. Id. 
75. Marazzito, 891 So. 2d at 654. 
76. Id. 
77. Coletti, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 38. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 909 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2005). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 970–71. 
73
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
58 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
X. GAMBLING LAW 
Three cases have involved prosecutions for wagering on baseball.84  
In the first, the Southern District ordered cash seized from a bookmaker who 
had taken bets on baseball to be returned.85  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit 
ordered a new trial.86 
In the second, the defendants “were found guilty of maintaining a 
gambling room.”87  On appeal, the Third District reversed because the 
evidence—a bet on one baseball game—was insufficient to support the 
charges.88 
In the third, the defendants were convicted by the Southern District 
of taking bets on baseball games.89  Finding no error, the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed their sentences.90 
XI. GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW 
Claiming she had been denied a promotion because of her gender, a 
woman baseball umpire sued multiple defendants.91  When she failed to 
make timely service, two of the defendants moved for dismissal, which the 
Middle District granted.92 
In two different lawsuits against the Brevard County School Board, 
the Middle District found that the disparities between the boys’ baseball and 
girls’ softball programs at various local high schools were so substantial they 
violated federal and state law.93 
                                                          
84. United States v. Sklaroff, 552 F.2d 1156, 1157 (5th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Frank, 265 F.2d 529, 529–30 (5th Cir. 1959); Cohen v. State, 189 So. 2d 498, 498–
99 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
85. Frank, 265 F.2d at 529–30. 
86. Id. at 531. 
87. Cohen, 189 So. 2d at 498. 
88. Id. at 499. 
89. Sklaroff, 552 F.2d at 1157, 1162. 
90. Id. at 1162. 
91. Cox v. Ariz. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 436, 437 
(M.D. Fla. 1993). 
92. Id. at 439. 
93. Landow ex rel. Landow v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cty., 132 F. Supp. 2d 958, 
958–59 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cty., 985 F. Supp. 1458, 1459 (M.D. 
Fla. 1997). 
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XII. IMMIGRATION LAW 
After successfully smuggling Cuban infielder Yuniesky Betancourt 
into the United States and obtaining a $2.8 million contract for him with the 
Seattle Mariners, sports agent Gustavo Dominguez decided to try his luck 
again with five more Cuban players.94  This time the plan blew up and 
Dominguez was convicted by the Southern District of smuggling, 
concealing, and transporting unlawful aliens.95  On appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the smuggling conviction but reversed the other charges for 
lack of evidence.96 
XIII. INSURANCE LAW 
Following the closure of a baseball card store, one of its investors 
agreed to keep its inventory in his home.97  A short time later, the home was 
broken into, and the cards were stolen.98  The investor sued his insurer and 
was awarded $25,000.99  Considering this amount to be too little, the investor 
filed a new action against his agent for failing to provide him with the proper 
coverage.100 
In the trial court and at the Fourth District, the agent successfully 
defended on the ground that the investor’s suit was time-barred.101  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected this contention.102  
Nevertheless, it ordered the complaint dismissed due to the investor’s bad 
faith in suing the agent.103 
A little league coach injured during a game sued both the league and 
the City of South Daytona.104  Nutmeg, the City’s insurer, tendered the case 
to Continental, the league’s insurer, but it denied liability.105  After the 
coach’s claim was dismissed, the City filed a declaratory judgment action 
against Continental for attorneys’ fees.106  The trial court ordered Continental 
                                                          
94. United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1057 (11th Cir. 2011). 
95. Id. at 1056–57. 
96. Id. at 1056. 
97. Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 2001). 
98. Id. at 1063. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Blumberg, 790 So. 2d at 1065–66. 
103. Id. at 1066–68. 
104. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. City of South Daytona, 807 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 5th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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to reimburse the City for both actions.107  On appeal, the Fifth District held 
the City was entitled to attorneys’ fees only in the coach’s action.108 
When pitcher Alex Fernandez re-injured his shoulder, the Florida 
Marlins sought reimbursement from its insurer Lloyd’s of London.109  
Having paid out on a previous claim, Lloyd’s denied coverage.110  During 
discovery, it sought to learn what the Marlins had been told by a Missouri 
lawyer named Michael Whittle.111  The Marlins objected, claiming that 
Whittle’s advice was protected by attorney-client privilege.112  The trial court 
rejected this contention because Whittle was not admitted in Florida, but the 
Third District reversed.113 
After prospect Matthew White tore his rotator cuff while pitching for 
the 2000 U.S. Olympic team, the Tampa Bay Devil Rays submitted a claim 
to the Standard Security Life Insurance Company.114  It refused to pay 
because White was able to pitch sporadically during the 2001 season for the 
Durham Bulls.115  Finding that numerous unresolved fact issues existed, the 
Middle District denied Standard’s summary judgment motion and referred 
the Devil Rays’ summary judgment motion to a magistrate judge.116 
XIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
In two different actions, Little League Baseball, Inc. sued parties 
who were using its trademarks.117  In the first, the Middle District ordered the 
defendant to stop using the marks.118  In the second, the Southern District 
refused to let the defendant depose the league’s president after finding he had 
                                                          
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 93. 
109. Andrew Cave, Lloyd’s Whacks $7.7M Claim by Baseball Team, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (London), July 5, 2004, at 25. 
110. Id. 
111. Florida Marlins Baseball Club, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s 
London Subscribing to Policy No. 893/HC/97/9096, 900 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Tampa Bay Devil Rays, LED v. Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. 
8:04-CV-1330-T-17MAP, 2006 WL 1119207, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2006). 
115. Id. at *4. 
116. Id. at *4–5. 
117. Little League Baseball, Inc. v. Kaplan, No. 08-60554-CIV, 2009 WL 
426277, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2009); Little League Baseball, Inc. v. Daytona Beach Little 
League, Inc., No. 76-108, 1977 WL 22777, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 1977). 
118. Daytona Beach Little League, Inc., 1977 WL 22777, at *1. 
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no pertinent knowledge and the defendant already had deposed four other 
league officials.119 
In another case, a songwriter who wrote a ballad about the Fort 
Myers Miracle sued the team for playing it at its home games.120  When the 
Miracle produced proof it had twice obtained permission to do so, the Middle 
District granted the team summary judgment.121  On appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed.122 
In a different action, a developer accused various parties of stealing 
his idea of having a baseball stadium anchor a mixed-used development 
project in Jupiter.123  Finding the concept to be an obvious one, the trial court 
dismissed,124 and the Fourth District affirmed.125 
In two cases, former MLB players sued others for using their 
names.126  In the first, the Southern District dismissed for lack of personal 
jurisdiction a lawsuit filed by the estate of Joe DiMaggio against various San 
Francisco officials who had named a park in his honor.127  In the second, the 
Fourth District decided the jury hearing Cecil Fielder’s lawsuit against an 
interior decorating company had been unduly influenced by Fielder’s 
fame.128 
XV. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
After escaping Cuba and signing a $30 million contract with the 
Cincinnati Reds, pitcher Aroldis Chapman found himself sued by four 
individuals who claimed they had been tortured by the Cuban government 
after Chapman gave false testimony against them to avoid losing his spot on 
the Cuban national baseball team.129  Citing the Act of State and political 
question doctrines, Chapman moved to dismiss the suit, but the Southern 
District found neither defense to be a bar.130 
                                                          
119. Kaplan, 2009 WL 426277, at *1. 
120. Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749, 751 (11th Cir. 1997). 
121. Id. at 751–53. 
122. Id. at 754. 
123. Alevizos v. John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Found., 764 So. 2d 8, 10–
11 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
124. Id. at 11, 13. 
125. Id. at 13. 
126. DiMaggio, LLC v. City & County of San Francisco, 187 F. Supp. 2d 
1359, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Weinstein Design Grp., Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So. 2d 990, 993 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
127. DiMaggio, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1362. 
128. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc., 884 So. 2d at 995. 
129. Garcia v. Chapman, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1229, 1231 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
130. Id. at 1240–42. 
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XVI. JUDICIAL ETHICS 
Broward Circuit Judge John T. Luzzo accepted Florida Marlins 
tickets from lawyers who regularly appeared in front of him.131  For this 
lapse in judgment, the Judicial Qualifications Commission recommended a 
public reprimand, which the Supreme Court of Florida imposed.132 
XVII. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
When he was denied overtime, a Sarasota White Sox groundskeeper 
sued the team.133  Based on the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “recreational 
operator” exemption,134 the Middle District dismissed.135  On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.136 
In another FLSA case, workers who had helped build the Miami 
Marlins’ new stadium sued for wages they claimed they had not received.137  
The Southern District dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,138 but 
the Eleventh Circuit reversed.139 
After officiating a game together at Spoto High School in Riverview, 
one umpire filed a report accusing the other umpire of inappropriate 
conduct.140  The Umpires Association refused to give the second umpire a 
copy of the report but remained willing to hire him for future games.141  
Indignant, the second umpire refused to accept any new assignments and 
sued the association for embarrassment and loss of income.142  Finding the 
plaintiff’s claims to be meritless, the Hillsborough Circuit Court dismissed 
them.143 
In an action arising out of the Biogenesis steroids scandal, MLB 
Commissioner Bud Selig sought testimony from Yuri Sucart, Alex 
                                                          
131. In re Luzzo, 756 So. 2d 76, 77 (Fla. 2000). 
132. Id. at 79. 
133. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 592 (11th Cir. 1995). 
134. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3). 
135. Jeffrey, 64 F.3d at 597. 
136. Id. at 592. 
137. Calderon v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 771 F.3d 807, 808–09 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
138. Id. at 809. 
139. Id. at 811. 
140. Sousa v. W. Cent. Fla. Umpires Inc., No. 09CA08550, 2010 WL 9606079, 
at *1 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Apr. 29, 2010). 
141. Id. at *2. 
142. Id. at *1–2. 
143. Id. at *2. 
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Rodriguez’s cousin, and a second man.144  When they moved to quash their 
subpoenas, the trial court dismissed for lack of standing.145  On appeal, the 
Third District denied for the alternate reason that the petitioners had failed to 
prove that the lawsuit was preempted by federal labor law.146 
XVIII. LIBEL LAW 
In an interview in the Ladies Home Journal, Kelly Ripken, the wife 
of Baltimore Orioles shortstop Cal Ripken, implied that a particular woman 
was a baseball groupie who wanted to sleep with her husband.147  Taking 
offense, the woman sued, but the trial court dismissed.148  On appeal, the 
Fourth District affirmed because the comment was “pure opinion.”149 
XIX. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 
A student at Braulio Alonso High School in Tampa died from 
cardiac arrest during a pre-season baseball workout.150  The jury found that 
the doctor who had signed the student’s medical release form was 20% 
liable.151  On appeal, the Second District reversed because the student’s 
estate failed to establish that the doctor’s actions were a proximate cause of 
death.152 
XX. MUNICIPAL FINANCE LAW 
In 1966, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled the City of Deerfield 
Beach could not build a spring training facility for the Pittsburgh Pirates.153  
Thirty-five years later, with public sentiment regarding such projects having 
                                                          
144. Sucart v. Office of the Comm’r, 129 So. 3d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2013). 
145. Id. at 1114. 
146. Id. at 1113–14. 
147. Morse v. Ripken, 707 So. 2d 921, 921–22 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
148. Id. at 921. 
149. Id. at 921, 923. 
150. Shartz v. Miulli, 127 So. 3d 613, 614 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review 
denied, 148 So. 3d 771 (Fla. 2014). 
151. Id. at 616, 618. 
152. Id. at 618–19, 621.  Prior to trial, the family’s lawsuit against various 
school officials was dismissed for failing to state a cause of action.  Miulli v. Fla. High Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n, 998 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
153. Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6, 7–8, 12 (Fla. 1966). 
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shifted, it held the City of Clearwater could build a spring training facility for 
the Philadelphia Phillies.154 
When it appeared that Orlando might get an MLB expansion team, 
Orange County pledged to build a new stadium using a 1% tourist tax.155  In 
response, a group of hotels filed a lawsuit.156  The trial court dismissed their 
action as premature, but the Fifth District reversed.157  The matter became 
moot after the franchise was awarded to Tampa Bay.158 
A decade later, the City of Miami agreed to build a new stadium for 
the Florida Marlins.159  Two taxpayers sought but were denied a temporary 
injunction prohibiting the City from selling the bonds needed to pay for the 
project.160  In dismissing their appeal as moot, the Third District pointed out 
that their failure to request an emergency stay had resulted in the bonds being 
issued.161 
XXI. OPEN GOVERNMENT LAW 
In a case involving St. Petersburg’s failure to land the Chicago 
White Sox as a tenant for its new stadium, the Second District ordered the 
City to share its records with the public.162  But in a subsequent case 
involving the relocation of the Baltimore Orioles’ spring training home from 
Fort Lauderdale to Sarasota, the Supreme Court of Florida decided that 
Sarasota had not violated any laws by conducting negotiations in private.163 
                                                          
154. Roper v. City of Clearwater, 796 So. 2d 1159, 1159–60, 1164 (Fla. 2001). 
155. Tamar 7600, Inc. v. Orange Cty., 686 So. 2d 790, 790 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 1997). 
156. Id. at 791. 
157. Id. at 791, 793. 
158. Id. at 790, 793; DE QUESADA JR., supra note 1, at 128. 
159. Solares v. City of Miami, 23 So. 3d 227, 227–28 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 
2009). 
160. Id. at 228. 
161. Id.  This decision followed the earlier dismissal of a similar lawsuit 
championed by automobile magnate Norman Braman.  See Braman v. Miami-Dade Cty., 18 
So. 3d 1259, 1259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
162. Times Publ’g Co. v. City of St. Petersburg, 558 So. 2d 487, 490–91, 495 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).  See generally BOB ANDELMAN, STADIUM FOR RENT: TAMPA 
BAY’S QUEST FOR MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (1993). 
163. Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Gov’t v. City of Sarasota, 48 So. 3d 
755, 758, 766 (Fla. 2010). 
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XXII. PERSONAL INJURY LAW 
In an early case, a Pensacola boy chasing a baseball was seriously 
injured when he ran into the street and was hit by a car.164  The jury found for 
the youngster, but the Supreme Court of Florida reversed due to his 
contributory negligence.165  In a much more recent case, the Middle District 
held that a van carrying a baseball team was not responsible for a bicyclist’s 
injuries.166 
In most of Florida’s personal injury baseball cases, the plaintiff 
either has been a spectator or a bystander.167  Sometimes, however, the 
plaintiff has been a player.  For example, when a batter was injured because 
the helmet he was wearing failed to protect him, he sued its out-of-state 
manufacturer.168  Although the trial court twice found the defendant 
amenable to suit in Florida, the First District reversed both times.169 
                                                          
164. Magee v. Friedricksen, 109 So. 197, 197 (Fla. 1926) (en banc). 
165. Id. 
166. Donaldson v. United States, No. 6:09-CV-1049-ORL-28GJK, 2011 WL 
1988803, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2011). 
167. See, e.g., Baker v. Major League Baseball Props., Inc., No. 
3:08CV114/MCR, 2009 WL 1098482, at *1, *4 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2009) (Florida fan injured 
at World Baseball Classic in San Diego had to sue in California); Woodford v. City of St. 
Petersburg, 84 So. 2d 25, 26–27 (Fla. 1955) (homeowner could sue City for failing to protect 
him from baseball-chasing crowd); City of Coral Springs v. Rippe, 743 So. 2d 61, 62, 65 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (jury’s finding that City knew its fences were too short to protect 
spectators was reasonable); Collazos v. City of West Miami, 683 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 3d 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not have been entered in 
case involving four-year-old struck by baseball bat); City of Jacksonville v. Raulerson, 415 
So. 2d 1303, 1304, 1306 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (whether injured youngster appreciated 
dangers posed by baseball chalking machine was a question for the jury); Jackson v. Atlanta 
Braves, Inc., 227 So. 2d 63, 63–64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (summary judgment entered 
against fan hit by baseball reversed for further fact-finding); City of Bradenton v. Finley, 208 
So. 2d 675, 676 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (City named as third-party defendant in accident 
arising from its alleged failure to maintain spring training facility had to be sued in county in 
which it was located); Buck v. McLean, 115 So. 2d 764, 765, 768 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1959) (spectator’s suit dismissed because of sovereign immunity); Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 
110 So. 2d 417, 417, 420 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (summary judgment for defendants 
appropriate where fan who fell through open space in baseball stadium’s grandstand could not 
explain how accident happened); Giordano v. Babe Ruth League, Inc., No. 11CA1352, 2013 
WL 6911496, at *1 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. July 10, 2013) (summary judgment granted to defendants 
in suit brought by spectator hit in the head by errant warm-up throw). 
168. Am. Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski, 359 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 1978). 
169. Id. at 485, 489. 
81
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
66 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
Three player cases have involved pitching machines.170  In the first, 
two friends were sharing a batting cage.171  While taking a swing at a pitch, 
one of the friends accidentally hit the other with his bat.172  The injured 
friend later sued the facility’s operator, claiming he should have warned 
patrons that it was dangerous for two players to be in the cage at the same 
time.173  The trial court agreed, but the Second District reversed.174 
In the second, a child was injured when a pitching machine’s arm 
unexpectedly struck him.175  After his parents sued the machine’s 
manufacturer and its distributors, they were counter-sued for contribution.176  
Finding that the child had released his parents from liability, the Third 
District affirmed the dismissal of the counter-suit.177 
In the third, a batter was injured when a pitching machine 
malfunctioned.178  After jury selection, one of the defendants settled the case 
for $1.1 million.179  It then sought contribution from the other defendants.180  
Two of the co-defendants refused to pay and claimed they had defenses that 
would have shielded them from any judgment.181  The trial court agreed with 
the co-defendants, but the First District reversed.182 
XXIII. REAL PROPERTY LAW 
As part of its plan to build a new power station, the City of 
Jacksonville filed an eminent domain lawsuit to acquire thirty-six acres of 
privately-held land.183  Contending that it did not need the entire parcel, the 
property’s owner, as well as a baseball team with a subordinate interest, 
                                                          
170. Home Ins. Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 500 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 1986); Dudley Sports Co. v. Berry, 407 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 
1981); Chambers v. Cline, 161 So. 2d 224, 224–25 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). 
171. Chambers, 161 So. 2d at 225. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Dudley Sports Co., 407 So. 2d at 336. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 337. 
178. Home Ins. Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 500 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
179. Id. at 666. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 665–66, 668–69 (rejecting manufacturer’s statute of repose defense). 
183. Inland Waterway Dev. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 38 So. 2d 676, 676–77 
(Fla. 1948). 
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objected but lost at trial.184  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida 
affirmed.185 
In a different action to stop the City of Gulfport from leasing a 
portion of Tomlinson Park to a baseball league, the Second District found the 
proposed arrangement to be a valid public use.186 
When a law transferring Al Lopez Field—the spring training home 
of the Cincinnati Reds—from the City of Tampa to the Tampa Sports 
Authority was challenged, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the statute as 
a proper exercise of the Florida Legislature’s municipal oversight powers.187 
In a similar action, a taxpayer sued the City of Fort Myers for failing 
to give proper notice of its plan to transfer City of Palms Park—the spring 
training home of the Boston Red Sox—to Lee County.188  Finding that the 
plaintiff did not have standing, the Second District dismissed.189 
In yet another case, a group of North Bay Village homeowners 
sought to prevent the construction of a baseball field at Treasure Island 
Elementary School, claiming it would create a nuisance.190  The Third 
District dismissed the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds.191 
XXIV. TAX LAW 
In 1948, a husband and wife won a car during a raffle at a Tampa 
Smokers baseball game.192  The IRS assessed income taxes, which the couple 
paid under protest.193  In court, they argued that a sign at Plant Field had 
informed fans that a car would be given away, thereby making the vehicle a 
gift.194  Agreeing with this contention, the Southern District ordered the 
government to issue a refund.195 
                                                          
184. Id. at 677. 
185. Id. at 679. 
186. Fla. Little Major League Ass’n v. Gulfport Lion’s Little League, Inc., 127 
So. 2d 707, 708, 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961). 
187. State v. Tampa Sports Auth., 188 So. 2d 795, 798 (Fla. 1966). 
188. Smith v. City of Fort Myers, 944 So. 2d 1092, 1093 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2006). 
189. Id. at 1093, 1096. 
190. Paredes v. City of North Bay Village, 693 So. 2d 1153, 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 1997). 
191. Id. at 1153–54. 
192. Fernandez v. Fahs, 144 F. Supp. 630, 630–31 (S.D. Fla. 1956). 
193. Id. at 630. 
194. Id. at 632. 
195. Id. at 631–32.  By the time the court ruled, the Smokers had folded.  See 
DE QUESADA JR., supra note 1, at 8 (explaining that the team’s last year was 1954). 
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When the Hillsborough County Value Adjustment Board granted a 
tax break to the New York Yankees’ spring training facility in Tampa, the 
Hillsborough County property appraiser challenged the decision.196  The trial 
court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing.197  On appeal, the Second 
District affirmed.198  In later proceedings, the Supreme Court of Florida 
affirmed the Second District.199 
Because of a back-loaded contract, the New York Mets owed 
deferred compensation to outfielder Darryl Strawberry.200  When the team 
sought to make the first payment, both the IRS and Strawberry’s former wife 
stepped forward.201  Agreeing with the magistrate judge’s recommendation, 
the Northern District found for the IRS as the first-in-time creditor.202 
XXV. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 
Generally speaking, professional athletes are entitled to receive 
workers’ compensation.203  Two Florida cases have authorized such 
benefits,204 and two others have rejected procedural attempts to block such 
claims.205 
XXVI. CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing makes clear, Florida’s courts have been in the 
middle of almost every conceivable type of baseball-related dispute.  What 
sorts of cases will they handle in the future?  Although prognostications 
always are fraught with risk, it seems likely that actions involving injured 
                                                          
196. Turner v. Hillsborough Cty. Aviation Auth., 739 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
197. Id. at 177. 
198. Id. at 179–80. 
199. Fuchs v. Robbins, 818 So. 2d 460, 464 (Fla. 2002). 
200. Colon v. Strawberry, No. 4:12-CV-101 MCR/CAS, 2013 WL 7023169, at 
*1–2 (N.D. Fla. July 26, 2013). 
201. Id. at *3. 
202. Id. at *4. 
203. WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., SPORTS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 256 (4th ed. 
2011). 
204. Miles v. Montreal Baseball Club, 379 So. 2d 1325, 1325–26 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 1980) (infielder injured at a team press party); Sielicki v. New York Yankees, 388 
So. 2d 25, 25–26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (pitcher forced into early retirement due to arm 
strain). 
205. Hartzog v. New York Yankees, 847 So. 2d 1115, 1115 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003) (statute of limitations); Detroit Tigers v. Castillo, 843 So. 2d 1026, 1026 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (venue). 
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fans will continue to be brought, especially if the nascent movement to 
jettison the venerable “Baseball Rule”—which protects stadium operators 
from liability for balls that leave the field and hit spectators—takes root in 
Florida.206 
A number of lawsuits will arise if the Tampa Bay Rays decide to 
exercise their new-found right to depart Tropicana Field early.207  Indeed, it 
almost is a certainty that a group of wary taxpayers will challenge whatever 
funding mechanism is used to finance the project.  Moreover, if the 
negotiations are not transparent, an open government lawsuit is practically a 
given.  And, of course, at least some residents will seek to force the club to 
fully honor its existing lease.208 
The minimum wage litigation taking place in California between 
minor league players and MLB has enormous potential ramifications for 
Florida.  The players contend they are being grossly underpaid in violation of 
federal law.209  If they prevail, the continued financial viability of one or 
more of Florida’s minor league teams could be in jeopardy. 
Just before the start of the 2015 season, MLB punished Miami 
Marlins pitcher Jarred Cosart after rumors spread that he had bet on 
baseball.210  Nevertheless, MLB and the country’s three other major sports 
leagues are getting closer to dropping their longstanding opposition to sports 
gambling.211  This will have significant implications for Florida’s casinos, 
                                                          
206. The Baseball Rule was announced in Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & 
Exhibition Co. and quickly gained widespread acceptance.  153 S.W. 1076, 1077–78 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1913).  Four recent cases, however, have called it into question.  See Coomer v. Kansas 
City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 197–98 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); S. Shore 
Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903, 907–09 (Ind. 2014); Rountree v. Boise Baseball, 
L.L.C., 296 P.3d 373, 376 (Idaho 2013); Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. F.F., 761 
S.E.2d 613, 616 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).  Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Florida 
has not had to construe the Baseball Rule. 
207. Charlie Frago, City, Rays Break Logjam on Stadium, TAMPA BAY TIMES, 
Jan. 15, 2016, at 1 (explaining that after nearly a decade of negotiations, the City of St. 
Petersburg has authorized the Rays to leave Tropicana Field before their lease ends in 2027). 
208. For on-going coverage of the Rays’ efforts to find a new home, see Noah 
Pransky, Shadow of the Stadium, http://shadowofthestadium.blogspot.com. 
209. Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F. Supp. 3d 981, 991–92 
(N.D. Cal. 2015). 
210. Craig Davis, MLB Fines Cosart but Finds No Baseball Bets, SUN-
SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 2015, at 5C.  Concluding he had gambled on other sports but not baseball, 
MLB fined Cosart an undisclosed amount of money.  Id. 
211. Barry Svrluga, Unafraid of Change, Rob Manfred Steps to Plate, Faces 
Pitches on Pace of Play, Gambling, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2015/02/05/unafraid-of-change-rob-manfred
-steps-to-plate-faces-pitches-on-pace-of-play-gambling (“Adam Silver, who has been the 
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which undoubtedly will lobby state legislators for permission to operate 
sports books.212 
President Obama’s decision at the end of 2014 to normalize relations 
with Cuba will have important consequences for baseball in general and 
Florida in particular.  Already, there is talk of holding spring training games 
in Cuba.213  Many baseball fans—especially those in South Florida—will 
travel to such games, and it is not difficult to imagine some of these road 
trips ending in lawsuits if something goes wrong. 
Lastly, baseball is seemingly a topic of conversation every time 
Florida’s lawmakers meet.  During its 2015 regular session, for example, the 
Florida Legislature helped advance construction of a joint-use facility for the 
Houston Astros and Washington Nationals in West Palm Beach by 
approving needed zoning changes.214  It also considered bills relaxing the 
transfer rules for high school athletes,215 imposing new restrictions on ticket 
resellers,216 punishing disruptive youth sports coaches,217 and requiring the 
state to regularly assess its efforts to retain MLB spring training sites.218  
Additionally, to mark the sixtieth anniversary of Roberto Clemente’s big 
league debut, the Florida Senate passed a resolution honoring the Pittsburgh 
Pirates’ Hall of Fame right fielder.219 
                                                                                                                                         
NBA’s commissioner just more than a year, has embraced the idea of legalizing sports 
gambling, and he has discussed that with his counterparts in baseball, football and hockey.”). 
212. Of course, even if MLB greenlights gambling on its games, Florida’s 
casinos will not be able to operate sports books until the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704, either is repealed by Congress or struck 
down by the courts.  A challenge to the statute currently is pending before the full Third 
Circuit in Philadelphia.  See Joe Drape, Court Will Reconsider Its Ban on Sports Betting in 
New Jersey, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 2015, at B17. 
213. Manfred Foresees Teams Visiting Cuba, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 11, 2015, at 
1C. 
214. Joe Capozzi, Scott’s Pen Clears Way for Stadium, PALM BEACH POST, 
June 11, 2015, at 1B. 
215. Dan Sweeney, Bill Gives Young Athletes Options on Where to Play: 
Possibility of Creating ‘Powerhouse’ High Schools a Fear, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 29, 2015, at 
1A. 
216. Dan Sweeney, Lawmakers Want to Ban Bots for Ticket Resellers, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 14, 2015, at 8A. 
217. Sean Rossman, Bill Boots Unruly Coaches, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT 
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/31/bill-boots-unruly-
coaches/70732638. 
218. H.B. 7067, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015); S.B. 1214, 2015 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Fla. 2015) (amending FLA. STAT. § 288.0001 to require triennial reports by the Office 
of Economic and Demographic Research and the Office of Program Policy Analysis and 
Government Accountability). 
219. S. Res. 1666, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015). 
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Farther afield, the Florida House of Representatives voted to let 
private adoption agencies refuse to place children with same-sex couples.220  
This much-criticized step came just weeks after the Tampa Bay Rays urged 
the Supreme Court of the United States to recognize gay marriages,221 and 
MLB, in response to Indiana’s new religious restoration statute, which many 
observers viewed as an attack on LGBT rights, issued a press release 
condemning discrimination in any form.222 
                                                          
220. Gray Rohrer, House Bill Has Tax Cuts, Gay-Adoption Controversy, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 10, 2015, at 1B. 
221. Roger Mooney, Rays Backing Gay Marriage in Supreme Court Cases, 
TAMPA TRIB. (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.tbo.com/news/crime/rays-backing-gay-marriage-in-
supreme-court-cases-20150306. 
222. Lucy McCalmont, MLB Responds to Indiana’s ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/01/mlb-indiana-
law_n_6987220.html. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Survey discusses major Florida evidentiary case law 
developments during the 2014 calendar year.1  As in most years since the 
Florida Evidence Code’s (“the Code”) passage, few significant statutory 
changes occurred in 2014.2  Florida attorneys must continue to look to the 
state’s appellate courts for guidance on the Code and other evidentiary 
related issues.*  As with most survey years, not every recent decision merits 
discussion.*  Cases have been selected for discussion in this Survey on the 
basis of three criteria:  (1) the case represents a new or relatively new 
evidentiary development, (2) the case provides a good example of 
fundamental principles in a certain area, or (3) evidentiary issues in a 
particular area arose so commonly, that they are important for discussion to 
both practitioners and the courts.3  As a service to readers, the author notes 
that the following evidentiary areas, not discussed in the Survey’s main text, 
generated opinions during 2014:4  judicial notice,5 accident report privilege,6 
                                                 
*  J.D., 1973, Catholic University; L.L.M., 1977, Temple University.  M. 
Dobson is a member of the Florida Bar and is also admitted to practice in Kansas.  He is a 
professor of law at Nova Southeastern University. 
1. See infra Parts II–VII. 
2. In 2014, the Florida Legislature made four changes to the Code.  See Act 
effective Oct. 1, 2014, ch. 2014-160, § 15, 2014 Fla. Laws 2157, 2190–91; Act effective Oct. 
1, 2014, ch. 2014-200, § 1, 2014 Fla. Laws 2632, 2633; Act effective May 12, 2014, ch. 2014-
19, § 30, 2014 Fla. Laws 299, 325; Act effective May 12, 2014, ch. 2014-35, § 2, 2014 Fla. 
Laws 676, 678.  Three of these were extremely minor.  Chapter 2014-160, Florida Laws, 
amended section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes, by changing statutory references in 
subsections (2)(b)(2) and (c)(2).  See FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2014).  Chapter 2014-19, Florida 
Laws, deleted obsolete provisions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in section 90.503 of 
the Florida Statutes.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.503.  Finally, chapter 2014-200, Florida Laws, made 
minor changes and deletions to the hearsay exception for statements of elderly persons or 
disabled adults in section 90.803(24) of the Florida Statutes.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.803.  The 
only significant statutory change was made in section 90.204 of the Florida Statutes 
concerning the propriety and nature of taking judicial notice.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.204.  
Chapter 2014-35, Florida Laws, added a fourth subsection to this rule, providing for the 
emergency taking of judicial notice in family law cases.  See id. § 90.204(4). 
3. See infra Parts II–VII. 
4. See infra Parts II–VII.  The author does not claim this footnoted list is a 
complete catalogue of all evidentiary issues discussed in the 2014 decisions.  For example, 
neither the Survey’s main text nor this list includes cases discussing expert testimony. 
5. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.201–.204.  When judicial notice is taken of 
information not offered in open court, fairness requires the parties to be given a chance to 
challenge it and to offer contradictory proof.  Id.  In Glaister v. Glaister, the court found a 
general master in a domestic relations case erred sua sponte by taking judicial notice of an IRS 
tax guide without affording a challenge opportunity as required by section 90.204(3) of the 
Florida Statutes.  Glaister v. Glaister, 137 So. 3d 513, 516–17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 
see also FLA. STAT. § 90.204(3).  
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informer privilege, 7  litigation privilege, 8  trade secrets, 9  impeachment on 
collateral matters,10 impeachment by showing potential bias,11 impeachment 
                                                                                                                   
As mentioned above in note 1, the 2014 Florida Legislature added a fourth 
subsection to section 90.204 of the Florida Statutes, providing for the emergency taking of 
judicial notice in family law cases when imminent danger to persons or property exists.  Ch. 
2014-35, § 2, 2014 Fla. Laws at 678 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.204(4)); see also supra note 
1 and accompanying text. 
6. See FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4).  In Wetherington v. State, the defendant’s 
felony driving under the influence conviction was reversed because the trial court erroneously 
allowed the investigating police officer to testify to statements Wetherington made identifying 
himself as the driver of a crashed vehicle in a one car accident.  Wetherington v. State, 135 
So. 3d 584, 585, 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  These statements were made before either 
the defendant waived his Miranda rights or otherwise waived his privilege against self-
incrimination.  Id. at 586 n.1.  This violated the accident report privilege.  Id. at 586; see also 
FLA. STAT. § 316.066. 
7. See State v. Powell, 140 So. 3d 1126, 1127, 1130 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (arising from the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari requesting reversal of a trial 
court’s order to disclose the identity of confidential informants who provided police 
information used in an application for a wiretap).  The State’s general privilege in withholding 
a confidential informant’s identity can only be overcome if either the informant will be a 
witness at trial or if disclosing the informant’s identity is essential to a fair determination of 
the case.  Id.  As the only purpose of disclosure was to provide information to contest probable 
cause for issuance of the wiretap application, identity disclosure was not constitutionally 
required.  Id. at 1132. 
For a recent short article discussing the informer’s privilege, see Stephen A. 
Saltzburg, Trial Tactics:  Informant Privilege, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2015, at 60. 
8. See Pomfret v. Atkinson, 137 So. 3d 1161, 1162–64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014).  Although there is no absolute privilege for an attorney’s alleged defamatory 
statements during ex-parte, out-of-court statements to a potential, non-party witness, such 
statements may be protected by a qualified privilege.  Id.  When the statements have some 
relation to an underlying lawsuit, the party alleging defamation must show express malice.  Id. 
at 1164.  Express malice means that the statements were made with a desire to harm the 
person allegedly defamed.  Id.; R.H. Ciccone Props., Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
141 So. 3d 590, 591–92 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (specifying that the litigation privilege 
did not support the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s quiet title action against a bank 
after the bank voluntarily dismissed its foreclosure action against the appellant). 
9. See FLA. STAT. § 90.506 (generally protecting trade secrets as privileged, 
as long as recognizing the “privilege will not conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice”).  
This section does not define what is a trade secret, leaving this instead to section 688.002 of 
the Florida Statutes.  FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4).  When information is claimed to be a trade 
secret, the court must first decide if it qualifies as such, and then hold a hearing on its 
disclosure, and on how it is necessary to determine the underlying issues in the litigation.  See 
Bright House Networks, LLC v. Cassidy, 129 So. 3d 501, 505–06 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding that customer lists not publicly available can be trade secrets, thus requiring an 
in camera review to determine such, and to also determine the opposing party’s need to access 
them for the litigation). 
For another recent case involving disclosure of trade secrets, see Laser Spring Inst., 
LLC v. Greer, 144 So. 3d 633, 633–34 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), finding that billing and 
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with prior inconsistent statements, 12  the rape shield statute, 13  the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,14 authentication of photographs taken 
                                                                                                                   
collection documents which admittedly were trade secrets could not be ordered disclosed 
without a hearing making particularized findings for their need. 
10. See FLA. STAT. § 90.608(5) (permitting “[p]roof by other witnesses that 
material facts are not as testified to by [a] witness”).  This language forbids impeachment by 
offering contradictory proof on purely collateral matters, introduced only to contradict the 
witness’s testimony on a minor point.  See id.  What is collateral or not must necessarily be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  See Anderson v. State, 133 So. 3d 646, 647–48 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1006 (2015) (finding that whether a sexual 
battery victim wore jogging clothes or pajamas at the time of the alleged attack was collateral, 
even if the victim’s characterization of her dress as jogging clothes was false); Cokely v. 
State, 138 So. 3d 1204, 1208–09 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that the witness’s 
proffered testimony would not have been collateral, as it would have contradicted the victim’s 
direct examination testimony related to the material contested issue of whether the victim had 
been trespassing on the defendant’s property before the defendant allegedly attacked the 
victim). 
One area where the Florida courts have held as a matter of law that proof will never 
be considered collateral is where it demonstrates potential bias.  Id. 
11. See Brown v. Mittelman, 152 So. 3d 602, 604–05 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding that the financial relationship between a treating doctor and a referring 
plaintiff’s law firm is discoverable as potential bias evidence in a negligence case). 
12. See Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 377–79 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1406 (2015) (finding that the trial court only harmlessly erred in sustaining objection to 
the attempted impeachment of a witness by using another person’s statement). 
13. FLA. STAT. § 794.022.  This section, commonly known as the Rape Shield 
Statute, although not part of the Code, is clearly meant to regulate proof in some criminal 
cases.  See id.; Cooper v. State, 137 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  While the 
section forbids the introduction of a victim’s prior sexual acts with persons other than the 
defendant, by its explicit terms, it does so only in sexual battery prosecution cases under 
section 794.011 of the Florida Statutes.  FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2).  Thus, when such acts are 
asked about in cases not being brought under this chapter, section 794.022 of the Florida 
Statues does not forbid the inquiry, despite a charge’s sexually related nature.  Id. § 794.022; 
see also Cooper, 137 So. 3d at 531 (arguing that where the state confessed on appeal that 
section 794.022 of the Florida Statutes should not have prohibited cross-examination of a 
victim about her prior sexual experiences in a lewd and lascivious molestation and battery 
case).  Despite this confession of error, the Fourth District Court of Appeal declined to reverse 
because the defense had not argued the section’s inapplicability at trial when the State 
objected to the defense’s inquiry.  Cooper, 137 So. 3d at 531–32.  Furthermore, the defense 
had not proffered what the defense’s questions would have revealed.  Id. at 531 n.1.  The 
Fourth District summarily rejected the argument that excluding the potential testimony was 
fundamental error.  Id. at 531. 
The result in Cooper illustrates the requirements that are ignored all too often by 
trial counsel.  See id.  The contemporaneous objection rule requires that counsel object 
promptly, precisely, and correctly when seeking to exclude evidence.  FLA. STAT. § 90.104.  
On the other side, when an objection is made, the attorney wishing to introduce certain 
information must correctly explain to the trial court why the objection should be overruled.  
See id.  If the objection is sustained, the proponent of the information must make an adequate 
offer of proof to preserve the issue for appeal.  See id.  Failure to satisfy any of these 
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from videotapes,15 sequestration of witnesses,16 lay opinion testimony,17 and 
various hearsay rule issues.18 
                                                                                                                   
requirements will almost always lead to an appellate court declining to address an evidentiary 
issue.  E.g., McGee v. State, 19 So. 3d 1074, 1078–79 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  As 
Cooper also shows, fundamental error arguments are often given short shrift and rarely lead to 
reversals.  See 137 So. 3d at 531–32.  Furthermore, the defense had not proffered what its 
questions would have revealed.  See id. at 531 n.1. 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (applied to the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400 (1965)).  The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees an accused the right 
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  Id. 
Several cases during this Survey period briefly discussed the scope of this clause’s 
protection.  E.g., McKenzie v. State, 153 So. 3d 867, 879 (Fla. 2014).  Although the clause 
protects the accused against the admission of testimonial hearsay in a criminal trial, it does not 
protect against the State using all non-cross-examined hearsay.  Id. at 882.  Particularly, when 
the defendant’s own statement constitutes the hearsay, the Confrontation Clause will not bar 
its use by the prosecution.  Id. (finding no evidentiary error in the State using a self-
represented defendant’s opening statement at trial against him as evidence of guilt); Peterson 
v. State, 129 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that an automobile’s 
computer-generated air bag control system report was non-testimonial, as it was non-
accusatory and did not describe any specific wrongdoing).  Although the court did not reject 
the defendant’s argument on this basis, the author believes a better ground is that the report 
was not hearsay to begin with, as it did not constitute an assertion by any person.  See FLA. 
STAT. § 90.801(1)(a); Peterson, 129 So. 3d at 453.  Thus, there was no statement under the 
definition of the hearsay rule.  Peterson, 129 So. 3d at 453 (defining statement); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 90.801(1)(a). 
The right to confrontation does not protect an accused against the introduction of 
physical evidence or testimony about unavailable physical evidence.  See Yero v. State, 138 
So. 3d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation 
when the State introduced testimony from several witnesses who described how a theft 
defendant had appeared on subsequently destroyed video evidence).  The video had been 
overwritten before the State was able to secure it for trial.  Id. at 1183.  However, Yero’s 
confrontation rights were satisfied by his ability to cross-examine at trial the witness who 
testified about the tape’s contents.  Id. at 1184. 
15. See Lerner v. Halegua, 154 So. 3d 445, 447 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(finding that to admit still photographs taken of frames from a video surveillance tape, 
someone who knew about the operation and storage procedures for the tape was necessary to 
authenticate them to show their reliability). 
16. FLA. STAT. § 90.616(1).  Although this rule provides for the sequestration 
of witnesses upon a party request or a court order, it does not specify what remedies there are 
for violation of a sequestration order.  Id. 
In Cokely v. State, a proposed defense witness violated the trial court’s sequestration 
order by being present at a pre-trial stand-your-ground defense hearing and hearing an alleged 
battery victim testify.  Cokely v. State, 138 So. 3d 1204, 1205–07 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014).  At trial, the court, as a matter of law, excluded this witness’s testimony for violating 
its order without holding any hearing into the violation’s circumstances.  Id. at 1207 n.4.  The 
Fourth District reversed the defendant’s subsequent conviction.  Id. at 1209. 
In this situation, trial courts need to balance the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to present a defense against violation of the court’s sequestration order.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI; Cokely, 138 So. 3d at 1208.  This requires the trial court to determine first, 
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II. RELEVANCY AND ITS GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Section 90.401 of the Code states that information that tends “to 
prove or disprove a material fact” is relevant. 19  Beyond this brief statement, 
relevancy cannot be defined by any code or set of rules.  Relevancy contains 
two sub-categories:  materiality and probative value.20  Materiality is usually 
a function of either the underlying claims and defenses in a particular lawsuit 
or of matters properly affecting witnesses’ credibility. 21   Whether 
information tends to prove or disprove 22  a material fact, and thus, is 
probative, depends upon the strength or weakness of the logical connection 
between the information and what it is offered to prove.23 
Since relevancy is mainly a function of logical deduction and 
substantive law, altering facts even slightly can affect information’s potential 
relevancy greatly. 24   Thus, cases discussing relevancy in general under 
                                                                                                                   
whether the defendant or defense counsel had been involved in causing the violation, and 
second, even if there was active defense involvement, the violation’s effect on the witness’s 
proposed testimony.  Id.  If the witness’s testimony would not have been substantially affected 
by hearing what the witness should not have heard, complete witness’s exclusion is too harsh 
a remedy.  See id.  Since the trial court never held any hearing on these issues, its virtually 
automatic exclusion of the witness was erroneous.  See id. at 1209. 
17. FLA. STAT. § 90.701 (permitting lay opinion testimony if doing so is 
necessary to convey the witness’s testimony and the opinions “do not require a special 
knowledge, skill, experience, or training”).  Two cases during this Survey discussed this rule.  
See Alvarez v. State, 147 So. 3d 537, 542 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Herring v. State, 132 
So. 3d 342, 346 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  In Herring, the court found that witnesses who 
knew and had seen the defendant around the time he had killed his father should have been 
allowed to give their opinion as to his sanity.  See 132 So. 3d at 344–46.  The witnesses were 
the defendant’s mother and a police officer, who apparently came to the victim’s home shortly 
after the killing while the defendant was still there.  Id. at 344.  However, the error was found 
harmless.  Id. at 346. 
However, in Alvarez, the same district court of appeal found reversible error in 
letting a police officer, testifying as a lay witness, give his opinion as to the skin color and 
race of a robbery and murder perpetrator who was captured on surveillance tape during the 
crime.  147 So. 3d at 538–39, 544.  The tape was admitted into evidence; thus the jurors could 
view it just as well as the officer and come to their own conclusions as to what it showed.  See 
id. at 539, 542.  The officer’s opinion was thus unnecessary, and any opinion as to identity 
should have been let to the jurors.  See id. at 542. 
18. See infra Part VII. 
19. FLA. STAT. § 90.401. 
20. Id. 
21. 1 CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, EHRHARDT’S FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 401.1 (2014 
ed.). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. See id.  There is a common assertion that no item of information is 
inherently relevant.  See id.  As a general proposition, this saying is correct.  See 1 EHRHARDT, 
supra note 21, at § 401.1. 
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section 90.401 of the Florida Statutes seldom have much precedential value 
as they are so fact specific.  During this Survey period, no case discussing 
general relevancy alone under section 90.401 of the Florida Statutes was 
unusual enough to merit extended discussion. 
However, general relevancy is not the end of the story for 
admissibility under the Code.  Once logical relevancy requirements have 
been satisfied, the Code expresses a preference that “[a]ll relevant evidence 
[be] admi[tted] except as provided by law.”25  This language encompasses 
reasons extending from evidence being excluded because of its substantive 
nature, such as hearsay or privilege, to evidence being excluded because of 
procedurally related problems, such as a question being asked outside the 
scope of cross-examination or evidence being offered to bolster a witness’s 
character for truthfulness before the witness’s credibility has been attacked.  
The substantive reason for excluding evidence that would otherwise be 
admissible under section 90.401 of the Florida Statutes may also stem from 
the information’s inherently prejudicial nature or the potential the evidence 
has for being confusing.26  In certain specific situations, the Code expressly 
provides for the exclusion of otherwise probative information.27 
No statutory scheme or evidence code can possibly specify every 
factual instance where evidence should be excluded because of its prejudicial 
or confusing nature.  The Code generally follows the Federal Rules of 
Evidence by providing for exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence when 
“its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence.”28 
There are two important points which should be remembered about 
this language.  First, only unfairly prejudicial types of evidence merit 
exclusion. 29   Evidence that fairly hurts the other side’s case or fairly 
advances the case of the proponent should not be excluded.  Second, even 
                                                 
25. FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (2014). 
26. Id. § 90.401. 
27. See id. § 90.407 (excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
when offered “to prove negligence, the existence of a product defect, or culpable conduct in 
connection with [an] event” causing injury or harm).  During this Survey period, no reported 
cases discussed this exclusionary rule.  See id. § 90.401; supra Part I. 
28. FLA. STAT. § 90.403.  Unlike the Code, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 also 
includes undue delay and wasting time as other reasons for exclusions.  FED. R. EVID. 403.  
But see FLA. STAT. § 90.403.  Section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes includes an additional 
sentence that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 does not.  Compare FLA. STAT. § 90.403, with 
FED. R. EVID. 403.  The section expressly provides that it “shall not be construed to mean that 
evidence of the existence of available third-party benefits is inadmissible.”  FLA. STAT. § 
90.403. 
29. See id. 
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unfairly prejudicial evidence will not be excluded unless its unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs any probative value the information has. 30
 There is a preference for admission when the balance between 
relevancy and prejudice, or other section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes 
concerns, is close or even.  Only a fairly gross disproportion of section 
90.403’s general concerns merits excluding any relevant evidence.  As with 
cases discussing logical relevancy, cases discussing section 90.403 are likely 
to be so fact bound that their precedential value is questionable.  However, 
one decision during 2014, refusing to reverse a death sentence for admission 
of potentially unfair prejudicial evidence, merits discussion.31 
Unfair prejudice exists when certain evidence is likely to arouse the 
jurors’ emotion in a way that would lead them to decide a matter on an 
improper basis.32  Poole v. State (Poole II)33 certainly has to potentially be 
considered such a situation, if one ever existed.34  Poole was convicted of 
first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, armed burglary, armed 
robbery, and sexual battery.35  The two victims, Loretta White and Noah 
Scott who lived together,36 went to sleep late one night after playing video 
games at their mobile home.37  Later that night, White woke up with Mark 
Poole on top of her pushing a pillow down on her face.38  He started to 
sexually assault her, and White begged him to stop and physically resisted.39  
                                                 
30. Id.  The words any probative value are purposefully used here to illustrate 
a very simple but often overlooked point with regard to arguments on admissibility.  See id.  
When arguing relevancy issues, attorneys should be careful to do so in a logical order.  If an 
attorney first argues that information should be excluded because its probative value is 
outweighed because of section 90.403 concerns, the attorney has implicitly conceded the 
information’s relevancy.  See id. § 90.403.  To then next argue the same information should be 
excluded under section 90.401 makes no sense.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.401.  If information has 
no relevancy under section 90.401, the considerations in section 90.403 do not matter.  Id. §§ 
90.401, .403.  The information should be excluded for lack of helpfulness to begin with.  See 
id. § 90.401. 
31. Poole v. State (Poole II), 151 So. 3d 402, 414–19 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 2052 (2015). 
32. Id. at 414.  For example, deciding a case on the basis of a party’s sexual 
orientation, race, or religion.  Id. at 409; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
33. 151 So. 3d 402 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2052 (2015). 
34. See id. at 414–16. 
35. Id. at 405. 
36. Poole v. State (Poole I), 997 So. 2d 382, 387 (Fla. 2008).  The two victims 
obviously had different last names.  Id.  Whether they were married to each other is not stated 
in either opinion discussing the case.  Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 406; Poole I, 997 So. 2d at 387.  
This fact is however completely irrelevant to the charges against the defendant.  Poole II, 151 
So. 3d at 406; Poole I, 997 So. 2d at 387. 
37. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 406. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
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Poole then struck her several times with a tire iron, severing one finger and 
part of another finger from her hand.40  Scott woke up, attempted to help 
White, and in turn he was beaten by Poole with the tire iron.41  Scott died 
from the blunt force head trauma suffered in this beating.42  Poole finally left, 
and White passed out from his attacks. 43   She recovered early the next 
morning and called the police who came and found Scott dead.44  Besides 
losing the fingers, White suffered multiple face and head wounds plus a 
concussion.45  The evidence against Poole was extremely strong46—so strong 
that at trial his defense counsel in closing argument conceded his guilt on the 
sexual battery, robbery, and burglary charges.47  However, defense counsel 
argued he was not the person who inflicted the other injuries on the two 
victims.48  Not surprisingly, a jury convicted Poole of all charges and after a 
sentencing hearing, recommended death by a twelve to zero vote.49  The trial 
judge agreed with the jury and imposed a death sentence.50 
On direct appeal in Poole v. State (Poole I),51 the Supreme Court of 
Florida affirmed the defendant’s conviction but vacated the sentence and 
remanded for another hearing.52  Although Poole argued numerous errors had 
affected the fairness of the guilt phase of his trial, the court found that 
defense counsel’s failure to make contemporaneous objections waived many 
of these points for appeal.53  On the one point, defense counsel had promptly 
objected to an erroneous comment on the defendant’s silence at trial in 
closing argument, the Supreme Court of Florida found the trial court had not 
abused its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial.54  But when it came to 
the claimed errors in the sentencing hearing, the Supreme Court of Florida 
                                                 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 406. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id.  Witnesses placed Poole near the trial the night of the attack.  Poole II, 
151 So. 3d at 406.  He was found with several items stolen from the trailer and was found to 
have sold several others.  Id. at 407.  DNA evidence from a vaginal swab matched him to 
White’s attack, and other scientific evidence, such as fingerprints and blood stains, connected 
him to the crimes.  Id. 
47. Poole I, 997 So. 2d 382, 390 (Fla. 2008). 
48. Id. 
49. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 407. 
50. Id. 
51. 997 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2008). 
52. Id. at 397. 
53. Id. at 390–91.  Many of these claims of error involved the prosecutor’s 
statements in the closing argument, commenting on Poole’s silence after arrest and on his 
failure to testify at trial.  Id. at 391. 
54. Id. at 389. 
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reached a different result.55  Here, the court found that the defense counsel’s 
objections to improper cross-examination of the defense witness, about 
Poole’s prior convictions that were not statutory aggravating factors and 
about the content of a tattoo on Poole’s stomach that said Thug Life, required 
reversal for a new sentencing proceeding.56 
A new sentencing hearing was held, after which the jury voted 
eleven to one for death, and the trial court again sentenced Poole 
accordingly.57  On appeal from this second sentence, the Supreme Court of 
Florida affirmed the sentence.58  Again, defense counsel failed to preserve 
certain issues for appeal, either by not making prompt contemporaneous 
objections 59  or by not making certain legal arguments at the trial court 
level.60  However, one preserved issue brought up the issue of the evidence’s 
probative value versus potentially unfair prejudicial effect in a starkly 
dramatic fashion. 
At the new sentencing, the State introduced a jar of formalin liquid 
containing White’s severed fingertip.61  The defense apparently objected to 
this as unfairly prejudicial.62  What exactly was the prosecutor’s response to 
the objection at trial is unfortunately not clear from the Supreme Court of 
Florida’s opinion.  In the Court’s words, “the prosecutor offered no credible 
reason as to why the severed fingertip was relevant to any issue in the 
penalty phase, much less any issue in dispute.”63  This language can be read 
in two ways.  One, when the defense objected at trial, the prosecutor could 
not credibly articulate why the fingertip was relevant.  Two, the prosecutor 
did specify a reason for admitting the fingertip at trial, but the defense just 
did not agree it was a credible one.  If the Court meant the first interpretation, 
the remainder of its opinion is incredibly disturbing.  If the prosecutor could 
indeed articulate no credible reason for admission at trial, then any reason 
                                                 
55. See Poole I, 997 So. 2d at 391. 
56. Id. at 393. 
57. Poole II, 151 So. 3d 402, 408 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2052 
(2015). 
58. Id. at 405. 
59. See id. at 413.  These missed objections were the failure to make 
contemporaneous objections to the prosecutor’s comments in the closing, disparaging the 
testimony of the defendant’s family members as all that crap, to the prosecution’s potential 
mischaracterizing intoxication evidence, and to the prosecution’s legally erroneous comments 
about merger of the aggravating circumstances.  Id. at 415–17. 
60. Id. at 413.  Defense counsel’s failure to make legal arguments at trial that 
the State’s impermissible disparate questioning of prospective jurors had led to a racially 
impermissible use of preemptory challenges and waived this issue for appeal.  Poole II, 151 
So. 3d at 413–14. 
61. Id. at 414. 
62. Id. 
63. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 414. 
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given then and any reason the State came up with on appeal is arguably 
disingenuous.  A more favorable reading is the alternative, that the State had 
a reason but the defense just did not find it a credible one.64 
Regardless of which alternative reading one chooses, the remainder 
of the Court’s opinion on this issue merits close inspection and criticism.  
The Court began by instructively laying out the process trial judges should 
follow when ruling on section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes objections.65  
This process involves two steps.66  “[T]he trial judge must first determine 
that the evidence is relevant for a specific purpose.”67  Then, the Court “must 
weigh the importance of the evidence to the specific purpose, against the 
possibility that the evidence will unfairly prejudice” the other side. 68  In 
Poole II, the defense objected to the fingertip being unfairly prejudicial in 
general and specifically objected to admitting the natural fingernails with the 
skin attached.69  The trial court rejected this, saying the fingertip was not 
difficult to look at, not unpleasant, and had no blood on it.70  Nowhere in the 
opinion is there any specific purpose that the trial court determined the tip 
was relevant for, nor does the Supreme Court of Florida mention any explicit 
weighing process the trial court went through. 
Despite this, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion articulates its 
own basis for admission.71  As the fingertip “was severed during the same 
criminal episode at issue in this penalty phase,”72 and it was “relevant to the 
amount of force used during the attempted . . . murder,”73 it was relevant.74  
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida supplied its own specific purpose for 
relevancy, despite the State’s potential inability to do so, and the trial judge’s 
apparent failure to do likewise.  Even if the State had articulated these two 
purposes, the two-step process still requires the weighing contemplated by 
step two.  Amazingly, the Supreme Court of Florida totally ignores this step 
and merely finds the fingertip’s admission was not an abuse of discretion.  
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion ignores the very two-step 
process it had articulated should be done only paragraphs earlier! 
Since the Supreme Court of Florida did not do the second step of the 
weighing process, it is appropriate to discuss what might have been the result 
                                                 
64. See id. 
65. Id. at 414; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014). 
66. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 414. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. See Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 414–15. 
72. Id. at 414. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
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had it done so.  Assuming the fingertip had some relevancy, how necessary 
was its introduction to the State’s case?  Put another way, would refusing to 
admit the severed fingertip as an exhibit have deprived the State of its fair 
opportunity to argue about the amount of force Poole used in committing his 
crimes?  The State still could have produced testimony about the fingertip 
being severed and arguably would have had to do so to authenticate the 
exhibit.  Thus, admission of the actual fingertip was to some extent 
cumulative to the voice testimony.  Furthermore, assuming the victim, 
White, testified at the hearing,75 she might have been able to hold up her 
hand to show the jurors where her fingers had been severed,76 or there might 
have been photographs of her hand available.  What is the potential unfair 
prejudicial effect?  Obviously, the jury might become irrationally inflamed 
by seeing the fingertip, both during the admission of evidence and during its 
deliberations where they would have it available as an exhibit. 
By not following the very process its own opinion sets forth, the 
Court never addresses the balancing question of relevancy versus unfair 
prejudice.  Even more, by rendering the decision on this point that the court 
did, it arguably promotes bad lawyering.  The prosecution had already been 
reversed once because of the errors it created.77  One would think it would 
have been extra careful to not do so again, but reading this opinion’s 
description of what the prosecution did gives a different impression.  Finally, 
by rendering its decision on the basis it does, the Supreme Court of Florida 
also may send a message to trial judges that they will be protected from bad 
decisions.  In fairness to the Poole II opinion, it did conclude this matter by 
finding that any error would have been harmless anyways.78 
Precedents and decisions send messages beyond just this is what the 
law is.  Poole II could easily send the message that such potentially 
excessive lawyering will not only be excused by finding it harmless error in 
some cases, but also encouraged, by not finding it error to begin with.  One 
hopes that this is not the standard type of lawyering a court would want to 
promote. 
                                                 
75. Id.  If she did not, then how did the State authenticate the exhibit?  Poole 
II, 151 So. 3d at 414–15. 
76. See id.  The crimes took place the evening of October 12 through 13 of 
2001.  Id. at 406.  I say might here because White could have had cosmetic surgery done on 
her hand, so just displaying it would not accurately show the force.  Id. at 414–15.  Still, her 
testimony about this would have been available.  See id. 
77. See Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 408. 
78. See id. at 418–19. 
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III. SPECIAL RELEVANCY CONCERNS 
A. Statements in Plea Negotiations 
Section 90.410 of the Florida Statutes protects offers to plead guilty, 
pleas of nolo contendere, and withdrawn guilty pleas from admission in any 
civil cases and most criminal cases.79  It also protects against admission of 
statements made in connection with negotiations for these pleas. 80   The 
purpose behind this protection is to encourage the state and defense to 
engage in plea discussions and to resolve more charges without full-blown 
trials whenever possible.81  Promoting free discussion in negotiations without 
having the fear one’s words will come back to haunt a party is thought to 
further these two goals.82 
However, section 90.410 of the Florida Statutes does not define what 
should be considered plea negotiations—or to use the statute’s words, 
“statements made in connection with any of the [covered] pleas or offers.”83 
Thus, parties may still, on occasion, unwittingly make careless 
statements about possible plea offers that come back to haunt them.  As most 
criminal defense lawyers also know, sometimes accused parties can become 
some of their own worst enemies.  Both these principles were recently 
illustrated by a decision briefly discussing section 90.410 of the Florida 
Statutes.  In Bass v. State,84 the State charged the defendant with second-
degree murder and armed robbery.85  Sometime before trial, Bass had been 
incarcerated, and defense counsel received a potential twenty-year plea offer 
from the State.86  Counsel transmitted this potential plea offer to Bass, who 
decided he wanted to first talk to his mother about it.87  The facts do not 
indicate whether defense counsel knew of Bass’s desire to do this.  Bass 
talked to his mother about the offer the day after defense counsel told Bass 
                                                 
79. FLA. STAT. § 90.410 (2014).  It does not, however, protect against 
admission of guilty pleas that have not been withdrawn.  See id.  Federal Rule of Evidence 
410—the federal counterpart—covers the same types of pleas and statements made in plea 
negotiations, but it does not offer as broad a protection against admission in all cases.  
Compare FED. R. EVID. 410, with FLA. STAT. § 90.410. 
80. FLA. STAT. § 90.410. 
81. See FED. R. EVID. 410; FLA. STAT. § 90.410; United States v. Herman, 544 
F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1977). 
82. See Herman, 544 F.2d at 796. 
83. FLA. STAT. § 90.410. 
84. 147 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 163 So. 3d 
507 (Fla. 2015). 
85. Id. at 1034. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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about it.88  Unfortunately for Bass, the State recorded his phone discussion89 
with his mother and later offered it at his trial and again, in the State’s 
closing argument90 to show Bass’s consciousness of his own guilt.91 
Defense counsel, during a hearing on the State’s motion in limine to 
use the conversation, argued it should be protected since a plea had been 
made and Bass was talking with his mother in connection with this offer.92  
The trial court disagreed, and the appellate affirmed this decision.93  The 
First District Court of Appeal said that to decide if statements were made in 
connection with plea offers and thus protected under section 90.410 of the 
Florida Statutes, the first step was looking at the plain meaning of the rule.94  
If the answer was not clear from the rule’s plain meaning, then a totality of 
circumstances approach should be taken. 95   This totality included two 
factors:  “[W]hether the defendant had a subjective expectation of engaging 
in plea negotiations when the statements were made, and, if so, whether the 
expectation was . . . reasonable.”96  Under either step, the district court found 
against Bass.97  First, the State’s offer was not definite, only a pending one.98  
Second, Bass’s statements about not taking twenty years but willing to 
accept less only came up in response to his mother’s question about the 
potential length of his sentence.99  Nothing Bass said about being willing or 
unwilling to take a certain length of time had yet, or later was, communicated 
to the State in response to the pending offer.100  Additionally, what Bass was 
really telling his mother was merely what his attorney had told him, not the 
traditional give and take one expects in plea discussions.101  His rejection of 
the State’s offer the next day after the conversation further indicated Bass did 
                                                 
88. Id. at 1034–35. 
89. Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1034–35.  The State did not allow Bass to call his 
mother the day defense counsel relayed the plea offer but permitted Bass to do so the next 
day.  Id. 
90. Id.  In the conversation, Bass told his mother he expected to have to serve 
some prison time, but told her he would not accept the twenty-year offer and would instead 
accept one of fifteen or sixteen years.  Id. at 1034. 
91. Id. 
92. Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1034–35. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1035; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.410 (2014). 
95. Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1035; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.410; United States v. 
Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978). 
96. Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1035 (citing Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1366). 
97. Id. 
98. Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1035. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 1036. 
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not have a subjective expectation that he was engaging in plea discussions 
when talking with his mother.102 
The court’s opinion illustrates that there is a difference between 
actually engaging in plea discussions and talking about plea discussions in 
general—especially when the person the discussions are being talked about 
with is not one’s own attorney or an agent of the state.  The decision also 
illustrates another important point that defense counsel should strictly follow.  
Never let your client talk about his case with anyone outside your presence, 
and especially, never let your client talk about his case with anyone else but 
counsel—even family members—during a phone call from a jail or 
correctional facility as these conversations are regularly recorded.  Defense 
counsel, at their initial contact with clients, should remember to 
automatically warn them about this.  Bass illustrates that warning family 
members about this is also a good idea.103 
B. Compromises and Offers to Compromise 
Similar to its provision on pleas and plea negotiations in criminal 
cases, the Code seeks to promote settlement negotiations as a favored way of 
resolving disputes between private parties.104  Section 90.408 of the Florida 
Statutes protects compromises, offers to compromise, and statements or 
conduct made during bona fide settlement negotiations conducted in good 
faith efforts to achieve resolutions before trial.105  A recent case demonstrates 
that Florida law is strict on this point, even stricter than its federal rule 
counterpart.106  Panama City-Bay County Airport & Industrial District v. 
Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.,107 arose from litigation following the 
building of a new airport in Panama City.108  When the airport opened in 
2010, a storm water retention pond had to be rebuilt to comply with Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection regulations.109  Four main parties 
had been involved in the planning and construction of the airport and pond:  
the Panama City Airport District (“the Airport”), a plans and specification 
designer (“Atkins North America” or “Atkins”), a construction and program 
                                                 
102. Id. 
103. See Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1034–36. 
104. See FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (2014). 
105. Id. 
106. See FED. R. EVID. 408; FLA. STAT. § 90.408; Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & 
Indus. Dist. v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 140 So. 3d 1112, 1116–17 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 163 So. 3d 510 (Fla. 2015). 
107. 140 So. 3d 1112 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 163 So. 3d 
510 (Fla. 2015). 
108. Id. at 1113. 
109. Id. at 1113–14. 
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management overseer (“Kellog Brown” or “KBR”), and a prime construction 
contractor (“Phoenix Construction Services” or “Phoenix”). 110   After the 
pond had to be rebuilt, numerous claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, and 
third-party claims were filed among the four main parties.111 
By trial, only claims between the Airport and KBR remained.112  The 
rest had been disposed of by various settlements.113  One settlement was 
between the Airport and Phoenix.114  In that settlement, the Airport admitted 
liability to Phoenix. 115   Phoenix accepted liquidated damages from the 
Airport in return for a share of any recovery in the lawsuit remaining 
between the Airport, KBR, and at that time, Atkins.116  Under the agreement, 
the Airport and Phoenix would cooperate in this remaining litigation by 
using the airport’s general counsel and common counsel paid for by 
Phoenix.117  The agreement also provided that both Phoenix and the Airport 
retained control of their own claims and could settle them independently.118  
Both the Airport and Phoenix settled before trial with Atkins, and neither 
Atkins nor Phoenix remained a party when the case went to trial.119 
Before trial, the Airport’s counsel moved in limine to exclude any 
evidence of Phoenix’s settlement offer or of the Airport-Phoenix settlement 
agreement itself.120  The trial court excluded terms of any offer but permitted 
the agreement to be disclosed.121  KBR disclosed the agreement at trial, using 
it to impeach some of the Airport’s witnesses and to advance KBR’s 
counterclaims.122  After a jury verdict for KBR and denial of a new trial, the 
Airport appealed.123 
In a short but important opinion, the First District reversed.124  The 
district court’s opinion focused on both section 90.408 and section 46.015(3) 
of the Florida Statutes, which the court found required this result.125  Both 
statutory sections prohibited the admission of completed settlement 
                                                 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1114. 
112. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1114. 
113. See id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1114. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 1114–15. 
122. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 1117. 
125. Id. at 1115–16; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(3), 90.408 (2014). 
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agreements, and section 46.015(3) additionally prohibited telling the jury a 
party has been dismissed from a lawsuit because of such.126 
KBR made two arguments why the apparently complete statutory 
bans in the two provisions should not be followed.127  KBR claimed the 
settlement between the Airport and Phoenix amounted to a Mary-Carter style 
agreement that Florida case law had found outside the statutory bans.128  
Mary-Carter agreements exist when one of multiple parties to litigation 
enters into a secret agreement with another party to reduce the first party’s 
exposure in the lawsuit and to have the second party remain in the lawsuit so 
that the two can secretly work against some or all of the remaining non-
parties to the agreement.129  These agreements were found to undermine the 
openness and integrity of the trial process by creating sham adversary 
relationships between name parties. 130   Thus, when such agreements are 
made, a non-party to them can inform the jury of their existence. 131  
However, here, the settlement arrangement was considered different. 132  
Phoenix did not remain a party to the litigation after the agreement with the 
Airport.133   Second, even though the Airport and Phoenix agreed to use 
common counsel, each retained control of its remaining claims and each did 
settle its remaining claims with some of the parties.134  Thus, the subterfuge 
and prospects of subterfuge existing in a Mary-Carter Agreement situation 
were not present.135 
Finally, any argument that the settlement’s existence should be 
admissible to show possible bias was rejected.136  As the court said, these 
two statutory sections contain neither explicit nor implicit exceptions for 
impeachment. 137   Thus, Florida evidence law, unlike the federal rule 
                                                 
126. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115–16; see also 
FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(3), 90.408. 
127. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115–17. 
128. Id. at 1116. 
129. Id.; Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1083 n.3 (Fla. 
2009) (defining Mary-Carter Agreement); Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 
1993). 
130. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1083; Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 246; Pan. City-Bay 
Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1116. 
131. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1116; see also 
Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 243. 
132. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1117. 
133. Id. at 1116. 
134. Id. at 1114. 
135. Id. at 1116. 
136. Id. at 1115–17. 
137. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115–16; see also 
FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(3), 90.408 (2014). 
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regarding settlements and offers,138 has made the policy choice in favor of 
broad exclusion of this type of evidence.139 
C. Character Evidence 
Character is one area of evidence law which seems to present many 
problems.  As a general rule, evidence is usually forbidden in any case, 
criminal or civil, to prove that a person has a certain general character or type 
of character trait, and acted consistently with this on a particular occasion.140  
This is commonly called the propensity rule.141  Evidence is not admissible 
to show someone has a propensity to act a certain way and followed this 
propensity at a particular time.142  Character evidence can be shown by one 
of three methods:  testimony as to one’s reputation in the community, 
testimony about a witness’s personal opinion of someone else’s character, or 
testimony about past specific acts of conduct of the person whose character 
is to be proven.143 
Despite the general prohibition, not every use of character evidence 
to show propensity is forbidden.144  Similarly, not every use of one of the 
three methods of proving character even involves character evidence at all.145  
A recent case during this Survey period demonstrates both an exception to 
the ban on character evidence to show action in conformity therewith and 
also how proof of someone’s reputation may not necessarily involve 
character evidence at all.146 
Antoine v. State 147  involved charges against the accused of first-
degree murder and of attempted first-degree murder, both by use of a 
                                                 
138. FED. R. EVID. 408.  Federal Rule of Evidence 408 explicitly contains an 
impeachment exception to the rule’s broad provisions on exclusion to show validity or 
invalidity of claim.  Id.  Federal Rule of Evidence 408 by its explicit terms does not allow 
statements made in settlement negotiations to be used to impeach by inconsistent statements.  
Id. 
139. Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1117; see also 
FLA. STAT. § 90.408. 
140. Fed. R. Evid. 404. 
141. See id.; Antoine v. State, 138 So. 3d 1064, 1075 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014). 
142. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).  This prohibition is embodied in the 
introductory language to section 90.404(1) of the Florida Statutes:  “Evidence of a person’s 
character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a 
particular occasion . . . .”  FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1). 
143. FED. R. EVID. 405(a)–(b). 
144. See id. 404(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
145. See id. 405(a)–(b). 
146. See Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1075–76. 
147. 138 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
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firearm. 148   The jury could not reach a verdict on the first charge but 
convicted Antoine on the second one.149  Both charges arose from the same 
unfortunate incident at a Palm Beach nightclub late one evening.150  The two 
victims, Brandon Hammond and Jeffrey Thompson, had been ejected from 
the nightclub twice that evening for their rowdy behavior.151  They returned a 
third time and managed to get themselves thrown out again.152  After their 
third ejection, Hammond and Thompson had a confrontation outside the 
nightclub with some men who were leaving.153  The defendant, Narcisse 
Antoine, tried to intervene and make peace.154  The two victims turned their 
attention to Antoine both with racial statements and threats of violence.155 
The club’s bouncer, Tyrone Slade, was also present when this 
occurred.156  Slade testified that Thompson gave him “the impression . . . he 
was about to sneak up and attack.”157  Hammond then hit Antoine in the jaw, 
splitting his lip.158  Antoine gave Slade the drink he was holding and pulled 
out a handgun.159  Slade later testified about the subsequent events.160  Even 
then, Antoine did not immediately fire on either man.161  Hammond began 
“‘reaching in his pants as if he had a gun’” 162  while racially cursing 
Antoine.163  Slade, the bouncer, heard Antoine asking Hammond if he was 
armed and if he planned to shoot Antoine.164  Slade also asked Hammond 
what he was reaching for and told him to stop.165   The defendant shot 
Hammond multiple times, killing him, and shooting Thompson. 166  
Thompson survived this shooting but was in a coma for some days 
afterward.167  At trial, he was unable to remember the events surrounding the 
                                                 
148. Id. at 1068. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1067. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 1068. 
157. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1068. 
158. Id. at 1068. 
159. Id. at 1069. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1069. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id.  Slade supposedly told Hammond, “[Do not] do this Brandon.”  Id. 
166. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1069, 1071. 
167. Id. at 1071. 
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shootings.168  A security guard at a nearby parking lot corroborated Slade’s 
testimony.169 
Antoine testified at trial, claiming self-defense for both shootings.170  
He said that earlier that evening, he had intervened inside the nightclub to 
prevent a fight between Hammond, Thompson, and three other men. 171  
Then, when Antoine left, he saw Hammond and Thompson trying to provoke 
another fight outside.172  Hammond had punched him and then threatened 
him with physical harm, including a threat to kill.173  Antoine said that when 
Hammond reached inside his own shirt, he was convinced Hammond was 
going to kill him first.174  Antoine then shot Hammond and shot Thompson 
whom Antoine claimed appeared to be reaching for a gun and coming 
towards Antoine.175  Antoine drove off, talked to an attorney early the next 
morning and was arrested later on.176 
Slade knew Hammond’s family and also knew Hammond’s 
reputation for violence and being a drunk. 177  A second bouncer at the 
nightclub also gave reputation testimony about Hammond’s reputation for 
violence.178  The trial court used Florida Jury Instruction—Criminal 3.6(f)—
on the significance of the reputation evidence to the self-defense claim.179  
This instruction required that not only must a victim have a reputation for 
violence, but that a defendant must also know of this reputation before a jury 
could consider it.180  The defense objected to requiring Antoine to know of 
Hammond’s reputation and requested an additional instruction that the jury 
could independently consider the victim’s reputation for violence when 
determining who was the first aggressor.  The judge denied the request and 
kept the instructions’ original wording. 
                                                 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 1069. 
170. Id. at 1067. 
171. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1070. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. (alteration in original). 
175. Id. at 1070–71. 
176. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1071. 
177. Id. at 1072. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id.  The exact instruction the trial court gave was as follows:   
If you find that Brandon C. Hammond had a reputation of being a violent and 
dangerous person, and that their [sic] reputation was known to the defendant, you 
may consider the fact in determining whether the actions of the defendant were 
those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that reputation. 
Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1072. 
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a 
new trial due to error in this instruction.  Section 90.404 of the Florida 
Statutes establishes one of the statutory exceptions to the ban on 
circumstantial use of character evidence.  This exception explicitly provides 
that “evidence of a pertinent trait of character trait of the victim of the 
[alleged] crime” is admissible when offered by the accused to prove the 
victim acted in conformity therewith.181  Furthermore, when the character 
evidence is so offered, reputation testimony is the appropriate method of 
doing so. 182   Thus, the trial court’s instructions were erroneous for two 
reasons:  First, they conditioned the jury’s consideration of Hammond’s 
reputation for violence on Antoine’s knowledge of this fact.183  Second, they 
did not tell the jury that if it found Hammond had such a reputation, the jury 
could use this in considering whether he acted in conformity therewith before 
the shooting, namely engaged in violent acts or threatening violent acts that 
caused Antoine to react in self-defense.  Why is the defendant’s actual 
knowledge of the victim’s reputation for violence required?  As the district 
court said, “‘because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the 
victim, rather than the defendant’s state of mind.’”184  If Antoine’s self-
defense claim had been predicated on previous violent acts of Hammond 
towards others, Antoine would have had to know about them for them to be 
relevant as they would have gone to his state of mind, not the victim’s 
conduct.  Indeed, under Florida evidence law, previous acts of someone are 
usually not allowed to prove that person’s subsequent action in conformity 
therewith.185 
Would Antoine’s knowledge of Hammond’s reputation have been 
helpful to his self-defense claim?  Yes, in that case Antoine would have been 
able to use the reputation evidence two ways, instead of one:  First, to show 
Hammond’s action in conformity therewith as the first aggressor;186 second, 
to show the reasonableness of Antoine’s claim that he feared he would be 
shot and so fired first.187  But just because the second way was foreclosed 
due to the defendant not actually knowing Hammond’s reputation, this 
should not legally prevent him from using it the other way.188 
                                                 
181. FLA. STAT. §90.405(1) (2014). 
182. Id.  Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, Florida does not allow proof of 
circumstantial character by personal opinion. 
183. Id. at 1075. 
184. Id. (quoting Dwyer v. State, 743 So. 2d 46, 48 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
1999)). 
185. FLA. STAT. § 90.404. 
186. See Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1076.; FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1). 
187. See Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1076. 
188. See id. at 1075–76.  The jury had deadlocked on the murder charge 
involving Hammond’s death but convicted on the attempted murder charge for shooting 
109
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
94 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
D. Williams Rule Issues–Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts 
As noted above, when character evidence is used to prove the 
defendant has a certain character trait to further prove the defendant has a 
tendency to act in accord with this trait, the propensity rule is violated.189  
This violation occurs however the character trait would be proven—whether 
by reputation, opinion, or specific acts of past conduct.190  Evidence law 
recognizes that a person’s past bad acts can be relevant for legitimate non-
propensity purposes.191  In Florida, this use of collateral crimes evidence is 
called Williams Rule evidence.192 
The Code has codified the Williams Rule.193  Section 90.404(2)(a) of 
the Florida Statutes states that “[s]imiliar fact evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue . 
. . but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad 
character or propensity.”194  What might these material facts be?  The section 
lists them as “including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”195 
While the Williams Rule has a similar counterpart in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence,196 there are several differences between the two that are 
actually more favorable to defendants in Florida.  First, in Florida, the state 
must give the defense notice of its intent to use such evidence and a 
description of it ten days before trial.197  In a federal court, the prosecution 
must only provide reasonable notice of such. 198  Second, under the federal 
rules, the existence of the accused’s other crimes must only be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence.199  In Florida, it must be established by clear 
                                                                                                                   
Thompson.  Id. at 1068.  However, since both charges stemmed from the same series of 
events, if the jury had found Antoine’s actions in shooting Hammond reasonable, it might 
have also done so in connection with the immediate shooting of Thompson afterwards.  See id. 
at 1075–76.  Thus, reversal was needed.  See id. at 1078. 
189. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
190. See id. 404(a)(1), 405. 
191. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659, 661 (Fla. 1959). 
192. Id. at 659. 
193. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2014). 
194. FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2)(a). 
195. Id. 
196. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
197. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(d)(1). 
198. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)(A). 
199. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 684 (1988). 
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and convincing evidence.200  Third, in Florida the evidence cannot be so 
focused upon that it becomes a feature of the trial.201 
More reported cases discussed this section of the relevancy rules 
than any other. 202   Cases discussing section 90.404(2)(a) of the Florida 
Statutes generated a fair number of reversals.203 
1. To Prove Matters Independent of Section 404(2) 
a. Inextricably Intertwined Evidence 
Sometimes to tell a coherent story, the State must introduce other 
acts evidence that is not directly related to the crimes charged.204  When this 
happens, the other crimes evidence is admissible.205  Some jurisdictions call 
this evidence of the res gestae. 206   In Florida, this type of other crimes 
evidence is referred to as inextricably intertwined evidence.207  Technically 
speaking, it is not Williams Rule evidence because its purpose is not to prove 
or disprove an element of the case.208  Rather its purpose is to prevent the 
story of the case from becoming confused, broken, or disjointed.209  Thus, 
some courts then do not require the State to follow section 90.404(2) of the 
Florida Statutes’ usual notification provisions.210 
                                                 
200. See McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1256 (Fla. 2006). 
201. Id.; see also Barnett v. State, 151 So. 3d 61, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (during this Survey period rejecting the argument that the Williams Rule evidence had 
improperly become a feature of the trial). 
202. McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1251; Carlisle v. State, 137 So. 3d 479, 486 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Barnett, 151 So. 3d at 63. 
203. See FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (2014).  There was reversal in six cases 
where the state introduced evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, and reversal in one case 
where the defense was denied the right to introduce Reverse Williams Rule evidence.  See 
Moore v. State, 143 So. 3d 468, 469 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Parker v. State, 142 So. 3d 
960, 965 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Kyne v. State 141 So. 3d 759, 764 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014); Jackson v. State, 140 So. 3d 1067, 1073 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Carlisle, 
137 So. 3d at 487.  The one Reverse Williams Rule case was Carlisle, where the court found 
the defense should have been allowed to cross-examine an alleged sexual battery victim about 
her earlier recantation of other sexual claims against the defendant.  Carlisle, 137 So. 3d at 
483–84, 487.  The questioning would have been admissible to show a motive to falsify on the 
victim’s part.  Id. at 484. 
204. Kyne v. State, 141 So. 3d 759, 762 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
205. Id. 
206. State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1988). 
207. Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 762. 
208. See Williams v. State, 621 So. 2d 413, 414–15 (Fla. 1993); Kyne, 141 So. 
3d at 762. 
209. Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 762. 
210. See FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2) (2014).  Kyne v. State, where the State argued 
no notice was due because the defense as evidence of prior threats between the defendant and 
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When other crimes or acts evidence is offered under the inextricably 
intertwined rationale, courts must be especially careful to make sure the 
evidence is necessary or else risk a high chance of reversal. 211   This is 
especially true because the other acts evidence is often potentially 
inflammatory in nature.212  During this Survey period, four cases where the 
State introduced evidence under the inextricably intertwined rationale 
resulted in conviction reversals. 213   Three of the four shared a common 
characteristic.214  They all involved evidence of possession of handguns or 
other firearms as the alleged inextricably intertwined acts.215 
Parker v. State216 provides the most overall instructive discussion of 
the three.  Parker’s vehicle was pulled over for a traffic routine stop, during 
which an officer saw a gun partially sticking out between the vehicle’s 
seats.217  The officer had Parker exit the vehicle and arrested him when it was 
discovered Parker was a convicted felon. 218   Later, during an inventory 
search, officers discovered illegal narcotics inside the vehicle.219  Parker was 
charged with multiple drug possession offenses as well as being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.220  The State severed the firearm possession charge 
                                                                                                                   
his step-father weeks before the defendant allegedly strangled his mother, was inextricably 
intertwined with the killing.  Kyne v. State, 141 So. 3d at 760–61.  The district court of appeal 
rejected this argument and also held that while the evidence might have been otherwise 
admissible as Williams Rule evidence, this could not be considered on appeal due to the 
state’s failure to supply the notice required under section 90.404(2)(d)(1) of the Florida 
Statutes.  Id. at 763; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(d)(1). 
Kyne sends an important message to the state.  If other acts are allegedly admissible 
as both inextricably intertwined with charged offenses’ facts and also separately admissible as 
Williams Rule evidence, careful prosecutors will always provide notice of intent to use such.  
Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 763.  Thus, if an appellate court later rejects the inextricably intertwined 
grounds, the state can preserve its ability to argue Williams Rule evidence as a fall back 
position.  Id. 
211. Id. 
212. See Williams, 621 So. 2d at 415. 
213. Parker v. State 142 So. 3d 960, 963 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see 
also Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 761; Tolbert v. State, 154 So. 3d 1141, 1142–43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014); Francois v. State, 132 So. 3d 1206, 1207 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
214. Parker, 142 So. 3d at 963; Tolbert, 154 So. 3d at 1142; Francois, 132 So. 
3d at 1207–08.  Kyne is the fourth and only non-weapons case where admission of other bad 
acts evidence caused reversal as not being inextricably intertwined with events surroundings 
the charges and not otherwise admissible under the Williams Rule.  Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 763. 
215. See Parker, 142 So. 3d at 963; Tolbert, 154 So. 3d at 1142; Francois, 132 
So. 3d at 1207–08. 
216. 142 So. 3d 960 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
217. Id. at 962. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
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before trial.221  The defense moved to exclude any evidence relating to the 
gun found in car as unnecessary to prove the remaining drug charges.222  The 
State claimed that testimony about finding the gun was needed to explain 
why the vehicle was searched and the drugs subsequently found.223  The trial 
court agreed with this argument.224  At trial, the first officer was allowed to 
talk about finding the gun and how the defendant’s hand was near where the 
gun was actually found.225  Not only was this testimony given but also the 
State physically introduced the gun as an exhibit. 226   A second officer 
testified Parker had been arrested for possessing the weapon, but the trial 
court sustained an objection to this, and the jury was instructed to ignore 
it.227 
The Fourth District listed four instances where uncharged acts or 
crimes evidence would be considered inextricably intertwined with the 
charges against an accused.228  When the evidence was necessary to “(1) 
adequately describe the deed; (2) provide an intelligent account of the 
crime(s) charged; (3) establish the entire context out of which the charged 
crime(s) arose, or (4) adequately describe the events leading up to the 
charged crime(s).”229  Here, it seemed as if the State was relying on either the 
third or fourth reasons to justify the testimony and the gun’s admission.230  
Whatever the State’s reason was, the Fourth District of Appeal reversed the 
conviction.231  The court found that testimony about the gun was totally 
unnecessary to prove the drug charges. 232   The State could have just 
produced testimony about finding the drugs in Parker’s car during a search 
car.  Additionally, error in admitting the gun-related testimony was 
compounded by admitting the gun itself as an exhibit. 233   The gun’s 
admission aggravated matters by “giving the weapon featured billing during 
the trial.”234 
                                                 
221. Parker, 142 So. 3d at 962. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Parker, 142 So. 3d at 962. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 963. 
229. Id. (quoting McGee v. State, 19 So. 3d 1074, 1078 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2009)). 
230. See Parker, 142 So. 3d at 962. 
231. Id. at 965. 
232. Id. at 963–64. 
233. Id. at 963. 
234. Id. 
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Perhaps the most flagrant of the three cases involving reversals for 
uncharged weapons testimony is Francois v. State. 235   There the State 
charged the accused with armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed 
robbery.236  The robbery victim and other witnesses said a handgun had been 
used in the crime.237  This gun was never found.238  Police officers went to 
the defendant’s residence and found four rifles there, one of which was under 
a bed and another sticking out from a mattress.239  The State argued that 
evidence of the rifles in the home showed Francois could have also once 
possessed the handgun and hidden it after the robbery. 240  Evidently, the 
reasoning went something like this–people who possess firearms in general 
are likely to possess a particular type of firearm and when that firearm is 
used in a crime they are likely to hide it.  Of course, part of this reasoning 
rests on using evidence for prohibited propensity purposes.  The other part—
that someone who commits a crime with a weapon is likely to hide the 
weapon to avoid detection—could have been made without introduction of 
any evidence about the rifles at all.  The trial court termed this argument 
“tenuous, at best, and labeled it far-fetched.”241  Surprisingly after declaring 
such, the judge admitted the rifles believing “the evidence comprised part of 
the police investigation and that Francois would not be prejudiced by the 
testimony.”242  In a short opinion, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed 
finding the evidence totally irrelevant to prove anything about the missing 
handgun.243  Additionally, there was no proof that Francois’s possession of 
the rifles was not perfectly legal.244  The court recognized that admitting 
testimony evidence about the rifles created a very real risk that “the jurors 
[would] conclude . . . Francois exhibited a propensity to commit crimes.”245 
All three cases could be described as good examples of prosecutor 
attempts at overkill causing reversals. 246   Unfortunately, there are also 
examples where trial courts did not give careful scrutiny to arguments and 
                                                 
235. 132 So. 3d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
236. Id. at 1207. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Francois, 132 So. 3d at 1207. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. (emphasis added). 
243. Id. at 1209. 
244. Id. 
245. Francois, 132 So. 3d at 1209. 
246. See id. 132 So. 3d at 1209; Parker, 142 So. 3d at 964; Tolbert, 154 So. 3d 
at 1143.  The third case is Tolbert v. State, which involved testimony about a handgun found 
in the same bag as illegal drugs.  Tolbert v. State, 154 So. 3d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014).  There was no proof connecting Tolbert to the gun, nor proof that he illegally 
possessed it.  Id. at 1142–43. 
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evidence offered for admission.247  The lesson to be learned from all three 
reversals is simple:  Inextricably intertwined is not a magic argument or 
phrase that will automatically allow in other crimes or acts evidence not 
essentially connected to the crimes charged.  This is especially so when the 
other acts involve weapons possession. 
b. To Legally Establish an Element of the Charged Offense 
There is another, probably an even more rare, non-Williams Rule 
reason to legitimately present uncharged collateral crimes evidence.248  There 
may be a legal necessity to present other crimes evidence when proof of an 
earlier act or crime is an essential element of a later charged offense.249  In 
this situation, the extent of the other crimes evidence should be determined 
by the elements of the charged offense. 
Spipniewiski v. State 250  involved charges of aggravated stalking, 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor battery.251  The 
victim and defendant were neighbors who had once been on good terms.252  
Trouble started when the victim who had been giving the defendant food, 
rides, and money told him she would no longer do so.253   The charges 
concerned events that happened from January to December 16, 2011.254  The 
State produced evidence that the defendant had punched the victim in 
November 2011, approached her swinging a bat in December 2011, and 
pulled her hair and bit her in December 2011.255  The November punching 
incident was also the subject of a separate misdemeanor charge in county 
court.256 
The Third District found the punching incident testimony relevant to 
the charge of aggravated stalking.257  As part of this charge, the State had to 
show the defendant had engaged in a course of conduct designed to 
repeatedly harass her, and that the defendant threatened the victim with 
                                                 
247. Id. at 1142–43; Parker, 142 So. 3d at 961, 964; Francois, 132 So. 3d at 
1208–09. 
248. Spipniewski v. State, 134 So. 3d 563, 565 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
249. See id. 
250. 134 So. 3d 563 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
251. Id. at 564.  Originally, there was a fourth charge—harassing the victim—
but the State dropped this before trial.  Id.  The opinion does not explain why.  See id. 
252. See id. 
253. Spipniewski, 134 So. 3d at 564. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 564–65. 
256. Id. at 565. 
257. Id. 
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intent to make her fearful of death or bodily injury.258  Course of conduct as 
defined in the aggravated stalking statute is “a pattern of conduct composed 
of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a 
continuity of purpose.”259  Thus, the other acts evidence was directly relevant 
and legally necessary to prove the aggravated stalking charge.260  Ultimately, 
the jury convicted the defendant of simple stalking; thus, in any event, 
admission of the other acts would have been harmless even if done in 
error.261 
2. To Prove Traditional Williams Rule Issues 
As mentioned, section 90.404(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes lists a 
number of reasons why other crimes or acts evidence is relevant, besides 
solely showing propensity.262  The list follows the inclusionary approach, 
and is not intended to be exclusive but merely to give examples of the most 
common, legitimate Williams Rule purposes. 263   During this Survey, 
Williams Rule evidence was admitted to prove a number of matters, 
mentioned264 and unmentioned265 in the section.266  Some decisions show 
how careless counsel is in urging admission of this evidence and how 
careless courts are in going along with their arguments.  It should never be 
sufficient for counsel to just laundry list the issues given in the Rule as 
reasons why the evidence should be admitted.  Courts should not allow such 
laundry listing to occur, but sometimes this happens.267  Fortunately one 
opinion during this Survey provides an excellent example of the careful 
                                                 
258. Spipniewski, 134 So. 3d at 566; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.048(3) (2014).  
259. FLA. STAT. § 784.048(1)(b). 
260. Spipniewski, 134 So. 3d at 566. 
261. Id. 
262. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a). 
263. See id.; Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659–60 (Fla. 1959). 
264. Two cases involved Williams Rule evidence offered at trial to prove 
intent.  See Barnett v. State, 151 So. 3d 61, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Jackson v. State, 
140 So. 3d 1067, 1070 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  Two cases involved used it to show 
identity.  See Barnett, 151 So. 3d at 63–64; Lewis v. State, 143 So. 3d 998, 1000, 1002 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
265. See Peralta-Morales v. State, 143 So. 3d 483, 485 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding the evidence admissible to show consciousness of guilt).  The author 
strenuously disagrees with this conclusion and believes the evidence was improperly admitted 
as proof of propensity. 
266. See FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a). 
267. See, e.g., Barnett, 151 So. 3d at 63 (where this happened at the trial level).  
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the admission of the evidence but after conducting a 
much more careful analysis and after correctly concluding it was admissible to prove identity 
and motive.  Id. at 63–64. 
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analysis the trial, and appellate courts should engage in before approving use 
of Williams Rule evidence.268 
Jackson v. State269 involved an appeal from a conviction for burglary 
of a dwelling and for battery.270  The State claimed that in March 2011, 
Jackson broke into his ex-girlfriend’s apartment and attacked her with a 
knife.271  Over defense objection, the trial court allowed the State to produce 
evidence of two prior incidents to prove the defendant had the intent needed 
to commit the March 2011 crimes.272  The first incident occurred in June 
2010, when Jackson had pulled the victim from a car and attacked her.273  
The second one occurred in November 2010, when Jackson had come to the 
victim’s apartment at her invitation, but had battered her there. 274   In a 
thoughtful opinion, the First District reversed the convictions.275  The court 
acknowledged that Williams Rule evidence is admissible to prove material 
facts in a case. 276   However, it differed from the trial court as to how 
materiality should be determined.277  Just because an issue is technically an 
element of an offense does not make it automatically material for Williams 
Rule purposes.278  Instead, the issue must be a truly contested one at trial.279  
Jackson did not raise any issue of intent.280  Rather, he claimed he had never 
been at the victim’s apartment on the particular date in March and thus did 
not commit any crime there.281 
“Even if intent [had been] a [true] material issue,” the other incidents 
were not substantially similar enough to demonstrate it.282  The first incident 
did not take place at the victim’s residence, and while the second one did, 
Jackson had been invited over to the apartment. 283   Thus, while both 
incidents allegedly involved batteries, neither one of them came close to 
involving a burglary and so, were not relevant in determining if he 
                                                 
268. Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1071–73. 
269. 140 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
270. Id. at 1069. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. at 1069–70. 
273. Id. at 1070. 
274. Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1070. 
275. Id. at 1070–73. 
276. Id. at 1069–70. 
277. Id. at 1070–71. 
278. Id. at 1071; see also Williams, 110 So. 2d at 659. 
279. Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1070–71. 
280. Id. at 1071. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. at 1071–72; see also McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1255 (Fla. 
2006). 
283. Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1070. 
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committed a burglary.284  As to the battery charge, the First District found the 
other acts’ relevancy was solely based on pure propensity reasoning—he 
attacked this woman twice in the past, so that makes it more likely he 
attacked her here—which is what the Williams Rule explicitly forbids!285 
Overall, Jackson is an excellent example of the thorough analysis 
trial, and appellate courts should engage in when faced with Williams Rule 
questions.  As this type of evidence has the potential to be unfairly 
prejudicial to defendants, it should not be admitted unless its materiality is 
truly factually an issue and not just an issue in a formal legal sense. 
3. To Prove Child Molestation Charges 
Both the Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence have added special 
provisions relating to the admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
evidence in child molestation cases.286  Section 90.404(2)(b)(1) of the Florida 
Statutes provides that in criminal child molestation cases, “evidence of the 
defendant’s commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation 
is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter for which 
it is relevant.”287  This section’s language indicates the legislature intended to 
allow what is usually not permitted in criminal case—evidence admitted 
largely for its propensity purposes.  Evidently, the legislature felt that when it 
comes to certain types of sex crimes, there is a very real risk of repeat 
offenders, so that evidence that an accused had committed an earlier sexual 
offense is strong indication he committed a later criminally charged one.  In 
McLean v. State,288 the Supreme Court of Florida held that even when this 
section merely serves “as a conduit for evidence that corroborates the 
victim’s testimony that the crime occurred rather than to prove the identity of 
the alleged perpetrator,”289 it does not violate due process.290  McLean did not 
find that evidence of prior acts of molestation was automatically admissible, 
despite the statutory wording that could be construed that way.  Instead, the 
court focused on the words “‘and may be considered for its bearing on any 
                                                 
284. Id. at 1072. 
285. Id. at 1070, 1072; see also Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659, 661, 
663 (Fla. 1959). 
286. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2) (2014); FED. R. EVID. 414. 
287. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b)(1).  There is a similarly worded provision for 
evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” in a sexual offense charge case.  See id. § 
90.404(2)(c)(1).  The Florida Legislature passed these sections in 2001.  Act effective July 1, 
2001, ch. 2001-221, § 1, 2001 Fla. Laws 1938, 1938. 
288. 934 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2006). 
289. Id. at 1251. 
290. Id. 
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matter [for] which it is relevant.’”291  When it comes to relevancy and other 
acts, relevancy must be evaluated first by how similar the other sexual acts 
are to the crime charged.292  The more similarity, the more probative they 
are.293  Likewise, the less similar, the less probative, and the more likelihood 
they will generate unfair prejudicial against an accused and should be 
excluded by section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes.294  McLean set out a four-
part test to determine admissibility of other acts of molestation.295  First, how 
similar are the other acts and the charged ones in terms of when, where, how, 
and to whom they occurred?296  Second, how close in time are the other acts 
and the ones charged?297  Third, how frequently did the other acts occur?298  
Finally, are there any intervening circumstances between the other acts and 
the ones charged?299 
Four reported opinions discussed this type of evidence in child 
sexual victim cases during the Survey period. 300   Not surprisingly, the 
appellate courts affirmed admission in three out of the four cases.301  Stewart 
v. State302 represents what is probably a typical approach to admission of this 
type of evidence.303  The accused was charged with sexually battering a 
person between twelve and eighteen years of age while he was in a position 
of familial authority.304  The State introduced proof Stewart had previously 
sexually battered his step-daughter and also his wife’s daughter, both when 
the girls were young. 305   In affirming his conviction, the First District 
described this as Williams Rule evidence even though it seems to have been 
introduced solely for its propensity. 306   The court described section 
                                                 
291. Id. at 1254. 
292. Id. 
293. McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1255. 
294. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014); McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1256. 
295. McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1262. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. See Harrelson v. State, 146 So. 3d 171, 173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 
Stewart v. State, 147 So. 3d 119, 121 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Fincher v. State, 137 So. 
3d 437, 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Peralta-Morales v. State, 143 So. 3d 483, 485 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
301. Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 175; Stewart, 147 So. 3d at 124; Fincher, 137 
So. 3d at 442; Peralta-Morales, 143 So. 3d at 486. 
302. 147 So. 3d 119 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
303. See id. at 123–24. 
304. Id. at 120; see also FLA. STAT. § 794.011(8)(b) (2014). 
305. Stewart, 147 So. 3d at 121. 
306. Id. at 123–24.  The court found it “showed an underlying pattern of 
molestation where the appellant was in a familial or custodial setting with the victims and the 
molestation occurred in the home.”  Id. at 121. 
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90.404(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes as establishing a relaxed standard of 
admissibility307 even though similarity between the charged offense and the 
past acts was still important.308  The court emphasized that similarity did not 
mean the two sets of offenses had to be identical or the same in all 
respects.309  Here, sufficient similarity to uphold admission existed because 
the victims were all underage females, the offenses all took place in the 
family home, the defendant was in a familial or custodial role each time, and 
the victims were all vulnerable due to being either asleep or under 
anesthesia.310  The fact that some of the acts involved digital penetration, and 
some involved penile penetration did not outweigh the other similarities.311 
Ironically, the only decision reversing a conviction for improper 
admission of this type of evidence also came from the First District.312  In 
Harrelson v. State,313 the appellate court reversed and remanded, for further 
proceedings, the defendant’s conviction for lewd, lascivious, or indecent 
assault on a child under sixteen.314  The victim was either the defendant’s 
daughter or step-daughter.315  Harrelson and her mother were divorced when 
the acts allegedly occurred.316  The defendant was alleged to have grabbed 
the victim’s hand and made her touch his penis during a visit to Harrelson’s 
mother’s home.317  At least some of the claimed other acts also occurred 
during other visits to Harrelson’s father’s home.318 
The State gave the defense the required notice of intent to use.319  
However, the trial court and defense undertook an unusual and ultimately 
legally reversible procedure to determine admissibility.  Defense counsel 
                                                                                                                   
Some may claim this is not propensity, but the author does not agree.  See id. at 123.  
It shows Stewart had a propensity to sexually molest young girls when he got them in the 
home.  See id. at 121.  Thus, he must have molested the young victim here.  See Stewart, 147 
So. 3d at 123–24. 
307. Id. at 123 (quoting Easterly v. State, 22 So. 3d 807, 814 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009)); FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b). 
308. Stewart, 147 So. 3d at 124. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. 
311. Id.  The other two opinions, not discussed in this Survey’s text, affirming 
admission of other acts of molestation are Fincher and Peralta-Morales.  Fincher v. State, 137 
So. 3d 437, 442 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Peralta-Morales v. State, 143 So. 3d 483, 486 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see also supra note 365 (briefly criticizing Peralta-Morales). 
312. Harrelson v. State, 146 So. 3d 171, 175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  
Both opinions were per curiam.  Judge Rowe is the only judge named as being on both panels. 
313. 146 So. 3d 171 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
314. Id. at 172, 175. 
315. See id. at 174. 
316. Id. at 174. 
317. Id. at 173. 
318. Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 174. 
319. Id. at 173. 
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suggested the trial court should first do the required weighing under section 
90.403 of the Florida Statutes of probative value versus unfair prejudice 
before making a finding that the other acts had been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.320  The trial judge did so and ruled the substantial 
similarity between the alleged offenses outweighed any potential 
prejudice.321  The trial court then concluded that no finding of clear and 
convincing evidence was needed as the other crimes involved the same 
victim, the same conduct, and the same approximate timeframe as the 
charged offense.322  The defense cross-examined the victim about the other 
acts and also called Harrelson’s mother as a defense witness.323  She testified 
some of the furniture supposedly in the home at the time was gone by then, 
all in an effort to dispute the acts’ existence.324 
In a brief opinion, the First District reversed.325  The court ruled that 
findings that other crimes, wrongs, or acts exist by a clear and convincing 
evidence standard are legally mandated in all cases.326  The fact that the 
alleged other crimes involved the same, instead of different, victims did not 
change this requirement.327  As the defense had at trial denied their existence 
with strong proof, the court could not say there was not a strong possibility 
this evidence did not influence the jury.328  However, a new trial was not 
necessarily required.329  As the trial court had already done the required 
section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes balancing, only a hearing to see if the 
State could meet the clear and convincing evidence standard was required.330  
If so, the conviction should have been re-instated.331  If not, a new trial was 
necessary.332 
Harrelson is important because it emphasizes to both counsel and 
trial courts the importance of following the complete procedure discussed in 
McLean for determining the admissibility of other acts of child molestation.  
Also, as McLean has been cited as requiring clear and convincing proof for 
any Williams Rule evidence, this multi-step procedure should be strictly 
                                                 
320. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014). 
321. Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 173. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 175. 
326. Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 173. 
327. Id. at 173–74. 
328. Id. at 174. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 174–75; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014). 
331. Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 175. 
332. Id. 
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followed for all evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts no matter what the 
offense charged. 
IV. WITNESS EXAMINATION ISSUES 
Witness examination issues can arise in any number of ways.  
During this Survey period, one case provided the factual background for the 
Supreme Court of Florida’s discussion of several of them. 333   The 
prosecution in Wilcox v. State334  charged the defendant with first-degree 
murder, armed kidnaping, and armed robbery.335   Wilcox had called his 
cousin, Richaundu Curry, and asked if he could stay at her Lauderhill 
townhome. 336   Curry shared her home with her brother, her sister, and 
Curry’s ex-boyfriend.337  The four of them lived next to the victim, Nimoy 
Johnson. 338   The day Wilcox arrived, someone burglarized Johnson’s 
home. 339   Johnson initially blamed it on someone living in Curry’s 
townhome, and the two of them had words about this.340  After Curry had 
assured Johnson they were good neighbors, he apologized, and everything 
seemed fine.341  About one week later, an intruder came to Johnson’s home, 
and got him to call three female friends of his to come over.342  The intruder 
had Johnson tie up the three women and then took Johnson from the room 
they were in.343  Later that evening, someone stole one of the women’s car.344  
After they had freed themselves, they found Johnson shot dead in his 
home.345  Eyewitness testimony placed Wilcox around Johnson’s home at the 
time of the kidnapping and murder.346  Besides this, DNA evidence linked 
him to a cigarette the intruder had smoked in the home.347  Wilcox had even 
admitted that morning in a phone call to Curry’s brother that he had killed 
                                                 
333. See Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 366–71 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1406 (2015). 
334. 143 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1406 (2015). 
335. See id. at 369. 
336. Id. at 366. 
337. Id. 
338. Id. 
339. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 366. 
340. Id. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. 
343. Id. at 367. 
344. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 368. 
345. Id. 
346. See id. at 367–68. 
347. Id. at 369. 
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Johnson the night before or earlier that same morning. 348  Abundant other 
evidence linked Wilcox to the charged crimes.349 
At trial, Wilcox claimed he did not perpetrate these crimes.350  He 
claimed never to have been to the county where the crimes took place and 
claimed he was in a neighboring county that weekend. 351  Wilcox was 
arrested at an apartment complex where the stolen car was found but claimed 
Curry’s brother gave it to him three days after the crimes.352  At the guilt 
phase, Wilcox represented himself, with standby counsel appointed for his 
assistance if Wilcox wished to ask for help. 353   This self-representation 
decision led to several evidentiary issues discussed below. 
A. Refreshing Recollection 
Sometimes witnesses forget for various reasons and need help in 
remembering so they can give or continue giving testimony.  The process of 
doing this is called refreshing recollection.354  Although this process is not 
laid out in statute or rules, it is so common that questions about it seldom 
arise.  To prove its case against Wilcox, the State called his cousin, 
Richaunda Curry, whose home was next to the victim’s home.355  Curry 
testified that in a second police interview after the crimes, detectives had 
asked her if she knew someone with gold teeth.356  She had not yet told 
police about her cousin, Wilcox because she did want to tell them she 
believed he was involved in the crimes.357  When she learned police were 
looking for someone with gold teeth, she felt comfortable telling them about 
Wilcox and his gold teeth.358  On cross-examination by Wilcox, she denied 
knowing anyone else with gold teeth, including her sister or her sister’s 
                                                 
348. Id. at 368. 
349. See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 368–71. 
350. See id. at 369. 
351. Id. at 369. 
352. Id. at 368–69. 
353. Id. at 369, 373. 
354. See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378.  Some jurisdictions may alternatively call 
this refreshing memory, but the concept is the same.  E.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.613.  Both the Code 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence imply this process is available, although neither one 
directly says so.  See id.; FED. R. EVID. 612.  Certainly, a trial judge’s inherent power to 
control proceedings under section 90.612(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes to “[f]acilitate, through 
effective interrogation and presentation, the discovery of . . . truth” permits judges to allow 
this.  FLA. STAT. § 90.612(1)(a).  Also, the existence of section 90.613 of the Florida Statutes, 
Refreshing the Memory of a Witness, implies this.  See id. § 90.613. 
355. See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 375. 
356. Id. at 377. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. 
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boyfriend.359  Specifically, Curry testified in response to a question from 
Wilcox that “[you are] the only one that got gold teeth, that I know of.”360  
After another question and brief answer, Wilcox asked, “[c]an I refresh your 
memory, please?”361  The State objected to lack of a proper foundation to 
refresh recollection, and the judge told Wilcox to rephrase his question.362  
Wilcox then asked “do you think any document . . . would refresh your 
memory as to who all had gold that was at your respective apartment?”363  
After Curry said probably, the State again objected, but the judge let Wilcox 
proceed.364 
Up to now, one cannot hardly find fault with the proceedings on this 
point.  Technically speaking, there may not have been an absolute need to 
refresh recollection, but the judge acted wisely in giving a pro se defendant, 
especially one in a capital case, leeway.  What happened next provoked 
error, although the Supreme Court of Florida found all trial errors harmless 
given the overwhelming proof against Wilcox.365 
Wilcox then tried to refresh Curry’s memory by using the statement 
of another witness, Jean, which was summarized in and attached to the 
affidavit for his arrest.366  According to the summary, Jean was the victim’s 
friend and had talked with Johnson about a week before the charged 
crimes.367  The summary claimed Johnson told Jean about confronting two 
people, one of whom had gold teeth, regarding Johnson’s home being 
burglarized.368  The man with gold teeth allegedly told Johnson he was not 
afraid of Johnson, and Johnson had allegedly threatened to shoot him.369  The 
                                                 
359. Id. 
360. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 377. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 377–78.  Technically, it seems that the State’s proper objection was 
lack of a predicate to refresh recollection.  See id.  Curry never said she could not remember 
whom else she knew who had gold teeth or that she was not sure if she knew someone else 
with gold teeth.  Id. at 377. 
Lawyers are not entitled to refresh recollection any time they get an answer they 
may not like or expect.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.613 (2014).  There must be a need to do so 
caused by a witness’s complete or partial inability to recall.  See id. 
At common law, a witness had to have complete memory failure about a matter.  
See NLRB v. Fed. Dairy Co., 297 F.2d 487, 488–89 (1st Cir. 1962).  This is not required by 
the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Code.  See FED. R. EVID. 612; FLA. STAT. § 90.613. 
363. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 377. 
364. Id. at 377–78. 
365. Id. at 378–79. 
366. Id. 
367. Id. 
368. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378. 
369. Id. 
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prosecutor objected to Curry being refreshed by Jean’s statement, and the 
trial court refused to let Wilcox use the document to do so.370 
The Supreme Court of Florida found error in this ruling.371  When a 
witness needs his or her memory refreshed, “a party may show the witness a 
writing or other object to attempt to refresh . . . recollection.”372  If a writing 
is being used to refresh, it does not have to be one actually written by the 
witness.373  Nor does it have to be otherwise admissible into evidence.374  
The witness should not be allowed to read parts of the writing aloud, nor 
should the questioning attorney do so, as that would cause potential hearsay 
issues. 375   If the witness’s memory is successfully refreshed, and the 
witness’s testimony is based on remembering an event, not on remembering 
the contents of whatever is shown to the witness, “that which prompted the 
witness’s memory is immaterial.”376  Thus, Wilcox should have been allowed 
to use the arrest affidavit summary to refresh Curry’s memory, if it could. 
B. Impeachment with Prior Convictions 
Section 90.608 of the Florida Statutes recognizes that any party may 
impeach a witness and that there are multiple ways of doing so.377  One 
standard method of impeaching a witness’s credibility is by showing the 
witness has committed certain crimes that theoretically cast doubt on the 
witness’s ability to tell the truth.378  Section 90.610(1) of the Florida Statutes 
limits these crimes to ones “punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of [one] year” in the jurisdiction of conviction 379  or ones that involved 
“dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment.”380 
                                                 
370. Id.  The court also refused to let Wilcox use the summary to impeach 
Curry.  Id. 
371. Id. 
372. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378. 
373. Garrett v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 336 So. 2d 566, 569 (Fla. 1976). 
374. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 379; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.613 (2014). 
375. See Garrett, 336 So. 2d at 569. 
376. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378.  Sometimes the witness’s memory of the 
underlying event or fact is not truly refreshed.  See K.E.A. v. State, 802 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla. 
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).  Rather what the witness has used as the basis for his or her 
subsequent testimony is what has been just shown to the witness.  See id.  When opposing 
counsel suspects this is the case, section 90.613 of the Florida Statutes requires that the item 
used to refresh recollection be produced so opposing counsel can use it to demonstrate this 
continued memory failure.  FLA. STAT. § 90.613. 
377. Id. § 90.608. 
378. Id. § 90.610. 
379. Id. § 90.610(1).  These are commonly called felonies, as the quoted 
language is the standard definition for a felony at common law.  See id. § 90.610; State v. 
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While section 90.610 of the Florida Statutes sets out what general 
crimes qualify for impeachment, case law has delineated the proper 
procedure for doing so.  The questioning attorney should ask, “have you ever 
been convicted of a felony or a crime involving dishonesty [or false 
statement]?”381  If the witness admits committing crimes of these types, then 
the questioner is limited to asking either, if so, how many?  Or just how 
many?382  If the witness answers both questions accurately, further questions 
about the witness’ criminal record should not be asked; at least not for 
purposes of impeaching by a prior conviction.383 
In the Wilcox case described above, problems also arose about the 
proper way of doing this type of impeachment. 384   Wilcox testified and 
denied his involvement in the murder, kidnappings, and robbery.385   On 
cross-examination the prosecutor asked him:  “[H]ave you been previously 
convicted of a felony or crime involving dishonestly?”386   After a short 
exchange between the two, Wilcox admitted, “I have been convicted of a 
crime.”387  When again asked if he had been convicted of a felony or crime 
involving dishonesty, Wilcox replied saying, “[g]ot to make me understand.  
As far as dishonesty is concerned, I do [not] see where I lied about 
anything.”388  The prosecutor told him it was not the state’s job to make him 
understand and asked for the third time about felonies or crimes of 
dishonesty.389  Wilcox replied by saying, “I got to say no.”390 
The prosecutor responded by inquiring if Wilcox had been convicted 
of second degree murder, armed robbery, and grand theft motor vehicle.391  
Wilcox admitted he had, but added it was as an accomplice. 392   The 
                                                                                                                   
Page, 449 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1984).  However, some jurisdictions recognize aggravated 
misdemeanors that are punishable by more than one year. 
380. FLA. STAT. § 90.610(1). 
381. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372. 
382. Id. at 372–74. 
383. Id. at 374; FLA. STAT. § 90.610.  This describes how impeachment by 
prior convictions should proceed when the person being impeached is an actual witness.  See 
FLA. STAT. § 90.610.  For discussion of the proper procedure for impeaching a hearsay 
declarant, see infra Section IV.D. 
384. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374. 
385. Id. at 371–72. 
386. Id. at 371.  Note how even this question is not technically in the correct 
form as it omitted any reference to crimes of false statement.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.610.  
However, this omission had nothing to do with the subsequent erroneous cross-examination.  
See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374. 
387. Id. at 372. 
388. Id. 
389. Id. 
390. Id. 
391. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372. 
392. Id. 
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prosecutor then asked Wilcox about each crime in turn and whether he 
considered that type crime to be a crime of dishonesty or dishonest, 
beginning with the theft conviction and ending with the second degree 
murder conviction.393 
The defendant argued that allowing the State to impeach him by 
mentioning his specific crimes was improper, because the prosecutor had to 
exploit his confusion about the questions to do so.394  In turn, the State 
argued Wilcox was being cagey395 and wrongfully tried to resist answering 
the State’s questions.396  Additionally, the State argued this issue had not 
been preserved for appeal by a contemporaneous objection.397 
The Supreme Court of Florida partially agreed with both sides.398  
The Court found that Wilcox was genuinely confused by the questioning 
itself when he said, “[you] [g]ot to make me understand” that he may have 
been confused about the proper way to object to the cross-examination and 
that the trial court was aware of this confusion.399  As there was no indication 
Wilcox did not fail to object to gain a tactical advantage; and also with the 
leeway pro se defendants should be given, the Court found the claim of error 
preserved.400 
As to the merits of Wilcox’s claim, the Court found that the trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion in letting the State initially inquire about 
Wilcox’s criminal record for the three convictions.401  The convictions were 
all felonies, thus permissible for impeachment.402  Besides this, Wilcox was 
given several chances to ask for help from standby counsel but did not do 
so.403  Although he truthfully said one time that he had been convicted of a 
crime, he had also twice explicitly said no when asked about this.404  Thus, 
the State was entitled to clear this up at trial.405 
However, even with this entitlement, the State’s follow up questions 
about whether Wilcox considered certain of the felonies crimes of dishonesty 
                                                 
393. Id. 
394. Id. 
395. Id. 
396. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372. 
397. Id. 
398. Id. at 373–74. 
399. Id. at 372–73. 
400. Id. at 373. 
401. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 373–74. 
402. Id. at 374. 
403. Id. at 373. 
404. Id. at 372–73. 
405. Id. at 373–74.  The Supreme Court may have found that Wilcox likely 
was, or at least probably was, partially lying at trial.  See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372.  The 
Court declared that “[a] reasonable person could conclude that Wilcox was being, as the State 
contends, cagey with his responses to the prosecutor’s questions.”  Id. at 373. 
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was erroneous.406  Once the State was able to show he had a past criminal 
record of certain type felonies, questioning about them should have 
stopped.407  Florida law recognizes that some crimes involve dishonesty or 
false statement and some do not.408  However, this distinction is important 
for impeachment purposes only when the crimes are misdemeanors, not 
felonies.409  Since any felony can be used to impeach under section 90.610(1) 
of the Florida Statutes, whether the felony additionally involved dishonesty 
was irrelevant.410  What the prosecution tried to do here was to get double 
mileage from the same felony conviction.411  The Supreme Court of Florida 
concisely summed up its ruling on this point.  After a witness’s prior 
convictions are displayed by name and number before a jury, “the 
prosecution may not then continue to question the witness regarding whether 
his or her prior felony convictions are also crimes of dishonesty.”412 
The prosecution’s impeachment by prior convictions was also 
incorrect for other points not discussed by the Court.  First, robbery and 
motor vehicle theft are crimes of dishonesty under Florida law.  Second, 
none of the prosecutor’s questions about the crimes being ones of dishonesty 
ever should have been allowed for another reason.  The questions asking 
whether Wilcox considered certain crimes to involve dishonesty asked for 
Wilcox’s opinions about what he had done in the past.413  This is irrelevant 
for prior conviction impeachment purposes.  What should count is not what 
Wilcox felt about his crimes being ones of dishonesty, but whether as a 
matter of Florida law, they were.  Both the prosecutor and trial judge seem to 
have ignored this distinction, and the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion 
surprisingly fails to comment on it. 
Even with these additional errors, the Supreme Court of Florida’s 
finding of harmless error is easily defensible given the apparent 
overwhelming evidence of Wilcox’s guilt and lack of credibility.414 
C. Inappropriate Witness Dress in Criminal Cases 
The next witness examination issue does not involve actual witness 
questioning. 
                                                 
406. Id. at 374. 
407. Id. 
408. See State v. Page, 449 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1984). 
409. Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374. 
410. Id. at 374; FLA. STAT. § 90.610(1) (2014). 
411. See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374. 
412. Id. 
413. Id. at 372, 374. 
414. See id. at 374−75. 
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Hopefully, it also arises so rarely that seeing a case having to discuss 
it is surprising indeed.  Finally, the fact that the issue could have been easily 
avoided by the use of good judgment is especially disappointing since it led 
to reversible error.415 
In Hayes v. State,416 the State claimed the defendant and another man 
committed armed robbery and assault against a single victim.417  Hayes was 
tried alone.418  The victim identified Hayes at trial, and the jury was not told 
if the second person had ever been caught.419  The robbery took place in the 
front yard of a man named Pharory Greene.420  Greene appeared as a defense 
witness, claimed that he saw the robbery take place, and that Hayes was not 
one of the perpetrators.421 
The problem was not with what Greene said but how he had to say it.  
Greene, at the time of Hayes’s trial, was incarcerated in the jail for an 
unnamed offense.422  The offense apparently had no connection with the 
robbery on trial.  Greene, over defense objections, had to testify wearing jail 
clothes.423  Days before the trial, defense counsel had brought clothes to the 
jail for Greene to change into before taking the stand.424  When Greene was 
brought to court in jail garb, defense counsel objected to this.425  He argued 
that the State would not ordinarily be permitted to cross-examine the witness 
about his incarceration;426 but that once Greene appeared in jail clothes, his 
prisoner status would be obvious.427  The trial court overruled this objection 
stating, “‘[w]e [do not] dress out witnesses’” no matter whom they would 
testify for. 428   Counsel also argued the jury would think Greene was a 
codefendant, while he in fact was not.429  The defense wanted to bring this 
out but declined to do so when the trial judge said it would open up Greene 
                                                 
415. Id. at 1108−09. 
416. 140 So. 3d 1106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
417. Id. at 1107. 
418. See id. 
419. Id. 
420. Id. 
421. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108. 
422. Id. at 1107. 
423. Id. at 1107−08. 
424. Id. 
425. Id. at 1107. 
426. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1107.  The opinion never mentions the exact offense 
for which Greene was jailed.  See id. at 1107–08.  However, it was obviously one that was 
unavailable for impeachment by prior conviction under section 90.610(1) of the Florida 
Statutes.  See id. at 1107; FLA. STAT. § 90.610(1) (2014). 
427. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1107. 
428. Id. (first alteration in original). 
429. Id. 
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to inquiry about his criminal history.430  Greene ultimately testified in jail 
clothes, and the jury never heard he was not a codefendant to the robbery 
charge.431 
In a short but well-reasoned opinion, the First District reversed and 
remanded for a new trial.432  The court first discussed the prohibition against 
forcing a defendant to testify in jail clothing.433  To do so would violate 
several of an accused’s fundamental rights.434  First, it would violate his 
presumption of innocence.435  Secondly, it would also violate his right to 
equal protection of the law as forcing defendants to testify in jail clothes 
would usually only affect those who could not make bail before trial.436 
As to forcing a defense witness to testify dressed in jail clothes, only 
the Second District Court of Appeal had previously addressed this issue.437  
In Mullins v. State,438 the court found such to be error as it could have an 
indirect effect on the accused’s presumption of innocence.439  Witnesses do 
not have the same presumption of innocence as defendants, but defendants 
should not be exposed to the dangers of guilt by association or to having 
their witness’s credibility unfairly undermined by matters that would be 
otherwise unusable for impeachment.440 
The First District agreed with this reasoning and noted that courts 
from other states agreed with it as well.441  Hayes also commented that at 
least one other state court had found that forcing a defense witness to testify 
in jail clothes generally “‘further[s] no vital State interest.’”442  The First 
District recognized there could be unusual situations when safety concerns or 
other circumstances justified requiring witnesses to testify in jail clothes or 
even physical restraints.443  But this was not the case here.444  Instead, it 
                                                 
430. Id. at 1107–08. 
431. Id. at 1108. 
432. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108–09. 
433. Id. at 1108. 
434. Id. 
435. Id. 
436. Id. 
437. See Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108; Mullins v. State, 766 So. 2d 1136, 1136 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
438. 766 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
439. Id. at 1137. 
440. See id. 
441. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108. 
442. Id. (quoting State v. Artwell, 832 A.2d 295, 303 (N.J. 2003)). 
443. Id. at 1109. 
444. Id. 
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seemed that it was merely “not the common practice”445 for this judge to let 
prisoner witnesses’ change into civilian clothes before testifying.446 
The appellate court refused to find harmless error. 447   Greene’s 
testimony that Hayes was not one of the robbers was critical to Hayes’s 
defense; thus, anything detracting from Greene’s credibility could hurt 
this.448  The court thus could not say there was “‘no reasonable possibility 
that the error contributed to the conviction.’”449 
Three things in general should happen as a result of this decision.  
First, this practice should be stopped.  Indeed, it is almost inconceivable that 
it happened in the first place.  Perhaps, the First District’s opinion should be 
required reading for newly elected or appointed judges when they attend 
judge school.  Second, defense counsel should be alert, like the one here, to 
object to this when it might take place.  Finally, prosecutors should also try 
to prevent such errors from taking place.  Prosecutors have an ethical 
obligation to seek justice and not just try to get convictions at all cost.450  
Additionally, why would any smart prosecutor want this to happen when it 
might easily lead to reversible error like it did here?  In fairness to the State 
in this case, there is no mention of the State ever objecting to Greene 
testifying in civilian clothes or objecting to a short continuance while he 
changed.  In the future, prosecutors should join with defense counsel to see 
that this scenario is never repeated. 
D. Impeaching a Hearsay Declarant 
Occasionally, statements from someone who does not actually testify 
get admitted as substantive proof.451  If offered for their truth, the statements 
are hearsay.452  When this happens, section 90.806(1) of the Florida Statutes 
provides in part that the declarant’s credibility “may be attacked . . . by any 
evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had 
testified as a witness.”453  Cases construing this provision seldom arise for 
                                                 
445. Id. 
446. Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1109. 
447. Id. 
448. See id. at 1107–09. 
449. Id. at 1109 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)). 
450. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 
2013). 
451. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c) (2014). 
452. Id. 
453. Id. § 90.806(1).  This subsection also provides that if so attacked, the 
declarant’s credibility “may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those 
purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.”  Id. 
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various reasons.454  First, it is more persuasive to rely on testimony from 
actual witnesses than from someone’s statement about what someone else 
said.455   Second, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause acts as a 
partial check on admission of some hearsay from unavailable declarants.456 
One instance where counsel may try to admit hearsay from 
unavailable declarants involves defendants who want their exculpatory out-
of-court statements admitted without their having to testify and be fully 
cross-examined.457  Provisions of section 90.806(1) of the Florida Statutes 
stand as a partial obstacle for those defendants who wish to have their cake 
and eat it too by doing this.458  One 2014 case illustrates both the danger to 
the criminally accused in trying to do so and also sets parameters on the 
extent of the State’s ability to impeach hearsay declarants.459 
In Mathis v. State,460 the State charged James Mathis with possession 
of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia.461  The drugs were found 
when the police executed a search warrant at Mathis’ residence.462  He was 
home and arrested after the drugs were found.463  On cross-examination, a 
police officer admitted talking with Mathis the day of the arrest.464  The 
officer conceded Mathis never made any admissions during their 
conversation.465  The trial court, on the State’s request, ruled the defense had 
introduced exculpatory testimony during the cross-examination, thus 
entitling the State to introduce copies of Mathis’ eight felony convictions and 
one misdemeanor conviction for a crime of dishonesty.466  The State did so, 
and Mathis was convicted.467 
On appeal, Mathis argued the officer’s cross-examination testimony 
was not exculpatory.468  The Second District disagreed as the conversation 
established Mathis “presumably denied . . . the drugs belonged to him.”469  
                                                 
454. See FLA. STAT. § 90.806; 1 EHRHARDT, supra note 21, at § 801.1. 
455. See 1 EHRHARDT, supra note 21, at § 801.1. 
456. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FLA. STAT. § 90.806. 
457. See Freeman v. State, 74 So. 3d 123, 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
458. See FLA. STAT. § 90.806(1). 
459. Mathis v. State, 135 So. 3d 484, 485 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
460. 135 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
461. Id. at 485. 
462. Id. 
463. Id. 
464. Id. 
465. Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 485. 
466. Id. 
467. Id. 
468. Id. 
469. Id.  This ruling seems undoubtedly correct.  Why would the defense have 
asked the question involved if not to elicit exculpatory testimony? 
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Thus, the State could impeach him by prior convictions.470  However, the 
appellate court agreed the State’s actual impeachment of Mathis went too 
far.471  While the State was entitled to impeach Mathis with his past criminal 
record, it was not automatically entitled to introduce copies of the prior 
convictions themselves. 472   Had Mathis taken the stand and testified, he 
could have been impeached by prior conviction under section 90.610 of the 
Florida Statutes.473  Under this rule, the State could have asked Mathis if he 
had ever been convicted of a felony or any crimes involving dishonesty or 
false statements.474  If Mathis had said yes, the State would then have been 
allowed to ask him how many? or how many times?475  If Mathis had given 
accurate answers to both questions, further interrogation on his prior 
convictions would have been disallowed.476  The State would only have been 
able to introduce copies of his prior convictions if Mathis had answered 
untruthfully to one of the two previous answers.477 
In Huggins v. State, 478  the Supreme Court of Florida permitted 
introduction of a defendant’s prior convictions after he elicited his own 
statements as favorable hearsay but limited the procedure for doing so.479  
The trial court told the jury of the number of the accused’s convictions and 
whether they were for felonies or for crimes of dishonesty or false 
statement.480  The trial court also gave a special limiting instruction on the 
permissible use of the convictions.481  The names of the convictions were 
never mentioned.482  After Huggins, in Freeman v. State,483 the district court 
of appeal suggested an added procedure.484  The trial court should wait until 
the defense rests before deciding on a state’s request to impeach a hearsay 
declarant.485  If the declarant testified later at trial, then cross-examination 
                                                 
470. Id. 
471. Id. 
472. Id. at 485–86. 
473. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.610 (2014). 
474. Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 485–86; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.610. 
475. Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 487. 
476. Id. at 486–87. 
477. Id. at 487. 
478. 889 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2004). 
479. Id. at 755–56. 
480. Id. at 754. 
481. Id. 
482. Id. at 756–57. 
483. 74 So. 3d 123 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
484. See Huggins, 889 So. 2d at 755–57; Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125. 
485. Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125. 
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could proceed according to the usual procedure.486  If not, the impeachment 
would follow as Huggins discussed.487 
The trial court in Mathis followed neither procedure.488  It did not 
wait to see if Mathis would ultimately testify.489  It also did not give a 
cautionary jury instruction to use Mathis’ prior convictions only to evaluate 
the credibility of his out-of-court statements and not as substantive proof of 
guilt, which would have been improper propensity use of the convictions.490  
Finally, it improperly admitted copies of the convictions, thus allowing the 
jury to see the exact crimes he was convicted for.491  The Second District 
declined to find these errors were harmless.492  Only one witness said the 
drugs were Mathis’, and her own credibility was in question because of her 
prior convictions.493 
V. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
The privilege for attorney-client confidential communications is 
recognized by all states and by federal case law as well.494  Section 90.502(2) 
of the Florida Statutes provides that “[a] client has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing the contents of 
confidential communications when such other person learned of the 
                                                 
486. Id. 
487. Id.; Huggins, 889 So. 2d at 755–57. 
488. Mathis v. State, 135 So. 3d 484, 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see 
also Huggins, 889 So. 2d at 755–57; Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125. 
489. Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 486–87. 
490. Id.  The cautionary instruction in Freeman is a good example of what the 
jurors should have been told.  Id. at 486; see also Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125.  “[E]vidence of 
prior convictions should be considered only for the purpose of assessing the defendant’s 
credibility of statements he allegedly made that were related by a witness and are not to be 
considered as proof of guilt for the charged offense.”  Freeman, 74 So. 3d. at 125. 
491. Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 485.  The court’s opinion does not say whether this 
happened, but if the copies had been allowed back into the jury room during deliberations, this 
would have been further error.  See id. at 485–87. 
492. See id. at 487. 
493. Id. at 487. 
494. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995).  
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 recognizes several general types of privileges:  Those 
recognized at common law; those in the U.S. Constitution; those created by federal statute; 
and those created by the rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.  FED. R. EVID. 501.  
When a common law version of a privilege conflicts with any of the latter three types, the 
common law version gives way.  Id. 
The attorney-client privilege has long been recognized as existing at common law 
and thus, continues to exist under federal case law.  See id. 501, 502.  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502 specifically discusses waiver limitations and inadvertent disclosure of material 
otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege and its closely related common law 
cousin, work product.  Id. 502. 
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communications because they were made in the rendition of legal services to 
the client.”495   Cases on the privilege decided during this Survey period 
seemed to fall within two main areas.496  They involved questions about the 
privilege’s scope and its waiver, or about the crime-fraud exception to the 
privilege.497  Each of these areas deserves brief discussion.498 
A. Scope and Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege 
The privilege does not protect all interchange of information 
between clients and their lawyers, only those communications that are 
considered confidential and made to get or give legal advice.499  Florida law 
places the burden on the party claiming the privilege to show it exists and 
also to show it has not been waived.500  During this Survey period, Florida 
courts found the following protected by the privilege:  fee arrangements 
between clients and their attorneys,501 billing records between clients and 
attorneys,502  and original draft responses to interrogatories sent from the 
client to her attorney.503  However, information that would not be protected 
in a client’s possession does not become protected by transfer to an 
attorney.504  Thus, trust account wire receipts reflecting payments into a law 
firm’s trust accounts after judgment was obtained against a judgment debtor 
are not protected by the privilege.505 
As with other privileges, the one for attorney-client communications 
can be waived. 506   This may be done by answering questions at a 
                                                 
495. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(2) (2014). 
496. See Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064, 
1065–66 (Fla. 2011), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2014); Merco Grp. of the Palm 
Beaches, Inc. v. McGregor, 162 So. 3d 49, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); RC/PB, Inc. v. 
Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 132 So. 3d 325, 326 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); infra Sections 
V.A–V.B. 
497. See Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1065–66; McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 50; RC/PB, 
Inc., 132 So. 3d at 326; infra Sections V.A–V.B. 
498. See infra Sections V.A–V.B. 
499. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(c)(1). 
500. RC/PB, Inc., 132 So. 3d at 326. 
501. Tumelaire v. Naples Estates Homeowners Ass’n, 137 So. 3d 596, 598 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
502. Id. at 599. 
503. See Montanez v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 135 So. 3d 510, 512 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
504. See Sweetapple Broeker & Varkas, P.L. v. Simmons, 151 So. 3d 42, 43 
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
505. Id. 
506. See FLA. STAT. § 90.507 (2014) (discussing waiver in general for all 
privileges); infra Part VI (discussing waiver of the psychotherapist-privilege). 
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deposition507 or by using the communications as the basis for arguments or 
answering questions at a hearing.508 
One recent case concerning the privilege’s scope in bad faith tort 
actions is worthy of discussion.509  Insurance companies owe a duty of good 
faith to their insureds in defending them in lawsuits.510  The companies also 
owe a duty of good faith to the plaintiffs bringing such lawsuit to process the 
plaintiffs’ claims in a reasonable manner.511  When a plaintiff is awarded a 
judgment against an insured in excess of the insured’s policy limits, both 
first-party and third-party bad faith actions against the company become a 
possibility.512 
Boozer v. Stalley 513  involved the following factual background.  
Benjamin Hintz was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident involving 
Emily Boozer.514  Boozer was covered by two Allstate policies totaling $1.1 
million coverage.515   Douglas Stalley, Hintz’s guardian, sued Boozer for 
negligence and recovered a $11.1 million verdict.516  Allstate paid its policy 
limits exposure, leaving $10 million unsatisfied. 517   Virgil Wright, an 
attorney, had been retained to defend Boozer.518  When Stalley filed a third-
party bad faith action against Allstate to collect the unsatisfied balance, 
Wright continued to appear on Boozer’s behalf in the post judgment 
proceedings.519  Stalley wished to both depose Wright and to subpoena his 
files in the underlying negligence action.520  Wright moved for a protective 
order, asserting attorney-client privilege. 521   Wright argued that 
communications between he and Boozer were privilege protected and that 
she had not assigned any first-party bad faith claim she might have against 
                                                 
507. See Montanez, 135 So. 3d at 512.  However, here, the court found the 
actual answers did not constitute a waiver.  Id. at 512–13. 
508. See Butler v. Harter, 152 So. 3d 705, 713–14 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2014).  Here, the court found that an attorney’s affidavit merely listing the number of hours 
worked on a case and the fees incurred did not disclose privileged information.  Id. at 714. 
509. Boozer v. Stalley, 146 So. 3d 139, 140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (en 
banc). 
510. Id. at 143. 
511. Id. at 143–44, 44 n.1. 
512. Id. at 142. 
513. 146 So. 3d 139 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (en banc). 
514. Id. at 139. 
515. Id. 
516. Id. 
517. Id. 
518. Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 141. 
519. Id. 
520. Id. 
521. Id. 
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Allstate to Stalley.522  Wright appeared at a deposition with his litigation 
file.523  He answered general questions about his case management system 
and also about how his files were organized.524  He refused to answer any 
questions or produce documents relating to his direct representation of 
Boozer. 525   Both Wright and Boozer petitioned for a writ of certiorari 
claiming the trial court erred by not granting them a protective order.526  
Stalley responded that since he had filed a third party action, he stood in 
Boozer’s shoes and should be able to obtain any communications that would 
be available to her as a client.527 
After deciding that certiorari review was an appropriate means to 
address the legal issues here, the Fifth District Court of Appeal undertook an 
extensive review of the law in this area.528  Boston Old Colony Insurance Co. 
v. Gutierrez529 was deemed the first modern decision to consider whether an 
attorney representing both an insured and an insurer could be deposed and 
required to produce a litigation file in a third-party bad faith action brought 
without an assignment of claim from the insured.530  There, the court found 
the plaintiff was entitled to the insured’s attorney’s entire file from the 
lawsuit’s start until the date judgment was entered in the underlying 
action.531  This was so because the excess judgment creditor now stood in the 
position of the insured as far as bringing a bad faith action.532  Following 
Gutierrez, the Fifth District in Dunn v. National Security Fire & Casualty 
Co.,533 had rejected claims of both work product and attorney-client privilege 
protection against disclosure of original litigation files in third party bad faith 
actions.534 
In Boozer, the Fifth District acknowledged both those decisions 
supported the trial court’s ruling that Stalley should be able to review parts of 
Wright’s litigation file and to depose him about his representation of her.535  
However, the Court found two subsequent Supreme Court decisions left the 
                                                 
522. Id. 
523. Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 141. 
524. Id. 
525. Id. 
526. Id. 
527. Id. 
528. Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 141–48. 
529. 325 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
530. Id. at 416–17. 
531. Id. at 417. 
532. Id. 
533. 631 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
534. Id. at 1105; see also Gutierrez, 325 So. 2d at 417. 
535. Boozer v. Stalley, 146 So. 3d 139, 139, 140, 142, 147–48 (Fla. 5th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014) (en banc). 
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holdings in Gutierrez and Dunn in question.536  Allstate Indemnity Co. v. 
Ruiz, 537  had held that in statutory first-party bad faith actions, 538  work 
product material was discoverable depending upon whether the requesting 
party could show both a need for such and substantial hardship unless it is 
able to do so.539  In so doing, the court refused to draw any distinction for 
discovery purposes between first-party and third-party bad faith actions.540 
The Fifth District found Ruiz’s possible impact potentially countered 
by the Supreme Court of Florida’s later holding in Genovese v. Provident 
Life & Accident Insurance Co.,541 a first-party bad faith action case that 
refused to extend Ruiz’s holding to discovery issues involving attorney-client 
privileged communications.542  Genovese noted a clear distinction between 
the purposes behind each privilege.543  The work product privilege exists to 
protect an attorney’s efforts to prepare, bring and defend litigation. 544  
However, it can be overcome in circumstances of need and hardship.545  The 
attorney-client privilege exists to foster open communications in the 
attorney-client relationship.546   Unlike work product, claims of need and 
hardship are not sufficient to abrogate this privilege. 547   As there is no 
statutory exception for disclosure of this privilege’s protected 
communications in first-party bad faith actions, the privilege protected 
communications between an insurer and its attorney in these cases.548 
The Fifth District noted that the certified question in Genovese was 
limited to first-party action cases.549  However, Boozer examined cases from 
Florida’s state550 and federal courts551 that found the same result should be 
                                                 
536. Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064, 1069 
(Fla. 2011), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2014); Allstate Indem. Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So. 
2d 1121–22 (Fla. 2005); see also Gutierrez, 325 So. 2d at 417; Dunn, 631 So. 2d at 1105. 
537. 899 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2005). 
538. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1)(b)(1) (2002). 
539. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1122. 
540. Id. at 1131. Ruiz contains a helpful discussion on the evolution of third-
party and first-party actions in Florida.  Id. at 1129. 
541. 74 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 2011), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2014). 
542. Id. at 1069; see also Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1132. 
543. Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1067. 
544. Id. 
545. Id. at 1068. 
546. Id. at 1067. 
547. Id. at 1068. 
548. See Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1068; FLA. STAT. § 90.502(c) (2014). 
549. Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1065–66. 
550. Boozer v. Stalley, 146 So. 3d 139, 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (en 
banc); see also Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Scoma, 975 So. 2d 461, 465 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
551. See Maharaj v. Geico Cas. Co., 289 F.R.D. 666, 670 (S.D. Fla. 2013). 
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obtained in third-party bad faith actions.552  Thus, it found the protective 
order should have been granted in Boozer.553 
The court in so doing, recognized the uncertainty in this area and 
certified the following question as one of great public importance: 
“DO THE DECISIONS IN ALLSTATE INDEMNITY CO. V. RUIZ . . 
. AND GENOVESE V. PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO. 
. . . SHIELD ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS 
FROM DISCOVERY IN THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH LITIGATION?”554 
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction on this 
question.555  However, before any briefs were filed, both parties moved to 
dismiss, and the court granted the motion.556  Justices Pariente and Lewis 
both filed dissents from the dismissal.557  Both justices argued that once the 
court accepted jurisdiction, it could still decide the issue regardless of the 
parties’ motions.558  Justice Pariente noted that the underlying bad faith claim 
had been removed to federal court.559  Thus, the privilege issue might arise 
again there, and the Supreme Court of Florida could be asked to decide it on 
a certified question.560  Both justices also recognized the present uncertainty 
that exists in this area and the need for its resolution.561 
This is an issue that is not likely to go away.  When and how the 
Supreme Court of Florida ultimately resolves it cannot be determined.  The 
author believes that proponents of the privilege protection have the better 
argument.  If Florida is to recognize the privilege, then it should recognize it 
for all cases unless exceptional reasons exist for doing otherwise.  Since the 
privilege is a creature of statute, any exceptions should be recognized first by 
the legislature.  Yes, application of the privilege may mean that in some 
individual cases it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs like 
Stalley to successfully bring a claim.  But that is the price to be paid 
whenever privilege protection exists.  The legislature has decided so far that 
this price is one generally worth paying.562  The decision whether to change 
this should be left in its hands. 
                                                 
552. Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 144. 
553. See id. at 141, 148. 
554. Id. at 148 (citations omitted). 
555. Stalley v. Boozer, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S221b (Fla. Apr. 17, 2015). 
556. Id. 
557. Id. 
558. Id. 
559. Id. (Pariente, J., dissenting). 
560. Stalley, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S221b (Pariente J., dissenting). 
561. Id. (Pariente and Lewis, JJ., dissenting). 
562. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2014). 
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B. Crime-Fraud Exception 
Statutorily, there are five exceptions where otherwise confidential 
communications are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.563  The 
most commonly invoked and discussed exception is the one dealing with 
claims of crime or fraud.564  The whole purpose for the privilege’s existence 
in the first place is to encourage people to seek legal advice without creating 
situations where either what prospective clients tell attorneys or what 
attorneys tell clients will come back to haunt the client.565  Lawyers need 
accurate and complete information from clients in order to best advise them, 
and clients should not be afraid their attorneys’ advice will be disclosed to 
the world unless the client chooses to do so.566  However, when a client seeks 
assistance for legally unworthy purposes, such as for advice on how to 
commit a crime or on how to hide assets from creditors after the fact, the 
privilege’s purposes are not being furthered.567 
During this Survey period, one case provided important instruction 
on how trial courts should proceed when claims of the crime-fraud exception 
are made.568  In Merco Group of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. McGregor,569 
judgment creditors served subpoenas upon Merco Group’s lawyers, seeking 
documents on the location and treatment of funds that had been put into 
Merco’s lawyers’ trust account.570  Merco opposed the subpoena, claiming 
the records were attorney-client privilege protected among other reasons.571  
The trial court rejected all other reasons572 except the privilege claim.573  As 
to that, the judge ordered production of all documents for in camera review 
and also instructed Merco to file a privilege log identifying each specific 
document it claimed privileged.574  After this and an additional hearing on 
issues of relevancy, the judge ordered production of the documents, finding 
prima facie evidence Merco had used the attorney-client relationship to 
                                                 
563. Id. § 90.502(4)(a)–(e). 
564. Id. § 90.502(4)(a).  No case during this Survey period discussed any of the 
four other exceptions. 
565. See Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1065–66. 
566. See id. 
567. See Merco Grp. of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. McGregor, 162 So. 3d 49 
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  
568. See id. at 51. 
569. 162 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
570. Id. at 50. 
571. Id. 
572. Id.  The opinion does not state what these reasons were.  Id. 
573. McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 50. 
574. Id. 
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conceal assets that should have been discoverable.575  From this order Merco 
petitioned for certiorari.576 
The Fourth District agreed that the trial court’s procedure was 
improper and that its production order should be at least temporarily 
quashed.577  There was no error in ordering the in camera inspection of the 
documents. 578   The court also did not address whether the trial judge’s 
conclusion that the creditors had made a prima facie of fraud was correct.  
Where the trial court erred was in not holding a subsequent evidentiary 
hearing after this finding where Merco could try to provide a “reasonable 
explanation of its conduct or communications.”579  Thus, whenever there is a 
claim the crime-fraud exception requires production of otherwise privileged 
information, at least two hearing should be required.580  The first hearing 
should be to address whether the exception might lie.581  This should be 
followed by in camera inspection that would protect the privileged 
information if the privilege claim is sustained.582  If the trial finds a prima 
facie case that the exception applies, an evidentiary hearing must be afforded 
the party claiming the privilege to further explain why the court’s tentative 
conclusion is incorrect.583  Only after rejecting any explanations from the 
privilege’s proponent should disclosure be ordered.584 
The hearing at which a party claims the exception applies must be 
noticed as an evidentiary one if the party plans to introduce proof there.585  
Otherwise, counsel cannot fairly defend against claims the privilege is 
inapplicable. 586   Failure to properly notify an opponent that a scheduled 
hearing is meant to be evidentiary in nature should mean that both any 
finding of fraud made there and any in camera inspection order should be 
quashed on certiorari. 587   This situation occurred in Trans Health 
Management, Inc. v. Nunziata588 during this Survey period.589 
                                                 
575. Id. at 50–51.  The opinion also does not state what the judgment against 
Merco was for and how much it was for.  Id. at 50. 
576. Id. at 51. 
577. McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 51–52. 
578. Id. at 51. 
579. Id. 
580. Id. 
581. Id. 
582. McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 51. 
583. See id. at 50–51. 
584. See id. at 51. 
585. See id. 
586. Id. 
587. McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 51–52; see also Trans Health Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Nunziata, 159 So. 3d 850, 859–60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
588. 159 So. 3d 850 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
589. See id. at 859–60. 
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VI. PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
Florida law contains a statutory privilege for confidential 
communications between a psychotherapist 590  and patient. 591   Section 
90.503(2) of the Florida Statutes provides in part that patients have a general 
privilege against disclosure of confidential communications to their 
psychotherapist with several statutory exceptions.592  The broad nature and 
scope of this privilege is obviously to encourage people to seek assistance for 
their mental or emotional problems without having their discussions about 
them revealed to the world.  During 2014, three reported cases discussed 
various aspects of this privilege.593 
A. The Privilege in General 
S.P. ex. rel. R.P. v. Vecchio594 demonstrates that the privilege affords 
protections to some persons who are not formal parties to litigation.  Vecchio 
was accused of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen-year-old child.595  
The child told a night security guard at a condominium she had escaped from 
a man who molested her.596  The child received a physical exam from a Child 
Protection Team doctor which revealed semen in her vaginal area.597  Police 
interviewed Vecchio after the security guard identified him from surveillance 
footage in one of the condominium’s elevators. 598   Vecchio admitted 
                                                 
590. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(a)(1)–(4) (2014).  The definition of 
psychotherapist under this privilege is extremely broad.  See id.  It includes medical doctors, 
psychologists, credentialed clinical social workers, mental health counselors, family 
therapists, and treatment personnel of certain statutorily listed facilities if these persons “are 
engaged primarily in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including 
alcoholism and other drug addiction.”  Id. 
The definition also includes advanced registered nurse practitioners who are 
engaged in similar diagnosis or treatment care.  Id. § 90.503(1)(a)(5). 
591. Id. § 90.503(1)(b).  A patient is someone who consults or is interviewed 
by a psychotherapist for “diagnosis or treatment of mental or emotional condition[s], 
including alcoholism and other drug addiction.”  FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(b). 
592. See id. § 90.503(2)–(4). 
593. See S.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Vecchio, 162 So. 3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); State v. Topps, 142 So. 3d 978, 979 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Scully v. Shands 
Teaching Hosp. Clinics, Inc., 128 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
594. 162 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
595. Id. at 77. 
596. Id. 
597. Id. 
598. Id. 
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performing sexual acts with the victim.599  The semen discovered in the exam 
also was found to be the defendant’s.600 
The victim had been sent out of state for treatment.601  Unfortunately. 
she relapsed after ten months of treatment when she heard the case against 
Vecchio had not been concluded.602  The treatment center filed a declaration 
of her unavailability, and the state said it would proceed without her as a 
witness.603  Vecchio moved to subpoena her medical, psychiatric, and other 
records.604  The trial court conducted an in camera review of the records and 
made one of them available to the defense.605  The others were re-sealed.606  
After this, the defendant pled open “to lewd or lascivious battery, lewd or 
lascivious molestation, and battery on a child.”607  The State’s sentencing 
memorandum mentioned the victim’s continuing emotional distress, and her 
father testified about the same.608  Vecchio moved the trial court to unseal the 
victim’s records, so he could raise a discovery violation on appeal.609  S.P., 
the victim’s natural guardian opposed unsealing the records, arguing they 
were private and privileged.610  The trial court granted Vecchio’s motion, and 
the State petitioned for certiorari review, which was granted.611 
The Fourth District quashed the trial court’s order for several 
reasons.612  Under Florida law, the Florida Constitution’s Right to Privacy613 
protected the victim’s medical records from disclosure.614  Florida statutory 
law also protects confidential medical records from disclosure.615  Finally, 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege protected her confidential 
communications to her doctors and others, made so she could get 
treatment. 616   The privilege admittedly created three statutory exceptions 
where disclosure was allowed:  “(1) during involuntary commitment 
proceedings, (2) when . . . a court order[s] mental examination[s], [and] (3) 
                                                 
599. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 77. 
600. Id. 
601. Id. 
602. See id. 
603. Id. at 77–78. 
604. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 78. 
605. Id. 
606. Id. 
607. Id. 
608. Id. 
609. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 78. 
610. Id. at 79. 
611. Id. 
612. Id. at 81. 
613. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
614. Id.; S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79. 
615. FLA. STAT. § 456.057(7)(a) (2014); S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79. 
616. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79. 
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when the patient . . . relies on [his] mental condition . . . as [a] claim or 
defense” in litigation.617  However, none of these applied.618  The Fourth 
District also recognized that the privilege could be breached if good cause619 
was shown but declined to find such here.620  The records would only have 
confirmed the victim’s trauma already shown at the sentencing hearing.621  
As to any potential Brady v. Maryland622 discovery violation, the defendant 
did not meet his burden of showing this existed.623  The Fourth District also 
commended the trial court’s in camera review of the victim’s records as 
ensuring no exculpatory evidence was withheld.624 
The Fourth District’s last point, commending the trial court’s in 
camera review of alleged privileged records to see if an exception or good 
cause existed for their disclosure, stands in partial contrast to what happened 
in Scully v. Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc.625  There, the appellant 
had filed a perceived disability based claim under the Florida Civil Rights 
Act alleging she had been wrongly constructively discharged.626  The alleged 
constructive discharge came from Scully’s refusal to give Shands a copy of a 
monitoring contract with the Professional Resource Network (“PRN”).627  
Scully had been “admitted to a psychiatric hospital [due to] an adverse 
reaction to . . . medication for her psychiatric condition.”628  PRN assured 
Shands she could safely return to work and was in the process of establishing 
a monitoring contract with PRN.629 
Scully sought to protect her PRN records from discovery.630  The 
trial court denied her a protective order and ordered their production.631  
Scully sought certiorari review in the district court.632 
The First District found the records relevant and not protected by the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege as “Scully placed her medical and 
psychiatric condition[s]” in issue by both the basis of her “claim and her 
                                                 
617. Id. at 79–80; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4)(a)–(c). 
618. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 80. 
619. Id. at 79; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.4615(2)(c). 
620. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79–80. 
621. Id. at 80. 
622. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
623. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79–80. 
624. Id. at 80. 
625. Id.; 128 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
626. Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988. 
627. Id. at 987. 
628. Id. 
629. Id. 
630. Id. at 988. 
631. Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988. 
632. Id. 
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request for emotional . . . damages.”633  Thus, a statutory exception contained 
in the privilege existed634 and some disclosure was appropriate.635 
However, the disclosure’s scope was inappropriate. 636   PRN had 
made its determination Scully could safely return to work in November 
2011. 637   The discovery request asked for any medical records and 
information about her without setting any time limitations.638  The trial court 
compounded this problem, but not limiting its order to the time period related 
to Scully’s claims.639  Furthermore, unlike the trial court in S.P., the trial 
court here had conducted no in camera review to make sure only records 
relevant to Scully’s claim were ordered disclosed.640  Thus, the case was 
remanded for the trial court to do so.641 
The message collectively sent about the psychotherapist-privilege by 
these two decisions should be clear.  Florida law seeks to protect as 
privileged, psychotherapist-patient confidential communications unless there 
is a clear good reason for not doing so.642  Even then, the privilege must be 
protected to all extent possible consistent with the legitimate needs of the 
parties.643  Thus, even when a statutory exception or other good cause for 
disclosure exists, trial courts should do in camera records review to make 
sure their disclosure orders are not broader than they should be. 
2. Confidential Communications and Third Party Presence 
Like any other privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege can be 
waived by its holder.644  Section 90.503(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes defines 
a confidential communications as one “not intended to be disclosed to third 
persons”645 except for three instances.646  Usually the presence of a third 
party to an otherwise confidential communication will destroy the 
                                                 
633. Id. 
634. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4)(c) (2014) (providing that there is no privilege 
when any party “relies upon the [mental or emotional condition of the patient] as an element 
of [the party’s] claim or defense.”). 
635. Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988. 
636. Id. at 989. 
637. Id. at 987. 
638. Id. at 988. 
639. Id. at 988–89. 
640. S.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Vecchio, 162 So. 3d 75, 80 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); Scully, 128 So. 3d at 989. 
641. Scully, 128 So. 3d at 989. 
642. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503 (2014). 
643. S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79. 
644. State v. Topps, 142 So. 3d 978, 981 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
645. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(c). 
646. Id. § 90.503(1)(c)(1)–(3). 
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communication’s confidentiality and waive the privilege. 647   The Fourth 
District in a case of first impression recently discussed a situation where it 
found that should not be so.648 
Avery Topps stabbed a dog to death and then tried to be admitted to 
a hospital.649  A deputy sheriff went to the hospital to arrest Topps.650  An 
emergency room doctor acting as a psychotherapist to possibly provide either 
for the defendant’s psychiatric commitment or for his clearance to be jailed 
examined Topps with the deputy in the room.651  The deputy was present to 
provide for the medical staff’s safety. 652   As standard part of Topps’ 
psychiatric evaluation, the doctor asked Topps why he came to the 
hospital.653  Topps then told the doctor about the stabbing.654  The State 
argued Topps waived any privilege by making the statements in the 
officer’sa third partypresence.655 
The trial court agreed with Topps and granted his motion to exclude 
the statement as privileged.656  In so doing, the judge found the officer had 
been present for multiple reasons:  to keep custody of Topps, to ensure 
medical staff safety, and to make sure Topps got needed medical attention.657  
Thus, as Topps had sought the treatment himself, “the deputy’s presence 
furthered the interest of the patient by allowing the examination to take place 
even though he was in custody as an arrestee.”658 
The Fourth District acknowledged the general rule that when a third 
party hears a communication, that can often destroy confidentiality and make 
testimony about it admissible.659  However, the privilege statutory language 
recognizes there are times when third parties may be needed to help 
communication in the therapeutic setting or otherwise aid the patient’s 
interest in getting diagnosis or treatment.660  One of those third party groups 
are “[t]hose persons present to further the interest of the patient in the 
consultation, examination, or interview.” 661   Another group includes 
                                                 
647. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 981. 
648. Id. at 978. 
649. Id. at 979. 
650. Id. 
651. Id. 
652. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979. 
653. Id. 
654. Id. 
655. Id. 
656. Id. 
657. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979. 
658. Id. 
659. Id. at 979–80. 
660. Id. at 980; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(c) (2014). 
661. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(c)(1). 
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“persons necessary for the transmission of the communication.” 662   The 
deputy fell into both of these groups.663 
The deputy’s presence furthered Topps’s interest in getting care 
because without it, no attempt to treat him would have occurred.664  Topps 
would not have been left alone with the doctor without law enforcement 
there.665  So the deputy’s presence was essential to Topps getting any help at 
all.666  The deputy was also a person whose presence was needed for the 
transmission of the communication because again, without the deputy being 
present, Topps would not have been allowed to be with the doctor.667  The 
doctor needed Topps’s statement as to why Topps came to the hospital for 
help.668  Topps would never have been able to make this statement if he had 
been immediately removed from the hospital itself. 669   Additionally, no 
follow-up on the statement could be done without it being made in the first 
place.670 
The Fourth District noted that sometimes a third party’s presence 
when a statement is made implies a waiver of an otherwise privileged 
communication.671  That should not be the case here because the deputy’s 
presence was not voluntary on Topps’s part.672  As long as Topps stayed in 
the room with the doctor, the deputy would be there whether Topps wished it 
or not.673  Since waivers usually must be voluntary or at least be implied 
voluntary from reasonable circumstances, no express or implied waiver was 
found here.674 
The Topps opinion also gives several cogent policy reasons why 
waiver should not be found here.  The policy behind the privilege is to not 
only protect certain communications patients do not want widely revealed 
but also to encourage those who feel in need of mental health care to seek it.  
Finding waiver here would discourage persons who commit criminal acts 
from seeking the mental health assistance they need.  Finally, as the court 
                                                 
662. Id. § 90.503(1)(c)(2).  A third group is “persons who are participating in 
the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist.”  Id. § 90.503(1)(c)(3).  
This third group clearly did not exist in State v. Topps.  See id. § 90.503(1)(c)(3); Topps, 142 
So. 3d at 978, 980–81. 
663. See Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979, 981–82. 
664. Id. at 981. 
665. Id. at 981–82. 
666. See id. 
667. Id. 
668. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 981. 
669. See id. at 981–82. 
670. See id. at 982. 
671. Id. at 981. 
672. Id. 
673. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979, 981. 
674. Id. at 981–82. 
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noted, people should not have to give up their privilege against self-
incrimination to seek medical treatment and diagnosis.675 
Several points apparently not raised by the State are not addressed by 
the court’s opinion.  Topps could have arguably whispered his answer to the 
doctor or have insisted the deputy stand far enough away so the deputy could 
not hear the answer.676  In theory, either of these could have been done.  To 
insist that they be done to preserve the privilege would be ridiculous.  First, 
Topps was already having problems or believed he had serious problems.  
Why else would he have gone to the hospital?  To require under these 
circumstances that he whisper his answer would be to require extraordinary 
action from him.  People should not have to go to extreme lengths to 
preserve their privileges.  Second, even if Topps had wanted the deputy to 
stand far enough away so the deputy could not hear, the deputy might not 
have agreed to do so.  Indeed, if concern for medical staff safety was one 
reason for the deputy’s presence, having him stand far away from Topps and 
the doctor could actually increase the risk of harm to medical staff.  Topps 
supposedly had just engaged in a violent act, what is there to say he might 
not do so against the doctor? 
The court’s opinion is a wise accommodation between the need for 
safety, security, and the need to have certain communications protected, so 
they will be made to begin with.  True, the exclusion of Topps’s statement 
may mean there is not sufficient evidence to convict him.  But the loss of 
potential evidence is always the price that must be paid to recognize and 
enforce a privilege’s protection.  The legislature has decided this is not too 
great a price to pay to promote psychotherapist-patient interchange.677  Topps 
goes far in respecting and furthering that decision. 
VII. HEARSAY 
Unless someone is a hermit and lives alone in a cave or is a castaway 
stranded alone on a deserted island without any modern means of contact 
with the outside world, communication with other people is a daily fact of 
life.  Indeed, one can hardly go through an ordinary day without it.  As a 
result, many to most trials involve some testimony about what people say or 
write to one another.678  When these out-of-court statements are offered for 
their truth at trial, hearsay issues arise.679 
                                                 
675. Id. at 982; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
676. Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979–81. 
677. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503(c) (2014). 
678. See id. § 90.801(1); Topps, 142 So. 3d at 978–79; infra notes 800–10 and 
accompanying text. 
679. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c). 
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Section 90.801 of the Florida Statutes defines hearsay as “a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
[other] hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.”680  In theory, hearsay is inadmissible at trial.681  However, any 
experienced lawyer or judge knows this is a myth.  Despite the general 
prohibition against admitting hearsay statements, most hearsay statements 
fall within either one of three statutory exemptions682 or one of the thirty 
exceptions to the general prohibition in the rules.683 
The key to handling hearsay issues is to first determine if a statement 
is hearsay to begin, with and, if so, then consider whether it falls within an 
exemption or exception.  If a statement is not being offered for its truth, it is 
not hearsay.684  If hearsay falls within an exemption, it also is not considered 
hearsay, despite having all the attributes of a classical hearsay statement.685  
At one time, a number of common misconceptions as to what was or was not 
hearsay were prevalent.  One would think that after almost forty years under 
the Code these misconceptions would no longer exist.  Unfortunately, one 
recent case meriting brief mention shows that this is not so.686  In Taylor v. 
State,687 a victim told a police officer about the defendant’s alleged threats 
against her shortly after they happened.688   The defense objected to her 
testifying about these statements and convinced the trial court her statements 
                                                 
680. Id. § 90.801(1)(c). 
681. Id. § 90.802.  This principle is embodied by section 90.802 of the Florida 
Statutes, which states that “[e]xcept as provided by statute, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.”  
Id. 
682. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a)–(c).  Section 90.801 of the Florida Statutes, 
after defining hearsay, provides three explicit situations where statements, which would 
otherwise fall within this definition, are declared exempt from the prohibition:  (1) prior 
inconsistent statements under oath; (2) prior consistent statements offered to rebut claims the 
declarant has a motive to falsify or fabricate; and (3) prior statements of identification.  Id. § 
90.801(1)(c), (2)(a)–(c).  All three exemptions require that the declarant’s whose statement is 
being introduced testify and be subject to cross-examination about the earlier statement.  Id. § 
90.801(2)(a)–(c). 
683. Section 90.803 of the Florida Statutes, which does not require declarant 
unavailability, contains twenty-four exceptions.  See id. § 90.803.  Section 90.804 of the 
Florida Statutes, which does have a declarant unavailability condition, has an additional six 
exceptions.  See id. § 90.804. 
684. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1); Caballero v. State, 132 So. 3d 369, 371 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that a victim’s prior inconsistent statement that the defendant 
had not sexually battered her at a certain time was not hearsay, as it would have been 
admissible for impeachment purposes and not for its truth). 
685. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801. 
686. See Taylor v. State, 146 So. 3d 113, 114–15 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
687. 146 So. 3d 113 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
688. Id. at 114. 
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did not fall within the excited utterance exception.689  However, the trial 
court ruled her statements were not hearsay at all690 because the victim, the 
declarant, was available and subject to cross-examination at trial.691  As the 
Fifth District declared, “[i]n so ruling, the trial [court] articulated a common 
misconception about the hearsay rule.”692  Only if the victim’s out-of-court 
statements, which were clearly offered as a truthful account of what just 
happened to her, fell within one of the three exemptions in the rule could 
they be considered non-hearsay.693  As they did not, the statements were 
hearsay despite the declarant’s availability for cross-examination at trial.694 
As with other areas of evidence law, not every case mentioning the 
hearsay rule merits.  Thus, this Survey does not discuss cases arising during 
2014 concerning the following issues of hearsay:  hearsay in restitution 
hearings, 695  hearsay in probation revocation hearings, 696  corpus delicti 
rule,697 prior consistent statements,698 state of mind exception,699 and past 
                                                 
689. Id. at 115; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2).  As the Fifth District said on 
appeal, this ruling was wrong.  See Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115–16. 
690. Id. at 115. 
691. Id. 
692. Id. 
693. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2); Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115. 
694. Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115. 
695. See Phillips v. State, 141 So. 3d 702, 705, 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding a trial court erred in allowing a victim to testify as to the value of stole items 
when the testimony was based on a website the victim had consulted). 
696. See McDoughall v. State, 133 So. 3d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding hearsay admissible at probation revocation hearings, but it cannot provide the 
only basis for revocation). 
697. Burks v. State, 613 So. 2d 441, 446 (Fla. 1993) (Shaw, J., concurring and 
dissenting).  Before the State can introduce an accused’s statement’s to prove an offense, it 
must offer evidence to independently prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged.  Id. at 443.  
The corpus delicti has been defined as “the fact that a crime has actually been committed, that 
someone is criminally responsible” for it.  Id.  (internal quotation omitted); see also J.B. v. 
State, 166 So. 3d 813, 815–17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing defendant’s petit theft 
conviction where the only evidence other than her admissions to the theft was inadmissible 
hearsay testimony from store employees who did not see the crime itself but only testified to 
an absent declarant’s statements). 
The general corpus delicti rule is not statutorily codified, but comes from cases 
construing the Code’s exception for personal admissions.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18)(a).  In 
certain types of sexual abuse crimes, the corpus delicti rule has statutorily been relaxed.  See 
id. § 92.565(2) (provides that in certain prosecutions for sexual crimes, an accused’s 
statements can be introduced without proof of the corpus delicti if the trial court finds that 
“the state is unable to show the existence of each element of the crime, and . . . finds that the 
defendant’s confession or admission is trustworthy”).  However, this does not preclude the 
state from introducing a defendant’s confession by satisfying the traditional requirements of 
corpus delicti needed for other, non-sexual offenses.  See Ramirez v. State, 133 So. 3d 648, 
652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that when the state meets the traditional corpus 
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recollection recorded exception. 700   Several significant cases on hearsay 
topics are discussed below.701 
A. Excited Utterances 
1. In General 
One of the traditionally recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is 
that of excited utterances. 702   Section 90.803(2) of the Florida Statutes 
defines these as “[a] statement or excited utterance relating to a startling 
event or condition made while the declaring was under the stress of 
                                                                                                                   
delicti requirement, the hearing and findings required under section 92.565 of the Florida 
Statutes do not apply). 
698. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b); Howard v. State, 152 So. 3d 825, 828–29 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that statement did not qualify under the exemption for 
prior consistent statements, under section 90.801(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes, as a state 
witness’s prior consistent statements elicited on direct examination were used prematurely to 
improperly bolster the witness’s testimony before any cross-examination had been done 
suggesting the witness was being untruthful). 
699. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3)(a); Combs v. State, 133 So. 3d 564, 567 (Fla. 
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that statements of a third party that he and another man 
planned to rob a bank defendant was accused of robbing should have been admitted under the 
state of mind exception).  The statements showed the declarant’s present intent to do a future 
act, and the actual robbery provided enough of a basis to show the declarant had acted 
consistent with this intent.  FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3)(a); see also Combs, 133 So. 3d at 567. 
Under this exception, the statements must be offered to prove the declarant’s, not 
someone else’s state of mind or subsequent acts, and the declarant’s state of mind must be 
relevant.  FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3)(a); see also Combs, 133 So. 3d at 567.  For a recent case 
finding error in admitting statements under this exception when the declarant’s state of mind 
was not relevant, see Henderson v. State,135 So. 3d 472, 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
700. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(5); Blount v. State, 152 So. 3d 29, 30–31 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding the deposition of a victim who claimed he could not 
completely remember the event testified to in the deposition qualified as past recollection 
recorded when the other requirements for the exception were met); McNeal v. State, 143 So. 
3d 1078, 1079–80 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that before a writing qualifies under 
this exception, the declarant must verify its accuracy or correctness.  Here the victim’s failure 
to do so for her written out-of-court statement disqualified it under this exception.). 
This Survey’s author notes that the defense did not object to the deposition being 
entered at trial on grounds that it would have violated the accused’s Confrontation Clause 
rights.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Blount, 152 So. 3d at 30.  Hopefully such an objection 
would be made if the state tries to make similar use of deposition in the future.  See Blount, 
152 So. 3d at 30.  Whether the accused would have had a prior opportunity to cross-examine 
the victim for confrontation purposes would then have to be addressed.  See Yero v. State, 138 
So. 3d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  To the author’s knowledge, no reported case 
in Florida has addressed this issue. 
701. See infra Sections VII.A–C. 
702. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2). 
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excitement caused by the event or condition.”703  This exception and its 
requirements have been discussed in many reported cases.704  Depending 
upon which case one wishes to cite, the exception has either two or three 
elements.705  State v. Jano706 appears to have the most complete one.  There 
the Court found three requirements for the exception:  (1) there must be an 
event sufficient to cause nervous excitement, (2) the declarant must in fact 
have been excited by the event, and (3) the declarant’s statement was made 
while the excitement from the event was continuing.707  Another way of 
saying this by use of a trilogy is that there must be an excited statement made 
by an excited person whose excitement was caused by an exciting event.  As 
this exception comes up fairly frequently, especially in criminal cases, the 
cases mentioning it during this Survey period are worth reviewing. 
Nine-one-one telephone calls present a common scenario where a 
party, usually the State, argues there are excited utterances.708  Emergency 
phone calls seem to so intuitively involve excited utterances that courts and 
attorneys may make the mistake of assuming this is so.709  With any other 
exception, the proponent of the hearsay has the burden of demonstrating its 
requirements are met.710  When an objection is made, the trial court should 
hold a brief hearing or make explicit findings on the record concerning the 
exception’s requirements before admitting the statements.711  Failure to do so 
can often result in reversal.712 
Unless the declarant or someone who knew and heard the declarant 
when the call is made testifies, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy 
the exception’s requirements.  For example, in Brandon v. State713, a 911 
caller identified the defendant as the person who had assaulted the caller and 
threatened her husband.714  When the caller could not be at trial to testify 
                                                 
703. Id. 
704. See State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1988); Taylor v. State, 146 
So. 3d 113, 115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Brandon v. State, 138 So. 3d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
705. See Jano, 524 So. 2d at 661; Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115; Brandon, 138 So. 
3d at 1152. 
706. 524 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1988). 
707. Id. at 661; see also Stoll v. State, 762 So. 2d 870, 873–74 (Fla. 2000) 
(later discussed these same requirements but merely combined the second and third ones, so as 
to find two, instead of three requirements.  Substantively this makes no difference). 
708. See Morrison v. State, 161 So. 3d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 
Tucker v. State, 884 So. 2d 168, 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
709. See Morrison, 161 So. 3d at 565. 
710. See Brandon, 138 So. 3d at 1152. 
711. See id. at 1151–52; FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (2014). 
712. See, e.g., Brandon, 138 So. 3d at 1152. 
713. 138 So. 3d 1150 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
714. Id. at 1151. 
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about the events, the State offered the call’s contents to prove them.715  After 
the contents were admitted and the accused convicted, the appellate court 
reversed.716  As neither the caller nor someone who knew her testified, the 
State never proved the caller’s identify.717  Likewise, since the State only 
could produce testimony from the person who received the call, there was no 
proof whether the caller was excited at the time, and even more importantly, 
how long after the alleged assault and threats the call had been made.718  
Without showing the time element, the State could not establish that the 
declarant had no time to contrive or to reflect on the alleged event.719  In 
fairness to the State, it appears the prosecution may have been surprised by 
the alleged victim’s absence. 720   However Brandon shows that in some 
instances it is better to just drop charges than try to stretch meager facts to fit 
an exception.  At least the wasted cost of trial and appeal is not incurred then. 
Taylor, referred to above, shows the requirement that the declarant 
be excited cannot be taken to an extreme. 721   The defendant allegedly 
threatened and shot at the victim who drove away in her car.722  She went to 
a restaurant to call 911 but stopped from doing so when she saw a police 
officer.723  Instead, the victim promptly told the officer what happened.724  
The trial court allowed the officer to testify about what the victim had said 
on the erroneous ground it was not hearsay, after making the equally 
erroneous finding the statements were not excited utterances. 725   After 
Taylor’s conviction, the Fifth District found the statements should have been 
admissible as excited utterances, even though they clearly were hearsay.726  
The officer testified the victim had calmed down some so she could tell him 
what happened; however, she was still shaking, crying, and appeared 
excited.727  Thus “[a]though she may have calmed down enough to speak”728 
as the officer had said she did, the overall excitement from the shooting and 
                                                 
715. Id. 
716. Id. at 1152. 
717. Id. 
718. Brandon, 138 So. 3d at 1152. 
719. Id. 
720. See id. at 1151. 
721. See Taylor v. State, 146 So. 3d 113, 115–16 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
722. Id. at 114. 
723. Id. 
724. Id. 
725. Id. at 114–16. 
726. Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115–16. 
727. Id. at 116. 
728. Id. 
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threats just minutes previously existed. 729   Therefore, the statements fell 
within the exception.730 
2. The First Complaint Exception 
Under the Code, hearsay statements are only admissible as provided 
by statute.731  Thus, theoretically only exceptions explicitly listed in the Code 
should be recognized.  However, some Florida courts continue to recognize a 
common law exception not explicitly listed, sometimes similar to the one for 
excited utterances.  Twenty years ago, Pacifico v. State732 found that if the 
alleged victim of a sexual assault or battery makes a statement “at [the] first 
opportunity to complain to anyone other than [the alleged attacker] after the 
sexual encounter,” the statement would be admissible over a hearsay 
objection.733  Subsequent case law found that even if the victim’s first try to 
complain to another person is unsuccessful, later statements to that same 
person about the assault may fall under the first complaint exception if they 
are not made after “an unduly long period of time.”734 
Pacifico suggests the statements would be admissible even if they do 
not qualify under any other hearsay exception.735  Another court, soon after 
the Pacifico decision, took a slightly more restrictive approach to the first 
complaint exception.736  In Burgess v. State,737 the court took an approach 
that might be described as an attempt to split the baby, even though it is hard 
to view this decision as having much Solomonic quality.  Burgess recognized 
the exception’s existence but limited its contents to “only the fact of the 
report of the sexual battery but not the details.”738  Burgess would require 
that statements reporting the details satisfy the statutory elements of another 
hearsay exceptionone mentioned in the Codesuggesting this would 
probably be either one for excited utterances or for present sense 
impressions. 739   This presents the unusual situation that under the first 
complaint exception, a jury might be able to hear the victim say she had 
reported being attacked but would not be able to hear any details from the 
                                                 
729. Id. 
730. Id. 
731. FLA. STAT. § 90.802 (2014). 
732. 642 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
733. Id. at 1186. 
734. Fletcher v. State, 698 So. 2d 579, 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App 1997); see 
also Burgess v. State, 644 So. 2d 589, 591 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
735. Pacifico, 642 So. 2d at 1186–87. 
736. Burgess, 644 So. 2d at 591–92. 
737. 644 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
738. Id. at 591. 
739. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(1)–(2) (2014); Burgess, 644 So. 2d at 591–92. 
154
Nova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/1
2015] EVIDENCE:  2014 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW 139 
victim about the attack unless, of course, the statement describing the details 
falls within a statutory exception.  So then why is first complaint exception 
needed in the first place? 
Apparently, the answer is that a relatively prompt first complaint 
rebuts any claim the victim had consented to the sexual acts involved.  Case 
law before passage of the Code admits such complaints to corroborate the 
victim’s testimony.740  If the victim complained about being attacked when 
she first had a chance, then her actual testimony about the attack in court is 
more likely to be true.741  Under this theory a statement giving details of the 
attack is not necessary for corroboration.  The complaint is not being offered 
for its details but for the fact that it was made relatively promptly thereafter.  
Under this theory, the statement is not being offered for its truth but for the 
mere fact it was made; but then, it would not be hearsay in the first place.  So 
why is an exception needed?  Probably because courts realize that the mental 
gymnastics this line of reasoning requires juries to perform is difficult or 
impossible for them to do.  Juries will almost undoubtedly take a complaint 
to someone that I have been attacked as proof the attack happened and not as 
proof that the victim is not lying when she says at trial it happened. 
Thus, the exception itself rests on the theory that juries will perform 
mental exercises it is almost impossible for a reasonable person to do, 
regardless of whether a limiting instruction is given them or not.  However, if 
the statement is admissible under an exception, then—in theory—no limiting 
instruction is required.742  So then, why not also allow testimony under the 
exception about the details? 
Besides this problem with the exception, there is another difficulty 
with it.  The exception apparently rests on the now fallaciously proven idea 
that any female sexually attacked would of course report it at the very first 
chance.  What if the female does not do so?  Then, the sexual act must either 
never have taken place743 or have been consensual to begin with.  However, 
modern studies show that it is not unusual for victims to delay reporting 
                                                 
740. Ellis v. State, 6 So. 768, 770 (Fla. 1889) (noting that this is supposedly the 
first case to recognize this exception).  The Court there declared that: 
The female outraged should seek the first opportunity to complain, and the fact that 
she does complain goes to the jury as evidence; but her detailed statement of the 
circumstances under which she was outraged cannot be given in evidence . . . by the 
party to whom she made the statement. Such testimony is hearsay, and it is 
calculated to confuse and mislead the jury, and is not permissible. 
Id. 
741. See Custer v. State, 34 So. 2d 100, 106 (Fla. 1948) (en banc). 
742. See Pacifico v. State, 642 So. 2d 1178, 1186–87 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1994); McDonald v. State, 578 So. 2d 371, 373–74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
743. Custer, 34 So. 2d at 106.  Modern medical testimony now can much more 
effectively rebut this assertion.  See Pacifico, 642 So. 2d at 1181. 
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being attacked for various reasons, not including consent.744  Thus, the need 
for the first complaint exception is based on outdated, fallacious reasoning, 
both about sexual attack victims and the mental ability of juries. 
More recent case law has questioned the legitimacy of recognizing 
such an exception and suggested it is beyond the power of courts to judicially 
do so.745  The latest case questioning the exception’s very existence was 
decided during this Survey period.746  In Browne v. State,747 a college student 
intern at a doctor’s office claimed that the doctor had attempted to sexually 
batter her late one evening after her intern hours.748  The victim claimed she 
fought the defendant off, drove home, and called a friend about being upset 
because Browne was following her.749  The victim went to the friend’s home 
where she met the friend’s boyfriend.750  The defendant claimed the victim 
had consented to the encounter, and the State called the victim’s friend to 
testify about what the victim had told her that night. 751   Over defense 
objection, the friend was allowed to repeat the victim’s account based on 
either the first complaint or excited utterance exceptions.752 
The Fourth District found error in admission of the friend’s 
testimony and reversed the convictions. 753   As to the excited utterance 
exception, the State failed to establish how much time had passed between 
the alleged attack and when the statements were made; thus it did not satisfy 
the requirement that the victim had not had time for reflection.754  As to the 
first complaint exception argument, the court’s opinion was even more 
detailed.755 
The court noted that while some courts still accepted the existence of 
the first complaint exception, others did not.756  Section 90.802 of the Florida 
Statutes explicitly provided that the only exceptions to the hearsay rule were, 
                                                 
744. JON KRAKAUER, MISSOULA:  RAPE AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN A COLLEGE 
TOWN, at xiii (2015). 
745. See Browne v. State, 132 So. 3d 312, 316 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  
This case did not directly question the legitimacy of the first complaint exception.  Id.  
Instead, it questioned in general the legitimacy of any exception not recognized in the Code.  
Id. 
746. See id. 
747. 132 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
748. Id. at 314. 
749. See id. at 314–15. 
750. Id. at 315. 
751. Id. 
752. Browne, 132 So. 3d at 315–16; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (2014). 
753. Browne, 132 So. 3d at 317, 319. 
754. Id. at 317; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2). 
755. Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17. 
756. Id. at 316. 
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thus, statutorily recognized in the Code.757  Section 90.102 of the Florida 
Statutes provides that “[t]his chapter—[chapter 90]—shall replace and 
supersede existing . . . common law in conflict with its provisions.”758  Thus, 
section 90.802 of the Florida Statutes had effectively abolished the common 
law first complaint exception, and the legislature had not codified it. 759  
Therefore, the court found the exception no longer existed in Florida.760 
Browne’s reasoning seems hard to refute.  Although the court did not 
use this, it clearly was invoking the principle of statutory construction that a 
specific provision should control over a more general one.  Section 90.802 of 
the Florida Statutes specifically abolished all but statutory exceptions; thus, 
the first complaint exception no longer existed despite section 90.102 of the 
Florida Statutes’ general language. 761   Browne also provides interesting 
authority that the exception is no longer valid in Florida since the Fourth 
District had recognized the exception earlier in Burgess. 762   Although 
Browne did not expressly overrule Burgess, it certainly does so by 
implication. 
The Supreme Court of Florida has not yet decided this issue.763  
Until it does so, some courts may recognize the exception.  Better courts and 
good prosecutors will seek to avoid invoking it and instead try to use a 
statutory one in its place. 
B. Market Reports and Commercial Publications 
As mentioned above, the Code has three statutory exemptions and 
thirty statutory exceptions to the ban against using hearsay. 764   Most 
attorneys know the common ones.  Once in a great while, a decision will 
discuss what might be called one of the exotic exceptions to hearsay, in the 
sense that this exception is rarely, if ever, encountered in practice. 
                                                 
757. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.802, .803. 
758. Id. § 90.102. 
759. See id. §§ 90.102, .802; Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316. 
760. Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 90.102, .802.  The 
court also found that even if the exception still had existed, the friend’s testimony went 
beyond just testifying about the complaint and recited the details of the alleged attack—
something the exception did not allow.  Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17. 
Finally, Browne rejected the argument that the victim’s statement was admissible as 
a prior consistent statement under section 90.801(2)(b) because the court found the victim had 
a motive to falsify before the statements were made.  Browne, 132 So. 3d at 317–18; see also 
FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b). 
761. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.102, .802; see also Browne, 132 So. 3d at 315–16. 
762. See Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316; Burgess v. State, 644 So. 2d 589, 591–92 
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
763. See Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17. 
764. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.801, .803–.804. 
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Section 90.803(17) of the Florida Statutes contains one of the less 
frequently invoked exceptions to hearsay. 765   This section provides that 
“[m]arket quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published 
compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in 
particular occupations if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of 
information and method of preparation were such as to justify their 
admission”766 are not excluded by the hearsay rule.767  This is commonly 
called the trade reports exception.768 
Until 2014, only one reported Florida case discussed this 
exception.769  In Health Options, Inc. v. Palmetto Pathology Services, P.A.,770 
the court upheld a party’s use of American Medical Association (“AMA”) 
terms and categories used for computer billings to establish damages for 
uncompensated services.771  The opposing party had used the same terms and 
codes, and these came from a trustworthy source, the AMA’s Current 
Procedural Terminology Editorial Panel.772 
During this Survey period, Hardy v. State,773 held that information in 
the Florida Department of Health’s computer database about prescription 
drugs did not come within the trade reports exception for two reasons.774  
First, section 90.803(17) of the Florida Statutes, unlike its federal 
counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(17),775 requires the information to 
be published. 776   The First District interpreted this to mean it must be 
available to the public.777  As access to the database was limited to certain 
authorized state employees, it did not qualify.778  Second, the court looked at 
the exception’s general title and found the database was not like a market 
                                                 
765. See id. 
766. Id. § 90.803(17). 
767. Id. 
768. See id.; Hardy v. State, 140 So. 3d 1016, 1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2014). 
769. See Health Options, Inc. v. Palmetto Pathology Servs., P.A., 983 So. 2d 
608, 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
770. 983 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
771. Id. at 616. 
772. Id. 
773. 140 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
774. Id. at 1019–20. 
775. FED. R. EVID. 803(17); FLA. STAT. § 90.803(17) (2014).  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(17) states that “[m]arket quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations [that 
are] generally . . . relied [on] by the public or by persons in particular occupations” are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule.  FED. R. EVID. 803. 
776. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(17); Hardy, 140 So. 3d at 1020; see also FED. R. 
EVID. 803(17). 
777. Hardy, 140 So. 3d at 1020. 
778. Id. 
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report or other compilation commonly used in commerce.779  Thus, even if 
the data had been freely available to the public, it would still not fall within 
the exception.780 
Judge Rowe wrote a protracted dissent in which he interpreted the 
word published more broadly than the majority.781  According to him, “the 
court’s focus should be the purpose for which the information was 
disseminated rather than how widespread the information was 
disseminated.”782  The judge acknowledged the database was not published 
in the ordinary sense of the word but was still published to not only 
authorized Department of Health employees but also some law enforcement 
officers for limited purposes.783  He also argued that the database should be 
considered “within the category of other publications in the same ilk as a 
tabulation or list as set forth in the statute”784 even if it was not a compilation 
commonly used in commerce.785 
Judge Rowe’s dissent, while forcefully argued and well-written, 
ignores the exception’s express language.  The exception does not use the 
words other publications; it says other published compilations.786  So long as 
this database is not published within the ordinary sense of that word, under 
basic principles of statutory construction, the majority’s opinion has the 
better of this argument. 
C. Business Records in Foreclosure Cases 
Business records are among the commonly used hearsay exceptions, 
especially in commercial cases.787  During this Survey period, a number of 
reported decisions discussed the business records exception.788  All but one 
                                                 
779. Id. 
780. See id. 
781. Id. at 1022 (Rowe, J., dissenting). 
782. Hardy, 140 So. 3d at 1022 (Rowe, J., dissenting). 
783. Id. 
784. Id. 
785. See id. 
786. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(17) (2014). 
787. Id. § 90.803(6).  This section provides in part that: 
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, 
conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business 
activity to make such . . . . are not excluded by the general prohibition against 
hearsay. 
Id. 
788. See, e.g., Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952, 955–58 (Fla. 2008); Hunter v. 
Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, 137 So. 3d 570, 572–73 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review 
denied, 157 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2014).  
159
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
144 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
of them involved the introduction of bank records in loan foreclosure 
actions.789  The foreclosing party’s failure to either attempt to introduce any 
business records790 or failure to lay a proper foundation for their introduction 
resulted in a number of reversals.791 
The required elements for the business records exception are not in 
debate.  In Yisrael v. Florida,792 the Supreme Court of Florida clearly stated 
that proponents of business records must demonstrate four elements:  “(1) the 
record was made at or near the time of the event; (2) was made by or from 
information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) was kept in the 
                                                 
789. See Caldwell v. State, 137 So. 3d 590, 590−91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014).  Caldwell was the one reported decision not involving loan foreclosure.  See id.  There 
the court reversed the defendant’s robbery conviction because of the admission of a booking 
report.  Id. at 590, 592.  The booking report and statements in it were used to prove the 
defendant’s height and weight at the time of his arrest.  Id. at 590–91.  Although the court 
found such reports could be business records under the hearsay exception, the State’s failure 
to lay a foundation for when the information in them was received, how the reports were kept, 
and that it was a regular practice to keep reports like this made this report inadmissible 
hearsay.  Id. at 591–92. 
790. See Beauchamp v. Bank of N.Y., 150 So. 3d 827, 828 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014).  Beauchamp reversed judgment for the bank because a loan service company 
representative’s testimony was admitted based on the records that had never been introduced 
into evidence and thus were inadmissible hearsay.  Id. at 827−29.  Although the opinion does 
not mention this, the testimony also violated the best evidence rule as it was about the material 
contents of a document that had not been admitted or otherwise accounted for.  See id. at 827–
28. 
791. See Kelsey v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 131 So. 3d 825, 826 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014).  Six reported decisions discussed the foundation for the business records.  See 
Burdeshaw v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 148 So. 3d 819, 822−26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 
Wolkoff v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 153 So. 3d 280, 282−83 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); Cayea v. Citimortgage, Inc., 138 So. 3d 1214, 1216–17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); 
Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 572; Lindsey v. Cadence Bank, N.A., 135 So. 3d 1164, 1167−68 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826.  Four of them found reversible error for 
failure to lay a proper foundation for admission under the business records exception.  See 
Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 820; Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 281–82; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 571; 
Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826.  Two affirmed judgments foreclosing on loans, finding no error in 
admission of bank records under the business records exception.  See Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 
1215; Lindsey, 135 So. 3d at 1169.  From this number of reversals, one might conclude that 
there are often problems introducing business records under the exception in loan foreclosure 
actions.  See, e.g., Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826.  This conclusion may not be correct as the 
number of the reported cases does not give any idea of how many cases there were actually 
tried or decided on summary judgment where there was no issue about a proper foundation.  
Contra id.  Perhaps the best that can be said from the reported decisions is that when the issue 
of business records foundations is raised on appeal in foreclosures, the courts are carefully 
scrutinizing the trial record to make sure the exception’s requirements have been satisfied.  
See Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 821−22; Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 281–82; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 
571−72; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. 
792. 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008). 
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ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity; and (4) that it was 
regular practice of that business to make such a record.”793 
Thus, what must be shown should be no surprise to business records 
proponents.794  The problem seems to be how to do so.  Choosing the right 
person or persons to authenticate the records and lay their foundation under 
the exception is the critical choice.795  Two recent decisions provide good 
representative examples as to how and how not to go about laying the 
foundation needed for the business records exception.796 
To successfully foreclose on a loan, the foreclosing party must show 
an agreement between the borrower and the plaintiff or a subsequent legal 
transfer of the loan to the plaintiff, the borrower’s default on payments, an 
acceleration of the debt to maturity, and the amount remaining due on the 
loan.797  When the original lender transfers the loan to another party, laying 
the business records foundation to show all this has caused problems.798  
Usually to do so, the plaintiff attempts to introduce loan payment history 
records that are computer generated.799  Such computer printouts may qualify 
as business records assuming the proper foundation is laid even though the 
actual printout was done in connection with a particular lawsuit.800  The 
person called to authenticate the records and lay the foundation must, 
therefore, be familiar with the business practices of more than one company 
and with how each company takes, records, and keeps payments on loans.801  
While a witness’s testimony that certain computer programs and certain 
practices are standardly used in the lending industry is helpful, a witness’s 
testimony must also be specific with respect to how a particular company 
services its loans. 802   When a witness working for one company cannot 
testify about how another company who had been involved with the loan 
does this, then foundation problems occur unless additional witnesses are 
                                                 
793. Id. at 956. 
794. See, e.g., Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1217; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. 
795. See Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 824; Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1217; Hunter, 
137 So. 3d at 572–73; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826; Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 282. 
796. Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1217; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. 
797. Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. 
798. Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 281. 
799. See, e.g., Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1216. 
800. See id. at 1217 (stating that “[p]rintouts of data prepared for trial may be 
admitted . . . even if the printouts themselves are not kept in the ordinary course of business so 
long as a qualified witness testifies as to the manner of preparation, reliability, and 
trustworthiness”). 
801. See id. at 1217–18. 
802. See id.; Burdeshaw v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 148 So. 3d 819, 826 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Hunter v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, 137 So. 3d 570, 573 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2014). 
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called who can do so.803  This was the case in both Hunter v. Aurora Loan 
Services, LLC804 and Burdeshaw v. Bank of New York Mellon805 where the 
employee of the subsequent loan assignees could not testify how previous 
holders of loans kept and recorded their information.806  While a witness 
does not have to be the person who actually makes entries for payments on 
the loan—the person who actually keeps the loan records or the person who 
prepared the records for trial—the witness must know how the companies 
concerned do so.807 
These two decisions suggest that counsel for foreclosing lenders 
should be especially careful when more than one holder of a note or 
mortgage is involved.  Counsel should then always ask, “do I need more than 
one witness”, and “do I have the right witnesses to satisfy the business 
records foundation?”  Counsel must make their own investigation and 
evaluation to ensure this and not just assume that whomever the foreclosing 
party wants to send as a witness is sufficient. 
Contrary to these two cases, it is what happened in Cayea v. 
Citimortgage, Inc. 808   There, Citimortgage was the original loan holder, 
making matters easier than in multiple holder cases.809 
A company employee in its default research and litigation 
department testified about Citimortgage’s regular practice of inputting 
payments, whether made electronically or by mail, into its system by 
payment processing department employees. 810   He also testified how 
payment entries were kept and that it was the lender’s regular practice to do 
so.811  Although he did not work in the payment department himself and had 
not done any of the actual inputting or record keeping on this loan, his 
testimony was sufficient to admit computer printouts of the loan history as 
business records.812 
Foundations for business records should be no problem if an attorney 
takes the time to understand how a particular business or company is run and 
selects the proper witnesses to testify about this.  The Burdeshaw decision 
provides a helpful multi-page summary of the cases dealing with this 
                                                 
803. See Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 823; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 573. 
804. 137 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 157 So. 3d 
1040 (Fla. 2014). 
805. 148 So. 3d 819 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
806. Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 826; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 573. 
807. Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 823; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 573. 
808. 138 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
809. See id. at 1215. 
810. Id. at 1215–16. 
811. Id. 
812. Id. at 1217. 
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exception in loan foreclosure cases.813  This should be a required reading for 
counsel in this field. 
VIII. BEST EVIDENCE RULE 
Section 90.952 of the Florida Statutes provides in part that “an 
original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove the 
contents of the writing, recording, or photograph.”814  This requirement is 
commonly known as the Best Evidence Rule.815  The rule does not usually 
apply unless the contents of the writing, recording, or photograph are 
considered material to the issues in a case.816  Additionally, modern versions 
of the rule do not strictly enforce the requirement of the original.817  Indeed, 
copies of a writing are now freely admissible unless there is some reason to 
believe that the proponent of such has either acted in bad faith or that the 
offered substitute is not accurate. 
The rule usually is so easily satisfied that it does not generate many 
evidentiary issues.  However, during this Survey period, three cases arose 
that deserve brief discussion.818 
A. Videotape Evidence 
Two best evidence rule cases involve admission of videotape 
surveillance against an accused in a criminal case. 819   Photographs are 
broadly defined under the rule to include more than just still pictures.820  
Videotapes are explicitly included within this definition.821  When videotapes 
that actually capture a crime are introduced to show an accused’s guilt, there 
is no best evidence rule problem.822  Problems arise when the videos are not 
produced at trial, and the state still wants to benefit from them.823  The reason 
                                                 
813. See Burdeshaw v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 148 So. 3d 819, 823–27 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
814. FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (2014). 
815. T.D.W. v. State, 137 So. 3d 574, 575–76 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
816. See Yero v. State, 138 So. 3d 1179, 1184–85 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 
2014). 
817. See FLA. STAT. § 90.953. 
818. See infra Section VIII.A. 
819. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575; Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1181. 
820. FLA. STAT. § 90.951(2).  Section 90.951 of the Florida Statutes defines 
photographs as including “still photographs, X-ray films, videotapes, and motion pictures.”  
Id. 
821. Id. 
822. See Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1184–85. 
823. See id. at 1185. 
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behind the videos’ absence can make all the difference in the world as 
illustrated by two recent cases.824 
In Yero v. State,825 the State charged the accused with theft of a 
woman’s wallet.826  The victim and her fiancée were at a bar late at night 
when they were approached by Yero who stood between them and spoke 
with them briefly.827  The wallet was sticking out of the victim’s purse, 
which was hung over a chair’s back.828  After speaking with them, Yero 
excused himself, went outside, came back and bought the couple drinks.829  
He then paid his own bar bill and left.830  Five minutes later, the victim 
noticed her wallet missing, and the sheriff’s office was called.831  A deputy 
arrived and learned the bar had surveillance cameras.832  The deputy and the 
two patrons watched the video.833  It showed Yero, at first, had no bulge in 
his pockets until after he stood between the couple.834  The bulge’s shape 
matched that of the missing wallet. 835   The video further showed Yero 
leaving the bar, coming back inside, no longer having the same bulge in any 
pocket.836 
All three testified at trial and described what they had seen on the 
video.837  The video itself was not shown as it had been overwritten by the 
bar’s security system.838  The deputy testified he had tried to get the video 
that night but was told it was unavailable.839  Nine days later, when the 
deputy returned to the bar, the tape was already overwritten.840  The system 
automatically recorded over any previous surveillance footage after five 
days, but no one ever told the deputy this.841  Thus, the tape was lost for use 
at trial.842   However, the trial court still allowed testimony about its contents 
                                                 
824. See id.; T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575. 
825. 138 So. 3d 1179 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
826. Id. at 1181. 
827. Id. 
828. Id. 
829. Id. 
830. Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1181. 
831. Id. 
832. Id. 
833. Id. 
834. Id. at 1182. 
835. Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1182. 
836. Id. 
837. Id. at 1181–82. 
838. Id. at 1182. 
839. Id. 
840. Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1182. 
841. Id. 
842. Id. 
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after the State elicited proof about how it was unavailable.843  Yero appealed 
his conviction claiming the State had lost in bad faith the exculpatory 
evidence, violating both his Due Process rights and the Best Evidence 
Rule.844  As to his Due Process rights, the Third District found no bad faith 
on the State’s part and further found the tape would have been inculpatory, 
not exculpatory, in any event.845  On the best evidence claim, the district 
court noted that the rule statutorily provided for instances where originals 
were not required. 846   One instance is when “[a]ll originals are lost or 
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith.”847  As 
the facts showed there was no bad faith, the witnesses’ testimony about the 
tape’s contents was permissible even in its absence.848 
What if a videotape is shown at trial, but the State elicits testimony 
about the contents of another tape that is not?  T.D.W. v. State849 presented 
that very scenario and led to a reversal.850  The State charged the defendant 
with being involved in a home burglary.851  A detective testified he was able 
to identify T.D.W. as one of the burglars from the angle shown on a 
surveillance video the detective viewed outside of trial.852  Even though other 
videotapes were shown at trial, the one showing the angle the detective 
referenced was not. 853   This proved to be crucial evidence against the 
defendant leading to his conviction.854 
On appeal, the Fourth District reversed. 855   The detective had 
testified the missing video clearly showed the accused’s face as one of the 
burglars.856  Unlike in Yero, the State never offered any explanation for the 
video view’s absence.857  Even though the State contended on appeal the tape 
                                                 
843. Id. 
844. Id. at 1182–84. 
845. Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1183. 
846. Id. at 1184–1185; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.954(1) (2014). 
847. FLA. STAT. § 90.954(1). 
848. Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1185.  Section 90.954 of the Florida Statutes lists three 
other instances when testimony about the contents of a missing writing does not violate the 
best evidence rule:  The original cannot be obtained by judicial process, the opposing party 
controls the original and is on notice it will be needed at hearing or trial, and the original is not 
material.  FLA. STAT. § 90.954(2)–(4). 
849. 137 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
850. Id. at 575, 578. 
851. Id. at 575. 
852. Id. 
853. Id. 
854. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575. 
855. Id. at 575, 578. 
856. Id. at 576. 
857. Id. at 577; see also Yero v. State, 138 So. 3d 1179, 1182 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014). 
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was lost or destroyed, unlike in Yero, it never offered any proof at trial to 
back up this assertion.858  The State, as the proponent of the tape, had the 
burden to demonstrate the reason behind its absence, especially because its 
contents were clearly material. 859   Thus, it would be “unfair, under the 
circumstance, to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.”860  The Fourth 
District found that “when offered to prove [a] crime without introduction of 
the video in evidence, a witness’s in-court description of the actions depicted 
on the video is content-based testimony that violates the best evidence 
rule.”861 
B. Promissory Notes 
As mentioned, duplicates are usually admissible to the same extent 
as originals under the Best Evidence Rule.862  One exception to this general 
rule of free substitution is when there is a negotiable instrument or other 
special kind of commercial document.863  This includes promissory notes.864  
Alavi v. Garcia865 involving promissory notes, summary judgment hearings 
and the best evidence rule is a recent case of first impression.866 
The appellants had summary judgment entered against them in an 
action on a promissory note. 867   Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 
governs summary judgment proceedings in Florida.868   Subsection (c) of 
Rule 1.510 requires that any motion for summary judgment must be served 
                                                 
858. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 577; see also Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1182. 
859. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 577. 
860. FLA. STAT. § 90.953(3) (2014).  The court did not actually quote this 
subsection, but the gist of its opinion clearly reflects this language.  See T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 
577. 
861. Id. at 576. 
862. See FLA. STAT. § 90.953; T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 576–77. 
863. FLA. STAT. § 90.953(1).  Admissibility of duplicates, states in part that  
[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original, unless:  (1) the 
document or writing is a negotiable instrument, . . . a security, . . . or any other 
writing that evidences a right to the payment of money, is not itself a security 
agreement or lease, and is of a type that is transferred by delivery in the ordinary 
course of business with any necessary endorsement or assignment. 
Id.  The Federal Rules of Evidence do not have similar language and seem to have 
no special provisions about commercial documents under the best evidence rule.  See FED. R. 
EVID. 1003. 
864. See FLA. STAT. § 90.953(1). 
865. 140 So. 3d 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
866. Id. at 1142.  Although the court’s opinion does not label itself as one of 
first impression on the issue it decides, it does say “there appears to be no precedent directly 
on point.”  Id. 
867. Id. 
868. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510 (2014). 
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on the opposing party twenty days before the hearing date, and the motion 
must include copies of any evidence the movant relies upon.869   The motion 
must identify any “materials as would be admissible in evidence ‘summary 
judgment evidence’ on which the movant relies.”870  Subsection (e) furthers 
requires any affidavits “shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence.”871  It also requires that “[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or 
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
[therein].”872  When Garcia filed for summary judgment, he did not file the 
original of the promissory note twenty days before the hearing.873  Appellants 
argued this required reversal as the best evidence rule had been violated by 
the failure to do so.874 
The Fifth District declined to find the best evidence rule applicable 
to summary judgment hearings.875   The court found the rule “applies to 
proceedings wherein evidence is introduced” 876  but that evidence is not 
formally introduced in summary judgment hearings.877  The hearings are held 
to see if there are any material issues of fact meriting a trial.878  If not, the 
trial court simply renders judgment as a matter of law. 879   Under the 
summary judgment rule’s own language, the movant need only show proof 
that would be880 admissible later at trial.881  For a promissory note, at trial the 
note would have to be authenticated and the original produced at trial.882  
However, an affidavit setting forth facts supplying the authentication and 
attaching a copy of the original is all that is needed for summary judgment.883  
The court also declared that “[e]ven assuming that the best evidence rule 
applies in the summary judgment context, we hold that the presentation of 
the original note at or before the hearing satisfies [the] rule”,884 thus serving 
it on the opposing party twenty days before the hearing would not be 
                                                 
869. Id. 1.510(c). 
870. Id. 
871. Id. 1.510(e). 
872. Id. 
873. Alavi v. Garcia, 140 So. 3d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
874. Id. at 1143. 
875. Id. 
876. Id. 
877. See id. 
878. Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143. 
879. See id.; FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510 (2014). 
880. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510; Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143. 
881. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510; Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143. 
882. Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143. 
883. Id. 
884. Id.  The court noted the Fourth District had also found production of the 
original at the hearing sufficient to satisfy the rule.  Id.; see also Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. 
v. Clarke, 87 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
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needed.885  The court did note that surrender of the original note was needed 
before final judgment could be entered unless it was proven the note had 
been lost or destroyed.886 
Admittedly this case is as much about summary judgment as it is the 
best evidence rule.  However, it serves as a reminder that some proceedings 
require the originals of certain commercial documents if they are available. 
The court’s construction of the summary judgment rule’s wording as would 
be admissible also seems a very reasonable one.  If the rule had intended a 
different result, one would expect it to read, that is admissible at trial or in 
the same form that would be admissible at trial.  One would also not expect 
the words summary judgment evidence to have been used.  The use of these 
three words clearly indicates that there is a distinction between it and trial 
evidence.  Finally, the case serves as a reminder to counsel moving for 
summary judgment–bring the originals of documents to hearings in case the 
trial court decides they are mandatorily required there.887  As the saying goes, 
“better safe, than sorry.” 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Overall, 2014 was probably a typical year for evidentiary 
developments. 888   Few statutory changes were made in the Code. 889  
Likewise, the courts decided few cases of first impression.890  This shows 
that after over thirty years, major issues under the Code have largely been 
resolved.  Now that this is so, attorneys and courts have to be careful in the 
judgment they use presenting and deciding evidentiary issues.  Unfortunately 
some of the cases discussed in this Survey could fall under the category of 
can you believe that ones.  Trial counsel and trial courts are on the front line 
as guardians of the Code, even though the appellate courts and Florida 
Legislature are its ultimate guardians.  All of us must take this responsibility 
seriously. 
                                                 
885. Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143. 
886. Id. 
887. See id. at 1142–44. 
888. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
889. See supra Parts II–VII. 
890. See supra Parts II–VII. 
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protected commercial speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.1  Traditionally, solicitation and advertising by lawyers has been 
looked down upon in the practice of law.2  In order to maintain the nobleness 
of the profession, lawyers were expected to build a reputation that would 
attract their business and clientele.3  The prohibition on advertising began as 
a rule of legal etiquette and not rules of ethics, as advertising regulations are 
modernly viewed.4  Lawyers treated the legal profession more as a public 
service rather than as a trade or means of earning a living.5  It was believed 
that commercializing legal services would lower the nobleness and honor of 
the profession.6 
Over time, these strong views against attorney advertisements 
evolved into a standard for rules of ethics.7  The Canons of Professional 
Ethics, drafted in 1908 by the American Bar Association (“ABA”), entirely 
prohibited attorney advertising and solicitation, claiming advertising and 
solicitation by lawyers was unprofessional.8  Later in 1969, the ABA drafted 
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“ABA Model Code”), which 
was adopted by every state in the nation and followed the Canons model of 
prohibiting all forms of attorney advertisements.9  After the Supreme Court 
of the United States decided in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona10 that attorney 
advertisements were classified as commercial speech and thus protected 
under the First Amendment, the ABA was left to change the standards of 
attorney advertisements in order to reflect this landmark decision and to 
uphold First Amendment protection of attorney advertisements.11  As a result 
of this decision, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“ABA 
Model Rules”) were drafted and later approved by the ABA in 1983, 
allowing attorney advertisements, but strongly prohibiting in-person 
																																																								
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210–12 
(1953). 
2. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210–12. 
3. Veronica Wooten Brace, Limits on Marketing of Attorney Services, 8 U. 
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 110 (1996). 
4. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977); Brace, supra note 3, 
at 110. 
5. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210; Brace, supra note 3, at 110. 
6. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 211–12. 
7. See Brace, supra note 3, at 110. 
8. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908); Brace, supra 
note 3, at 110–11. 
9. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)–(B) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1975); Brace, supra note 3, at 111. 
10. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
11. Id. at 383–84; Brace, supra note 3, at 111; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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solicitation by lawyers.12  The ABA Model Rules have since served as the 
model for professional lawyering codes for sixty-five percent of the states, 
leaving the majority of the states to permit various forms of attorney 
advertisements.13  Throughout the history of the legal profession, in response 
to constitutional challenges and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the ABA has amended both ABA Model Code and ABA Model 
Rules, permitting attorney advertising but still retaining a heavy grip in 
regulating advertising as much as the Constitution and the Supreme Court of 
the United States has allowed.14 
The delicate balance between the honor and nobleness of the legal 
profession and the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech is 
critical in the case of a Florida law firm that is challenging The Florida Bar’s 
Standing Committee on Advertising for denying the firm’s proposed plan to 
send automated text messages in hopes of obtaining potential clients.15  The 
law firm’s plan consists of obtaining “a daily list provided by the . . . county 
clerk of court to [retrieve] phone numbers of [people who had been] arrested 
the previous day.”16  The law firm would then use these contacts to send 
automated text messages advertising the firm’s legal services to these listed 
individuals.17  The text messages would provide an opt out option for the 
recipients to choose to not receive any future communications from the 
firm.18  The Committee found that the firm’s proposal of automated text 
messages is considered direct solicitation and is thus prohibited by Rule 4-
7.18(a) of The Florida Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct, 19  which 
involves direct contact with prospective clients.20  The law firm countered 
the Committee’s response by claiming that text messages are not similar to 
direct telephone communications, and that due to modern habits and modern 
																																																								
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); 
Brace, supra note 3, at 111 n.19. 
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (1983); Brace, supra note 3, 
at 111. 
14. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; Brace, supra note 3, at 111; see also MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (1983 & 2013); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
DR 2-101 (1975). 
15. Nathan Hale, Fla. Bar Rejects Firm’s Plan to Send Ads Via Text 
Messages, LAW360 (May 22, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/659251/fla-
bar-rejects-firm-s-plan-to-send-ads-via-text-messages; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); 
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210–12. 
16. Hale, supra note 15. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(a) (2014). 
20. Id. r. 4-7.18 (2014); Hale, supra note 15. 
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modes of communication, text messages serve the same purpose as email or 
direct mail.21 
This Comment will focus on commercial speech, the rights of 
lawyers to advertise legal services, and the regulations that The Florida Bar 
has placed on attorney advertisements.22  This Comment will also discuss 
why Florida’s regulations on attorney advertisements are neither consistent 
with the Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions, nor take into 
consideration modern modes of communication utilized in today’s society.23  
Part II of this Comment will examine regulations on attorney advertisements 
on a national level and discuss the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
decisions regarding commercial speech and protection of attorney 
advertisements and solicitations under the First Amendment, as well as the 
ABA’s rules on attorney solicitation and advertising. 24   Part III of this 
Comment will explain the various modes of attorney advertisements, 
including direct and indirect solicitation of potential clients and targeted 
letters to potential clients.25  Part IV of this Comment will introduce the State 
of Florida’s rules regarding attorney advertisements and solicitations and 
compare Florida’s rules to the ABA’s rules regarding attorney 
advertisements.26  This Comment will then analyze attorney advertisements 
via text messages in Part V and explain how text messages are indirect 
modes of advertising and why Florida should consider modern modes of 
communication in regulating attorney advertisements. 27   Ultimately, this 
Comment will conclude that text messages can be considered direct 
communications, which are protected forms of commercial speech that 
should not be restricted by The Florida Bar.28 
II. A NATIONAL LOOK AT ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS:  THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. Opening the Door to Protection of Attorney Advertisements 
Commercial speech was first recognized as protected speech under 
the First Amendment in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
																																																								
21. Hale, supra note 15. 
22. See infra Part II–IV. 
23. See infra Part IV–V. 
24. See infra Part II. 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. See infra Part IV. 
27. See infra Part V. 
28. See infra Part VI. 
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Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.29  In this case, the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that commercial speech is entitled to protection under the 
First Amendment, even if the speech is purely economic or the speaker’s 
motive of the speech is to receive pecuniary gain. 30   The appellees, 
consumers of prescription drugs, brought suit against the Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy challenging the validity of a Virginia statute under the 
First Amendment.31  The state statute prohibited pharmacists to advertise 
prices of prescription drugs.32  The Court explained that commercial speech 
was of general public interest and served as a benefit to society, providing 
consumers with the knowledge and availability of goods and services.33  It 
was further held that a state’s interest in protecting and upholding the 
professionalism of the field might not be sufficient enough to maintain the 
prohibition of an advertisement. 34   Ultimately, the Court extended First 
Amendment protection to commercial speech and concluded that although a 
state is free to regulate commercial speech, a state may not place a complete 
ban on advertisements or commercial speech and keep the knowledge of the 
availability of goods and services away from consumers.35 
The protected First Amendment right to commercial speech was 
extended to attorney advertisements in the case of Bates.36  This was the first 
case subsequent to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to weigh the rights of 
attorneys to advertise against the ABA Model Rules and state bar rules in the 
light of commercial speech and First Amendment protection.37 
In this case, the appellants were two licensed attorneys in the State of 
Arizona who in order to generate business, placed an advertisement in a local 
newspaper advertising legal services and the prices of the services offered by 
																																																								
29. 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
30. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762; see also U.S. CONST. amend. 
I. 
31. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749–50, 753–54; see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
32. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749–50. 
33. Id. at 764–65. 
34. Id. at 766, 770. 
The challenge now made, however, is based on the First Amendment.  This casts 
the [b]oard’s justifications in a different light, for on close inspection it is seen that 
the [s]tate’s protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages 
of their being kept in ignorance.  The advertising ban does not directly affect 
professional standards one way or the other. 
Id. at 769. 
35. Id. at 770; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
36. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
37. Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363, 384; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1970). 
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the firm.38  The Arizona State Bar claimed that the firm’s use of a newspaper 
advertisement to generate business violated Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) 
incorporated by the Supreme Court of Arizona that read: 
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or 
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer 
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television 
announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone 
directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he 
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.39 
A hearing was held before the Special Local Administrative 
Committee, which decided that the appellants should be suspended from 
practicing law for a period of six months.40  The appellants challenged the 
Committee’s decision as a violation of their First Amendment rights. 41  
Focusing on their previous decision and precedent set by Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the same 
First Amendment protection of commercial speech was applicable to 
attorney advertisements of legal services and fees.42  The Court explained 
that even if a speaker’s intent in making the speech is purely economic, such 
speech is protected in certain contexts.43   Stressing the societal interests 
served by commercial speech, the Court discussed how commercial speech 
informs the public of the availability, prices, nature of products and services, 
and assures “informed and reliable decision-making.”44  Since the decision of 
the Court in Bates, attorney advertisements are not subject to complete 
prohibition or suppression; however, states retain a right to regulate attorney 
advertisements.45 
B. How Far Can Regulation of Attorney Advertisements Go? 
Both landmark decisions of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and 
Bates determined that commercial speech was protected under the First 
Amendment; however, both cases held that states retained the right to 
																																																								
38. Bates, 433 U.S. at 353–54. 
39. Id. at 355; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) 
(1970). 
40. Bates, 433 U.S. at 356. 
41. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
42. Bates, 433 U.S. at 357; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773. 
43. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 383–84. 
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regulate commercial speech under certain contexts.46  These two Supreme 
Court of the United States’ decisions determine that commercial speech is 
protected under the First Amendment but retains lesser protection than other 
constitutionally protected forms of speech.47  Despite the lessened protection 
that commercial speech is granted under the First Amendment, commercial 
speech is still protected from unwarranted governmental regulation.48  Both 
cases are influential decisions in regard to protection of commercial speech 
under the First Amendment; however, neither of these decisions discussed to 
what extent commercial speech could be regulated by the government or by 
the states.49 
Following Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court of 
the United States set a standard consisting of a four-prong analysis for what 
constitutes commercial speech and the extent of how far the government or 
states may regulate commercial speech.50  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,51 the Supreme Court was 
presented with the question of whether a regulation from the Public Service 
Commission of New York completely banning promotional advertising of an 
electrical utility company violated the First Amendment. 52   The Court 
defined commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience.”53  For commercial speech to be 
protected under the First Amendment, the speech must concern lawful 
activity and may not be misleading.54  If the speech is concerning lawful 
activity and is not misleading, the speech falls within First Amendment 
protection. 55   The Court determined that in order to restrict commercial 
speech, the asserted governmental interest to be served by the restriction on 
commercial speech must be substantial. 56   If the asserted governmental 
interest to be served is substantial, it must be “determine[d] whether the 
																																																								
46. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363, 384; Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770–72. 
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980); Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363; Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761, 770. 
48. Bates, 433 U.S. at 363; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
49. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770; see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
50. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566; Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748. 
51. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
52. Id. at 558; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
53. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561. 
54. Id. at 564; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
55. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
56. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
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regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether 
[the regulation] is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest.”57  Taken together, this analysis is known as the Central Hudson 
test. 58   Based on the Central Hudson test, in determining whether 
commercial speech is guaranteed First Amendment protection and whether 
the government or state has the ability to restrict the commercial speech, the 
protection of the speech looks at the nature of the expression and nature of 
the governmental interest served by the regulation imposed.59  Regulations of 
commercial speech are measured under an intermediate scrutiny analysis.60  
A state’s restrictions on commercial speech “must be substantially related to 
the achievement of an important [state] objective.”61 
The Court in Central Hudson held that in order to determine whether 
the restriction on commercial speech is in proportion to the government or 
state interest, the restriction must directly advance the government or state 
interest involved, and if the government or state interest could be served by a 
more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restriction will 
not meet First Amendment muster.62  In other words, the restriction imposed 
may only extend as far as the interest that it serves.63  Similar to Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy and Bates, the Court in Central Hudson held that a 
ban on advertising could not survive if the ban is imposed to protect ethical 
or professional standards of a profession.64  The Court concluded, as stated in 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, “‘[t]he advertising ban does not directly 
affect [the] professional standards [of a profession] one way or the other.’”65  
																																																								
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
In commercial speech cases, then, a fourpart analysis has developed.  At the 
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must 
concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial.  If both inquiries yield positive answers, we 
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest. 
Id. 
59. Id. at 563; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
60. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995). 
61. Intermediate Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 
564. 
63. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564. 
64. Id.; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 378, 383 (1977); Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
65. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564 (quoting Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769) (alteration in original). 
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The Court found that the state’s interest in upholding professionalism is not a 
substantial interest in regulating commercial speech.66 
In 1982, the Court took the Central Hudson test and analyzed it from 
the perspective of attorney advertisements in the case of In re R.M.J. 67  
Comparing this Supreme Court decision to Bates, In re R.M.J. was the first 
case subsequent to Central Hudson to apply the four-prong analysis of what 
constitutes commercial speech and the extent of regulation permitted on 
attorney advertisements.68  The Court in In re R.M.J. emphasized the holding 
of Bates, where the Court held that commercial speech protection under the 
First Amendment extended to attorney advertisements and “‘advertising by 
attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression.’”69  The Court found 
in Bates that the advertising of prices for legal services offered was neither 
advertising unlawful activity nor a misleading advertisement, preventing the 
speech from being prohibited on that basis. 70   The Court in Bates also 
rejected suppression of an attorney advertisement based on the state interest 
that attorney advertisements had negative effects on the profession.71 
The Court in In re R.M.J. found that although Bates was a critical 
case in analyzing the extent of protection of attorney advertisements under 
the First Amendment, the decision in Bates was a narrow decision in holding 
that attorney advertisements could still be regulated by states.72  The Court 
found that “[f]alse, deceptive, or misleading advertising remains subject to 
restraint, and . . . advertising by the professions poses special risks of 
deception, ‘because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, 
misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other 
advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.’”73  In 
regards to attorney advertisements, the Court in Bates did not set any 
standards or regulations “on potentially or demonstrably misleading 
advertis[ements].”74  However, in circumstances subsequent to Bates, the 
Court reasoned that regulation and prohibition of advertisements are 
permissible where the advertisements are likely to be misleading.75  The 
																																																								
66. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 571–72. 
67. 455 U.S. 191, 203, 206 (1982). 
68. Id.; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566; Bates, 433 U.S. at 
383; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
69. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 199 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 383); see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
70. Bates, 433 U.S. at 382–83. 
71. Id. at 368–69, 371. 
72. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bates, 433 
U.S. at 383. 
73. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 383). 
74. Id. at 202. 
75. Id. 
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Court in In re R.M.J. set the official standard for the commercial speech 
doctrine in the context of advertising for professional services as follows: 
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the 
protections of the First Amendment.  But when the particular 
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently 
misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such 
advertising is subject to abuse, the [s]tate[] may impose 
appropriate restrictions.  Misleading advertising may be prohibited 
entirely.  But the [s]tates may not place an absolute prohibition on 
certain types of potentially misleading information . . . if the 
information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.76 
Even though a state holds the ability to regulate non-misleading 
commercial speech, “the [s]tate must [still] assert a substantial interest, and 
the interference with the speech must be in proportion to the interest 
served.”77  Regulations on commercial speech and professional advertising 
“must be narrowly drawn, and the [s]tate lawfully may regulate only to the 
extent regulation furthers the [s]tate’s substantial interest.”78 
While Central Hudson established a four-pronged analysis as to 
what constitutes commercial speech and the extent that the government may 
regulate commercial speech, the Central Hudson test focused on commercial 
speech in a general context.79  The Court in In re R.M.J. took the four-
pronged analysis of Central Hudson and applied it to professional 
advertising.80  The four-pronged analysis of Central Hudson is used by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in determining whether certain contexts 
of commercial speech are protected under the First Amendment, and the 
extent to which such speech may be regulated by the states.81 
C. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
The ABA is a professional organization of lawyers and law students 
from all over the nation.82  The ABA was founded in 1878 and has since 
expanded to four hundred thousand members, committed to:  “[S]erving . . . 
																																																								
76. Id. at 203. 
77. Id. 
78. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. 
79. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 564–66 (1980). 
80. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203–04; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 
U.S. at 566. 
81. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
82. See About the American Bar Association, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
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members, improving the legal profession, eliminating bias . . . and advancing 
the rule of law throughout the United States and around the world.”83  The 
ABA aims to uphold the legal profession and provide practical tools and 
resources for lawyers.84 
One of the roles of the ABA is to establish model ethical codes, 
which the majority of states in the nation have adopted as a part of their own 
ethical standards.85  The current ethical rules established by the ABA are the 
ABA Model Rules.86  The ABA Model Rules “were adopted by the ABA 
House of Delegates in 1983 [and] [s]erve as models for the ethical rules of 
most states.”87  California is the only state that does not model their ethical 
and professional rules for lawyers after the ABA Model Rules.88  The current 
ABA Model Rules set ethical and professional standards for lawyers across 
the nation in regard to the client-lawyer relationship, acting as a counselor, 
acting as an advocate, transactions with persons other than clients, law firms 
and associations, public service, information about legal services, and 
maintaining the integrity of the profession.89 
The ABA standards regarding attorney advertising and solicitation 
are found in Rule 7.2 and Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules.90  The general 
rule of attorney advertising is found in Rule 7.2 of the ABA Model Rules and 
reads “[s]ubject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may 
advertise services through written, recorded or electronic communication, 
including public media.”91  The ABA and ABA Model Rules follow the 
precedent by Bates, recognizing that attorney advertisements serve a 
fundamental benefit to the consumers in need of legal services.92  The ABA 
states: 
To assist the public in learning and obtaining legal services, 
lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only 
through reputation but also through organized information 
campaigns in the form of advertising.  Advertising involves an 
active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer 
																																																								
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id.; About the Model Rules, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
86. See About the Model Rules, supra note 85. 
87. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
88. About the Model Rules, supra note 85; see also CAL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT (2015). 
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013). 
90. Id. r. 7.2–.3. 
91. Id. r. 7.2. 
92. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977). 
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should not seek clientele.  However, the public’s need to know 
about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising . . . 
.  The interest in expanding public information about legal services 
ought to prevail over considerations of tradition.  Nevertheless, 
advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are 
misleading or overreaching.93 
The modern ABA Model Rules completely overturned the ABA’s 
1969 ABA Model Code and the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethicsboth 
of which defined the traditional view of attorney advertising as 
unprofessional and placed complete bans on attorney advertisements.94  After 
the ABA Model Rules were adopted in 1983, attorney advertisements were 
recognized as protected commercial speech under the First Amendment, and 
ethical attorney advertisements came as a result of the Supreme Court of the 
United States decisions in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Bates, and In 
re R.M.J.95 
The ABA Model Rules discuss the rules of attorney solicitation in 
Rule 7.3: 
A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone, or real-time 
electronic contact solicit professional employment when a 
significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s 
pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted:  (1) is a lawyer; or (2) 
has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with 
the lawyer.  A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by 
written, recorded, or electronic communication or by in-person, 
telephone or real-time electronic contact even when not otherwise 
prohibited by paragraph (a), if:  (1) the target of the solicitation has 
[been] made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the 
lawyer; or (2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or 
harassment.96 
The distinction that the ABA Model Rules make between the rules 
regarding attorney advertising and attorney solicitation involves the use of 
real-time or live communications to a specific audience.97  The ABA defines 
																																																								
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 cmt. (2013). 
94. About the Model Rules, supra note 85; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1975); CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (Am. 
Bar Ass’n 1908). 
95. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199–200 (1982); Bates, 433 U.S. at 383–84; 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770, 773 
(1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 (2013). 
97. See id. r. 7.2 (ABA professional rules of attorney advertisements); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 (2013) (ABA professional rules of attorney solicitations). 
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solicitation as “a targeted communication initiated by the lawyer that is 
directed to a specific person and . . . offers to provide, or can reasonably be 
understood as offering to provide, legal services.”98  A communication to the 
general public is not considered solicitation by the ABA.99  The ABA Model 
Rules express concern for potential abuse through solicitation of direct in-
person or live communication by a lawyer to a potential client.100  According 
to the ABA Model Rules, “[the] potential for abuse inherent in direct in-
person, live telephone, or real-time electronic solicitation justifies its 
prohibition, particularly since lawyers have alternative means of conveying 
necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services.”101  The 
ABA Model Rules explain that communications with potential clients can be 
sent through other electronic modes of communication that are not 
considered to be real-time or live communications, such as e-mail or other 
electronic modes of communication.102  The ABA’s goal in prohibiting direct 
solicitation by attorneys of potential clients is to prevent a potential client 
from hiring an attorney based on undue influence, intimidation, or pressure 
under the circumstances.103 
The ABA has a substantial interest in prohibiting direct, in-person 
solicitation to protect the consumer of legal services; however, targeted or 
direct solicitation may benefit the consumer or potential client, as well as the 
attorney.104  In an article published by the ABA Journal in 2013, Stephanie 
Francis Ward discussed how consistently targeting advertisements to a 
specific audience may benefit a legal practice. 105   Ward countered the 
traditional belief that lawyers should attract their business clientele through 
good work and not through advertisements,106 by stating, “[s]ome lawyers 
believe that if you do good work, people will automatically come to you.  
They are wrong.  People need reminders.”107  Ward stressed the ABA’s 
promotion of direct advertisements by referring to the fact that personal 
injury lawyers often send targeted advertisements and letters to accident 
																																																								
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 cmt. (2013). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3. cmt (2013). 
104. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
7.3 cmt (2013). 
105. Stephanie Francis Ward, 50 Simple Ways You Can Market Your Practice, 
A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2013, 10:19 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/50_simple_
ways_you_can_market_your_practice. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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victims, and criminal defense lawyers often refer to arrest reports in hopes of 
targeting and obtaining potential clients. 108   This practice of targeted 
advertisements benefits both the consumers who are in need of legal services 
and who may not know how to go about obtaining legal representation and 
the attorneys who are in need of business and clientele.109 
III. PROTECTED FORMS OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS 
Looking at the ABA Model Rules and at the ethical and professional 
rules of the states that are modeled after the ABA Model Rules, there are 
many permissible forms of attorney advertisements and solicitation through 
written or electronic communications. 110   Two forms of attorney 
advertisements that result in a gap between the standards for attorney 
advertisements of the ABA and state ethical and professional rules are 
indirect and direct solicitation, specifically targeted letters to potential 
clients.111 
A. Direct Solicitation v. Indirect Solicitation 
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,112 the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that “the [s]tate—or the Bar acting with state 
authorization—constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients 
in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that 
the [s]tate has a right to prevent.”113  In this case, the appellant, a practicing 
lawyer, learned of a young girl who was a driver in a recent car accident.114  
The appellant visited the young accident victim in the hospital, where he told 
the accident victim that he would represent her, and subsequently, the 
accident victim signed an agreement retaining the appellant’s legal 
representation and agreed that the appellant would receive one-third of the 
victim’s recovery.115 
After obtaining the signed retainer agreement with the accident 
victim, the appellant contacted the passenger of the vehicle that the victim 
was driving and informed the passenger that she had a chance of recovery 
																																																								
108. Id. 
109. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376–77 (1977). 
110. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(a), 7.3(a)–(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2013); About the Model Rules, supra note 85. 
111. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3(a)–(b) (2013). 
112. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
113. Id. at 449. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 450. 
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against the driver and persuaded her to sign a contingent fee agreement.116  
When the passenger of the vehicle decided she did not want to sue the driver 
and attempted to revoke her agreement with the appellant, the appellant 
claimed that the agreement was binding and could not be revoked.117  The 
driver of the vehicle also attempted to revoke her agreement with the 
appellant.118  Both the driver and passenger of the vehicle brought complaints 
against the appellant with the Grievance Committee of the Geauga County 
Bar Association.119  These complaints were later referred to the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
who determined that the appellant violated the Ohio Code of Professional 
Responsibility, and appellant argued that it was his First Amendment right to 
solicit his legal services to potential clients.120 
In Ohralik, the Court stated that “[t]he solicitation of business by a 
lawyer through direct, in-person communication with [a] prospective client 
has long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession’s ideal of the 
attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant potential for harm to 
the prospective client.”121  The Court determined that a state has a stronger 
interest in heavily regulating direct in-person solicitation than in regulating 
indirect attorney advertisements made towards the public.122  In-person direct 
solicitation by attorneys of potential clients is still considered to be 
commercial speech and thus protected under the First Amendment; however, 
in-person direct solicitation receives a lower level of judicial scrutiny.123  The 
Court distinguished the in-person solicitation used by the appellant in 
Ohralik from the indirect advertising at issue in Bates, in that in-person 
solicitation may discourage potential clients in need of legal representation 
and “may disservice the individual and societal interest, identified in Bates, 
in facilitating ‘informed and reliable decision-making.’”124  The Court also 
recognized a significant difference between in-person direct solicitation and 
indirect advertisements in that “[u]nlike a public advertisement, which 
simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or 
not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an 
immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or 
																																																								
116. Id. at 449, 451. 
117. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 452. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 452–53; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
121. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454. 
122. Id. at 457–58. 
123. Id. at 457; see also U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
124. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457–58; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 
350, 364 (1974). 
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reflection.”125  In-person solicitation—because of the intimidation and undue 
influence that it has the potential to cause—does not stand up to the 
precedent set forth by the Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Bates, in 
holding that commercial speech, specifically attorney advertisements, serve 
the fundamental function of informing the public of the availability and 
nature of goods and services and promote rational decision-making.126 
The Court in Ohralik, held that a state has a substantial interest in 
regulating in-person direct solicitation by attorneys to potential clients, 
because “the potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a 
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an 
unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.”127  It was decided by the 
Court that a state has reason to believe that in-person solicitation may be 
harmful to the person who is solicited, and thus, the state has an interest in 
protecting its people from this harm.128  The Court held that being officers of 
the courts, attorneys serve the role of administering justice and a state has an 
interest in regulating attorneys and the standards of the legal profession, 
including setting forth standards regarding attorney advertisements.129 
The Supreme Court of the United States set fundamental precedent 
regarding direct and indirect solicitation and attorney advertisements in 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.130  
In this case the appellant was a practicing attorney who in hopes of 
expanding his practice, ran advertisements for his law firm in a local 
newspaper.131  The appellant targeted defendants of drunk driving cases.132  
When the Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel saw the appellant’s 
newspaper advertisement, the appellant was informed that his advertisement 
violated the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibited 
offering representation to criminal defendants on a contingent-fee basis.133  
Appellant then withdrew the advertisement.134  One year later, the appellant 
ran another newspaper advertisement targeting women who had suffered 
injuries from the use of a particular contraceptive device.135  As with the 
																																																								
125. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. 
126. See id. at 457, 466–67; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764–65 (1976). 
127. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464–65. 
128. Id. at 466. 
129. Id. at 460. 
130. 471 U.S. 626, 641–42, 645–47 (1985). 
131. Id. at 629–30. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 630; see also OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) 
(1970). 
134. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 630. 
135. Id. at 630–31. 
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targeted drunk driving advertisements previously posted by the appellant, 
this advertisement attracted the attention of the Ohio Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel.136  The appellant was charged with violating several disciplinary 
rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, including that the 
targeted drunk driving advertisement was “‘false, fraudulent, . . . and 
deceptive to the public’ because it offered representation on a contingent-fee 
basis in a criminal case” and the advertisement targeted toward injured 
women was not dignified and violated the state rule that “[a] lawyer who has 
given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take 
legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice.”137  In its 
opinion, the Court stressed that because the appellant was proposing a 
commercial transaction, the appellant’s speech was commercial and fell 
within the boundaries of First Amendment protection.138  The question for 
the Court then was the extent that the use of direct advertisements may be 
regulated.139  Throughout its holding, the Court kept in mind that complete 
prohibition or “blanket bans on price advertising by attorneys and rules 
preventing attorneys from using non-deceptive terminology to describe their 
fields of practice are impermissible.” 140   The Court also kept in mind 
throughout its holding, that in regards to rules prohibiting in-person 
solicitation, there are some circumstances where rules prohibiting in-person 
solicitation of potential clients by attorneys may be permissible. 141  
Differentiating the use of in-person solicitation by the appellant in Ohralik, 
with the use of newspaper advertisements by the appellant in Zauderer, the 
Court determined that the use of newspaper advertisements, though directed 
toward a specific audience, did not invade the privacy of those individuals 
who read the newspaper and saw the advertisement for legal services.142  The 
Court further discussed that print advertisements do not have the same high 
risk of overreaching or undue influence that in-person solicitation has.143  
The Court stated: 
Print advertising may convey information and ideas more or less 
effectively, but in most cases, it will lack the coercive force of the 
																																																								
136. Id. at 631. 
137. Id. at 631–33 (footnote omitted); see also OHIO CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)(1), 104(A), 106(C) (1970). 
138. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637–38; see also Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (holding that commercial speech includes 
any speech that proposes a commercial transaction). 
139. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629. 
140. Id. at 638. 
141. Id.; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457–58. 
142. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. 
143. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642. 
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personal presence of a trained advocate.  In addition, a printed 
advertisement, unlike a personal encounter initiated by an attorney, 
is not likely to involve pressure on the potential client for an 
immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.144 
An indirect advertisement, although aimed toward a specific 
audience, allows a potential client to reflect on the need and ability of hiring 
a particular lawyer and to freely make the choice of hiring a particular 
attorney, without undue influence or added pressure of in-person 
solicitation.145  In the case of Ohralik, the state had a substantial interest in 
regulating in-person solicitation of potential clients by attorneys in order to 
protect its citizens from undue influence or intimidation. 146   The Court 
determined that this substantial state interest could not stand to regulate the 
use of indirect solicitation of potential clients by attorneys, because indirect 
advertisements do not carry the same risk of undue influence that in-person 
solicitations carry.147 
B. Targeted Letters to Potential Clients 
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 148  the Supreme Court of the 
United States was faced with the issue of “whether a [s]tate may . . . prohibit 
lawyers from soliciting [and advertising] legal business for pecuniary gain by 
sending truthful and non-deceptive letters to potential clients known to face 
particular legal problems.”149  The petitioner was a practicing attorney who 
filed for approval by the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission of a 
letter that he had hopes of sending “‘to potential clients who . . . had a 
foreclosure suit filed against them.’”150  “The Commission did not find the 
letter [to be] false or misleading,” however, the Commission did find that the 
letter violated a “Kentucky Supreme Court Rule [that] prohibited the mailing 
or delivery of written advertisements ‘precipitated by a specific event or 
occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct 
from the general public.’”151  The Commission then urged the Supreme Court 
of Kentucky to amend its rules after finding that the rule “ban[ning] . . . 
																																																								
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 462, 466 (holding that a state has reason to 
assume that in-person solicitation of potential clients by an attorney will be injurious to the 
person who is solicited). 
147. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642. 
148. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). 
149. Id. at 468. 
150. Id. at 469. 
151. Id. at 469–70. 
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targeted, direct mail advertise[ments] violated the First Amendment.”152  The 
petitioner then petitioned the Kentucky Bar Association’s Committee on 
Legal Ethics for an advisory opinion on the validity of the rule, which 
resulted in the Committee on Legal Ethics’ adoption of the ABA’s Rule 7.3 
on attorney solicitation.153 
In analyzing targeted direct solicitation by attorneys to potential 
clients, the Court reiterated its fundamental holding in Zauderer that “[t]he 
‘unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers [that] justified a 
prophylactic rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in such solicitation for 
pecuniary gain,’ . . . are not present in the context of written 
advertisements.”154  The Court pointed out that previous precedent set by the 
Court in regards to attorney advertisements never distinguished between the 
constitutionality and protection of various modes of written advertisements 
to the general public.155  The Court made the analysis based upon the four 
prong analysis of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.156  The Court here 
distinguishes between advertisements that target specific individuals and 
read “[i]t has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on” 
and advertisements that more broadly read “[i]s your home being foreclosed 
on?” 157  The Court determined that the advertisement not targeting specific 
individuals is commercial speech that can be regulated or prohibited. 158  
Whereas, the more broad advertisement could not be prohibited without 
violating the First Amendment as long as the advertisement was not false, 
misleading, or advertising unlawful activity.159 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, the preceding court below the 
Supreme Court of the United States, had relied on the holding of Ohralik and 
found that the state’s complete prohibition on all targeted, direct mail 
solicitation was permissible under the First Amendment, because of the 
“serious potential for abuse inherent in direct solicitation by lawyers of 
potential clients known to need specific legal services.”160  The Supreme 
Court of the United States in its holding did not agree that the precedent set 
																																																								
152. Id. at 470; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
153. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
154. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472 (alteration in original) (quoting Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985)). 
155. Id. at 473. 
156. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
157. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473. 
158. Id. at 472–73. 
159. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473, 479. 
160. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978). 
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by Ohralikthat direct in-person solicitation by attorneys of potential 
clientswas present in the case of Shapero regarding targeted, direct mail 
solicitation.161  The Court made a fundamental distinction between direct and 
indirect solicitation.162  The Court stated: 
Of course, a particular potential client will feel equally 
overwhelmed by his legal troubles and will have the same 
impaired capacity for good judgment regardless of whether a 
lawyer mails him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a 
newspaper advertisement—concededly constitutionally protected 
activities—or instead mails a targeted letter.  The relevant inquiry 
is not whether there exist potential clients whose condition makes 
them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of 
communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit 
any such susceptibility.163 
The Court found that it is not to whom the targeted solicitation is 
sent that makes the solicitation prone to regulation, but the mode of 
communication in which the solicitation is sent that makes the solicitation 
prone to regulation.164  The mode of communication is a fundamental factor 
in determining whether direct solicitation is overreaching or cause for undue 
influence.165 
Compared to print advertising, targeted direct mail solicitation 
“‘poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence’ than does in-
person solicitation.”166  The Court held that written communications, either 
targeted or made toward the general public do not “involve[] ‘the coercive 
force of the personal presence of a trained advocate’ or the ‘pressure on the 
potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of 
representation.’”167  People receiving a written communication has the ability 
to draw their attention either towards or away from the solicitation.168  A 
targeted letter also does not have the ability to invade the privacy of a 
recipient any more than an attorney solicitation directed to the public at large 
can invade on a recipient’s privacy.169  The Court ultimately held that “a 
truthful and non-deceptive letter, no matter how big its type and how much it 
																																																								
161. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475–76; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 467–68. 
162. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474–75. 
163. Id. at 474. 
164. See id. at 475. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985)). 
167. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642). 
168. Id. at 475–76. 
169. Id. at 476. 
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speculates, can never shout at the recipient or grasp him by the lapels, . . . as 
can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicitation.” 170   Because attorney 
advertisements are commercial speech and thus, protected under the First 
Amendment, a state may not raise a substantial interest in restricting truthful 
and non-deceptive lawyer solicitations, including targeted direct mail 
solicitations.171 
IV. FLORIDA’S REGULATIONS ON ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS 
A. Recognizing Commercial Speech Protection in Florida 
The State of Florida has long been known for its strict standards in 
regulating attorney advertisements. 172   Florida first recognized attorney 
advertisements as commercial speech and protected under the First 
Amendment in the year 1989. 173   Following the precedents set by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the 
Florida Bar took the initiative of conducting a survey of the public opinion 
on attorney advertising, and “[a]fter conducting hearings, . . . surveys, and 
reviewing extensive public commentary, the [Florida] Bar determined that 
several changes to its advertising rules were in order.”174  As a result of these 
findings, “[i]n late 1990 the [Supreme Court of Florida] adopted the [Florida] 
Bar’s proposed amendments with some modifications.”175   The Supreme 
Court of Florida took the initiative to pass the amended rules to attorney 
advertisements because of the precedents set by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Bates. 176   The 
Supreme Court of Florida cited Bates stating that the Supreme Court upheld 
“‘reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising.’”177  
The Supreme Court of Florida explained “[s]ince lawyers render professional 
																																																								
170. Id. at 479 (citation omitted). 
171. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
172. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Tera Jckowski Peterson, Medium-Specific 
Regulation of Attorney Advertising: A Critique, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 259, 260 (2007). 
173. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995); Fla. Bar:  Petition 
to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1990); 
see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
174. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 620; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
175. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 620; see also Fla. Bar:  Petition to Amend 
the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d at 452. 
176. Fla.  Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. 
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 456–57; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. 
177. Fla. Bar:  Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. 
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 458 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384). 
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services [that] vary from attorney to attorney, case to case, and client to 
client, the potential for deception . . . in advertising is great.” 178   The 
amended rules to attorney advertisements in Florida supported “reasonable 
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising” and reduced 
deception of potential clients caused by advertisements.179  These amended 
Florida Bar Rules were the first amendments to the Florida Bar Rules 
subsequent to the Supreme Court decisions of Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy and Bates, upholding commercial speech as protected under the 
First Amendment and extending this protection to attorney advertisements.180  
Maintaining its strict regulations on attorney advertisements, Florida has 
proceeded to “push[] the First Amendment envelope that safeguards the right 
of attorneys to inform potential clients about the [legal] services they 
offer.”181 
The Florida Bar, even after the Supreme Court of Florida passed the 
amended rules allowing Florida to be a more permissive state towards 
attorney advertisement, continued to reveal its beliefs about the negative 
effects that attorney advertisements place on the legal profession.182  In 1994, 
after the attorney advertising rules were recently amended to allow attorney 
advertisements, former Florida Bar President, Patricia A. Seitz, expressed to 
the ABA that “‘[a]ggressive ads have caused the public to see the legal 
system as a lottery of fictitious claims in which lawyers make out like 
bandits in fees.’” 183   Patricia A. Seitz also expressed that attorney 
advertisements were to blame for “‘increas[ing] the public’s cynicism about 
the legal system, which undermines the system that lawyers take an oath to 
uphold.’”184  In the year 2000, as advertisements became more popular and 
used amongst attorneys, the Florida Bar decided that it was time to take a 
stronger stance against attorneys who violated any Florida rules regarding 
attorney advertisements.185  The Florida Bar subsequently passed a motion to 
																																																								
178. Id. 
179. Id. (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384). 
180. Fla. Bar:  Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. 
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 457–58; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 
U.S. at 770. 
181. Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 261. 
182. See Fla. Bar:  Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—
Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d at 452, 455; Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 260 n.1. 
183. James Podgers, Image Problem: Burned by a Fall in Public Favor, the 
Organized Bar Turns Up the Heat on Lawyer Advertising, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 66, 68; see 
also Fla. Bar:  Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So. 
2d at 452, 455. 
184. Podgers, supra note 183, at 68. 
185. Gary Blankenship, Bar to Take a Harder Line Toward Lawyer Ad 
Violations, FLA. B. NEWS, July 1, 2000, at 13. 
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initiate grievances against any Florida Bar attorney who violated the Bar 
rules in regard to attorney advertisements.186  The Bar’s motive for initiating 
grievances against violators of the Florida Bar rules of attorney 
advertisements was due to appeals.187  The Bar was frustrated that since 
advertisement appeals take several months, attorneys may still run their 
advertisements, and by the time the appeal has been decided, the 
advertisement could have already been exposed through various media and 
communications.188 
The Florida Bar maintained its strong grip on regulating attorney 
advertisements in 2004, when it was announced that the Florida Bar was 
forming an Advertising Task Force. 189   The purpose of creating the 
Advertising Task Force was to review Florida’s attorney advertisement 
regulations and determine when changes or amendments to the rules would 
be necessary.190  The Florida Bar President at the time, Kelly Overstreet 
Johnson, expressed that “many lawyers still dislike or oppose lawyer 
advertising, believing [it is] the [strongest] cause of public discontent with 
the profession.”191  Johnson also explained that because Supreme Court of 
the United States precedent prohibits complete bans on attorney 
advertisements, it is important to make sure that the Florida Bar’s rules 
remain “as consistent . . . as possible and enforced.”192 
In 2013, the Florida Bar petitioned to the Supreme Court of Florida 
to consider proposed amendments to Subchapter 4-7 of the Rules Regulating 
the Florida Bar. 193   The Florida Bar proposed to the Supreme Court of 
Florida that they strike all current rules regarding attorney advertisements 
and adopt entirely new rules, which ultimately the Supreme Court of Florida 
adopted. 194   The adoption of entirely new rules regarding attorney 
advertisements was due to a “contemporary study of lawyer advertising, 
which . . . include[d] public evaluation and comments about lawyer 
advertising.”195  After analyzing the findings, the Florida Bar came to the 
																																																								
186. Id. 
187. See id. 
188. Id. 
189. See New Bar Panel to Review Attorney Advertising Rules, FLA. B. NEWS, 
Dec. 15, 2003, at 1. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Subchapter 4-7, 
Lawyer Advert. Rules, 108 So. 3d 609, 609 (Fla. 2013); see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 4-7.11 (2014). 
194. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Subchapter 4-7, 
108 So. 3d at 609, 611. 
195. Id. at 609–10. 
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conclusion that entirely new rules, which prevent the “dissemination of 
misleading and unduly manipulative information,” should be adopted. 196  
The new advertising rules were “designed to make the advertising rules more 
cohesive, easier for lawyers who advertise to understand, and less 
cumbersome for the [Florida] Bar to apply and enforce.”197 
B. Distinguishing Standards of the Florida Bar and the American Bar 
Association 
Florida is a state that has modeled its ethical and professional rules 
of conduct after the ABA Model Rules.198  Florida’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct regarding attorney advertisements and solicitations are found in 
Rule 4-7.18, which reads: 
Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this rule, a lawyer may 
not:  (1) solicit, or permit employees or agents of the lawyer to 
solicit on the lawyer’s behalf, professional employment from a 
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior 
professional relationship, in person or otherwise, when a 
significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s 
pecuniary gain.  The term solicit includes contact in person, by 
telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or by other communication 
directed to a specific recipient and includes any written form of 
communication, including any electronic mail communication, 
directed to a specific recipient and not meeting the requirements of 
subdivision (b) of this rule and rules 4-7.11 through 4-7.17 of these 
rules; [and] (2) enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect a fee 
for professional employment obtained in violation of this rule.199 
The Florida Bar Standing Committee on Advertising’s Handbook on 
Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation also contains regulations that lawyers in 
the State of Florida must comply with, in addition to the Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 200   The Handbook on Lawyer Advertising and 
Solicitation cites Rule 4-7.11(a) of the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct:  “Florida’s lawyer advertising rules apply to all forms of 
communication seeking legal employment in any print or electronic forum, 
including but not limited to newspapers, magazines, brochures, flyers, 
television, radio, direct mail, electronic mail, and Internet, including banners, 
																																																								
196. Id. at 610. 
197. Id. 
198. See About the Model Rules, supra note 85. 
199. FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(a) (2014). 
200. See FLA. BAR STANDING COMM. ON ADVERTISING, HANDBOOK ON LAWYER 
ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 1 (10th ed. 2013, rev. 2014). 
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pop-ups, websites, social networking, and video sharing media.”201  In regard 
to Rule 4-7.18 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct and prohibited 
forms of attorney solicitation, the Handbook on Lawyer Advertising and 
Solicitation states: 
A lawyer may not contact a prospective client in person, by 
telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or through other means of direct 
contact, unless the prospective client is a family member, current 
client, or former client.  This prohibition does not extend to 
unsolicited direct mail or email communications made in 
compliance with Rule 4-7.18(b).202 
Attorneys who advertise through direct mail and email 
communications must not use “‘coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, 
harassment, intimidation, or undue influence’” in order to obtain clientele.203  
According to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer is not 
permitted to send potential clients advertisements through direct mail or 
email communications if the lawyer has been informed that the potential 
client does not wish to receive the communications from the lawyer.204 
On a national perspective, Rule 7.2 and Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model 
Rules set the standards for attorney advertisements and solicitations.205  In 
contrast to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct that specifically list the 
modes of communications in which a lawyer may not advertise to a potential 
client, Rule 7.2 of the ABA Model Rules states that “a lawyer may advertise 
services through written, recorded or electronic communication, including 
public media.”206  Some of the communications in which Florida prohibits 
lawyers from advertising through are permitted by the ABA Model Rules.207  
For example, it can be argued that telephone communications classify as 
electronic communications and are thus permissible under the ABA Model 
Rules, but not permissible under the Florida Rules of Professional 
																																																								
201. Id. at 2. 
202. Id. at 4. 
203. HANDBOOK ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200, 
at 19; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(b) (2014). 
204. HANDBOOK ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200, 
at 19; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(b) (2014). 
205. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2, 7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); see 
also supra Section II.C. 
206. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11(a)–(b) (2014); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(a) (2013). 
207. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11 (2014); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 (2013). 
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Conduct. 208   Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules specifically discusses 
solicitation of clients by attorneys and distinguishes that a lawyer may not 
solicit through any live or real-time communications; whereas the Florida 
Rules of Professional Conduct define solicit as in-person communications.209 
V. EXTENDING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION TO ATTORNEY 
ADVERTISEMENTS VIA TEXT MESSAGES 
A. Classifying Attorney Advertisements Via Text Messages as Protected 
Commercial Speech 
A Florida law firm has recently challenged the Florida Bar for 
denying the law firm’s proposal of sending automated text messages to 
potential clients advertising the firm’s legal services.210  The Florida Bar 
classified automated text messages to potential clients as direct solicitation 
by telephone prohibited by the Florida Advertising Rules and Florida Rules 
of Professional Conduct.211  The law firm has argued that text messages may 
be classified as direct mail or email, which are permitted by the Florida 
Advertising Rules and the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.212  Based 
on the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in regards to 
direct and indirect attorney advertisements, text messages more closely 
resemble the indirect communications in Shapero than the direct solicitation 
analyzed in Ohralik.213 
When analyzing attorney advertisements through the use of text 
messages, direct text messages to potential clients by attorneys reflect the 
same communications that the Supreme Court of the United States analyzed 
in Shapero.214  Similar to the issue in the case of the Florida law firm sending 
direct text messages to potential clients, the Supreme Court of the United 
States was left with the question of whether a state may prohibit direct letters 
to targeted potential clients in Shapero. 215   As the Court pointed out in 
																																																								
208. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11(a) (2014); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(a) (2013). 
209. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.18(a)(1) (2014); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3(a) (2013). 
210. Hale, supra note 15. 
211. FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.18(a)(1) (2014); HANDBOOK ON 
LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200, at 4; Hale, supra note 15. 
212. Hale, supra note 15; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18 
(2014). 
213. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978). 
214. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 479. 
215. Id. at 468; Hale, supra note 15. 
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Shapero, a recipient of written communications has the ability to read the 
communication or avert their attention away from the communication.216  
Text messages, like letters, have the ability to be read, ignored and looked at 
later, or if the recipient chooses, not even seen at all.217  In this respect, text 
messages are similar to written communications, such as emails or letters.218 
In the context of direct solicitation, text messages do not reflect the 
same in-person solicitation that the Court analyzed in Ohralik.219  In-person 
solicitation, or live communications such as soliciting through the telephone, 
are distinguished from text messages in that text messages do not have the 
same high risk of intimidation or undue influence that live or in-person 
solicitation may have.220  Recipients of text messages are not pressured to 
accept legal representation immediately and are not pressured by the 
presence of an attorney.221  Advertisements sent via text message also allow 
the recipient to reflect on the message, compare the nature and availability of 
goods and services, and allow for rational decision-making.222  Unlike direct 
in-person solicitations, text messages are not immediate communications that 
urge an immediate response.223  Attorney advertisements via text message 
are classified as commercial speech and are thus deserving of First 
Amendment protection because they are direct communications that propose 
a transaction and serve the public interest of informing the public of the 
availability, nature, and prices of services.224 
																																																								
216. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475–76 (“A letter, like a printed advertisement—but 
unlike a lawyer—can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or 
discarded.”). 
217. See id. 
218. See id.; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985). 
219. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 
U.S. 447, 457 (1978). 
220. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. 
221. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (“Print advertising may convey information and 
ideas more or less effectively, but in most cases, it will lack the coercive force of the personal 
presence of a trained advocate.”); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465 (“[T]he potential for overreaching 
is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, 
personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.”). 
222. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 
(1977) (holding that “commercial speech . . . inform[s] the public of the availability, nature, 
and prices of products and services, and . . . serves individual and societal interests in assuring 
informed and reliable decision-making.”). 
223. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (“In addition, a printed advertisement, unlike a 
personal encounter initiated by an attorney, is not likely to involve pressure on the potential 
client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.”); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 
457 (“The aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presentation 
and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed decision-making.”). 
224. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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B. Text Messages Applied to the Central Hudson test 
If attorney advertisements via text messages are classified as 
commercial speech, in order to determine whether such commercial speech 
may be restricted or prohibited by a state, the Central Hudson test must be 
applied.225  The first prong of the four-part analysis asks whether the speech 
is protected under the First Amendment. 226   Bates extended commercial 
speech protection to attorney advertisements, allowing attorney 
advertisements to be considered protected First Amendment speech. 227  
Attorney advertisements via text messages propose a transaction and inform 
the public of the availability of goods and services, qualifying as commercial 
speech. 228   Attorney advertisements via text messages, which do not 
advertise unlawful activity and are not misleading or deceptive, meet the 
conditions for First Amendment protection.229 
The second part of the Central Hudson test requires that the asserted 
governmental interest be substantial.230  In regard to the Florida Bar denying 
a Florida law firm’s proposal to send automated text messages to potential 
clients, the Florida Bar can argue that its asserted interest in restricting the 
automated text messages would be to protect Florida citizens in need of legal 
services.231  As the Court found in the case of Ohralik, a state has reason to 
assume that in-person solicitation of potential clients by an attorney may be 
harmful to the person who is solicited.232  However, text messages, like other 
written communications, do not have the ability to intimidate or cause undue 
influence like other forms of in-person solicitation. 233   Attorney 
advertisements also serve the important function of informing consumers of 
goods, which is fundamental to the freedom of speech of both attorneys and 
consumers.234  This asserted state interest of protecting consumers in Florida 
would fail in the case of attorney advertisements via text messages.235  The 
																																																								
225. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
226. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
227. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
228. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56. 
229. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
230. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566, 568–69. 
231. See Hale, supra note 15. 
232. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466. 
233. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (holding that print advertisements generally 
pose a much less risk of overreaching or undue influence than in-person solicitation). 
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; Bates, 433 U.S. at 
364. 
235. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466 (holding the State has reason to assume in-
person solicitation of potential clients by an attorney will be injurious to the person who is 
solicited). 
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Florida Bar may also argue that direct solicitation should be prohibited in 
order to maintain the nobleness of the legal profession.236  As the Court held 
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, a state interest in upholding 
professionalism of a field may not be a sufficient interest in restricting 
commercial speech.237  The asserted state interest in upholding the dignity of 
the legal profession would also fail under the Central Hudson test in 
analyzing attorney advertisements via text messages to potential clients.238 
If the asserted state interests were determined to be substantial, it 
must then be determined whether the restrictions directly advance the 
asserted state interest.239  If the Florida Bar were to assert the interests of 
protecting consumers or upholding the legal profession, then restricting text 
messages by attorneys to potential clients would have to carry out these 
interests. 240   The restrictions also may not be more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.241  If the Florida Bar were able to carry out 
its asserted interests without restricting or prohibiting attorney 
advertisements via text messages, then the restriction or prohibition of the 
commercial speech would violate the First Amendment.242 
C. Keeping up with Modern Modes of Communication 
In the year 2000, the Florida Bar noted that a “member of the Florida 
Bar might feel lost without a cell phone.”243  Fifteen years later, that opinion 
should not have changed considering that technology has only grown more 
popular and become more useful.244  The opinion of the Florida Bar in 2000 
was that technology must be “utilize[d] . . . to become more efficient and [to] 
provide the public with a better justice system.”245  At the time, technology 
was seen as “giving the decision-maker more information to make . . . 
																																																								
236. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 766 (1976). 
237. See id. at 766, 770. 
238. Id. at 766 (holding an asserted state interest in upholding professionalism 
of a field may not be sufficient); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
239. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
240. See id. 
241. See id. 
242. See id. (holding that a state’s asserted interest in restricting commercial 
speech must be narrowly drawn and may not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest). 
243. Gary Blankenship, The Florida Bar:  Changing Through Technology, 
FLA. B. J., Apr. 2000, at 37, 37. 
244. See Hale, supra note 15. 
245. Blankenship, supra note 243, at 39–40. 
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decision[s].”246  Relating to commercial speech, attorneys who choose to 
advertise must ensure that their advertisements are able to keep up with 
evolving technology in order to provide consumers with the knowledge of 
the nature and availability of goods and services.247  If in the year 2000, the 
Florida Bar was noting how extensive the use of cell phones were, this 
number has only expanded, and attorneys today must also utilize these 
communications.248 
In 2000, evolving technology was already a major concern for the 
practice of law, as stated, “[t]echnology—and how lawyers use it—will be an 
important factor in determining what the practice of law looks like in the 
next [ten] years, let alone the next [fifty].”249  It is important for lawyers to 
recognize where the profession is headed and be able to keep up with the 
profession.250  Society and technology is something that is constantly and 
rapidly changing that lawyers, along with state bar associations, must be able 
to recognize. 251   Rules regarding commercial speech and attorney 
advertisements should also be flexible and able to keep up with society and 
technology.252  It will be “[t]he lawyers who are able to stay on top of 
changing times [that will be] the ones who are going to be successful.”253  
There will be even more expansive growth and changes in technology, and it 
is essential that the legal profession, including commercial speech and 
attorney advertisements, be able to keep up with these changes.254 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the history of the legal profession, advertising by 
attorneys has consistently been looked down upon and considered 
unprofessional. 255   These consistent negative views of attorney 
advertisements have influenced the ethical and professional standards of the 
																																																								
246. Id. at 40. 
247. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (“And commercial 
speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and 
services, and thus performs an indispensible role in the allocation of resources in a free 
enterprise system.”). 
248. See Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40; Hale, supra note 15. 
249. Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40. 
250. Id. 
251. See id. 
252. Id.; DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212. 
253. Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40. 
254. See id. 
255. See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212; Brace, supra note 3, at 110–11; supra 
Part I. 
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ABA, as well as a majority of state bar ethical and professional standards.256  
It was not until 1977 in the case of Bates, where the Supreme Court of the 
United States determined attorney advertisements to be commercial speech 
and thus protected under the First Amendment, that the ABA standards and 
state bar ethical and professional rules began to permit attorneys to freely 
advertise their legal services and fees.257  Even after the Court extended First 
Amendment protections to attorney advertisements, ethical and professional 
rules have still maintained strict standards and regulations on attorney 
advertisements.258  These strict regulations consist of the delicate balance 
between maintaining the honor and dignity of the legal profession and 
upholding the First Amendment rights of attorneys to freely advertise their 
legal services and fees.259  Florida is a state that has consistently placed some 
of the strictest regulations on attorney advertisements.260 
Attorney advertisements that directly solicit potential clients are a 
great concern for the ABA, as well as state bar associations, including the 
Florida Bar.261  One of the modes of communication that is currently at issue 
in the State of Florida, is targeted automated text messages to potential 
clients. 262   The Florida Bar has struck down a firm’s proposed plan of 
sending automated text messages to potential clients, as direct solicitation via 
telephone in violation of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.263  Upon 
a closer analysis of the use of text messages by attorneys to potential clients, 
these communications more closely resemble the direct solicitation that was 
held to be constitutionally protected commercial speech in Zauderer and 
Shapero. 264   Text messages sustain the fundamental public interest of 
informing consumers of the nature, availability, and prices of available 
services and promote rational decision-making by the consumer.265 
In conclusion, the Florida Bar should allow attorney advertisements 
via text messages because these communications are considered protected 
																																																								
256. See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212; Brace, supra note 3, at 110–11; supra 
Section I.C. 
257. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977); Brace, supra note 3, 
at 111, 113; Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 263–64, 272–73. 
258. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (2013). 
259. See supra Part I. 
260. Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 260–61; see also supra Part IV. 
261. See supra Section III.B. 
262. See supra Parts I, V. 
263. See supra Part I. 
264. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 475–76, 478 (1988); 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641–42 
(1985); Hale, supra note 15; supra Section V.A. 
265. See supra Part V. 
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forms of commercial speech under the First Amendment.266  Text messages 
do not invade the privacy of the recipient, nor demand an immediate 
response, proving to not violate the ABA Model Rules or Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct.267  Florida must also consider allowing attorneys to 
advertise legal services through targeted text messages in order to keep up 
with evolving modern communications.268 
																																																								
266. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also supra Part V. 
267. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3, 7.3 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2013); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18 (2014); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; 
supra Part V. 
268. See supra Section V.C. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the high increased costs of insurance premiums and advances 
in medicine, tort reform has become a rising area of conflict in the law.1  
States are found in conflict with the high costs of insurance while at the same 
time protecting an individual’s rights to seek just compensation in the law.2  
Many legislators have adopted distinct standards in order to respond 
effectively to the needs of their state.3  States, such as Georgia, Arizona, 
North Carolina, and others, are revolutionizing medical malpractice reform 
by increasing the burden of proof required in emergency physicians’ medical 
malpractice cases from the standard torts preponderance of the evidence to a 
clear and convincing standard.4 
Increasing the standard of proof to a clear and convincing standard 
makes it close to impossible for a plaintiff to raise a successful claim against 
a doctor who committed malpractice.5  Nevertheless, tort reform is rapidly 
occurring across the United States; many lobbyists of these reforms promise 
that the restrictions on a plaintiff will bring lower insurance costs for 
everyone.6  Statistical evidence contradicts that promise, with a showing of 
four hundred thousand dollars as the average amount that a jury awards in 
medical malpractice cases.7 
Following the wave of tort reform, Florida has passed caps on the 
amount of damages that can be awarded to a plaintiff and has made the 
distinction between cases of emergency physicians and general 
practitioners.8  With recent cases, such as Estate of McCall v. United States,9 
the constitutionality of tort reform has been called into question when caps 
																																																								
1. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” 
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 457, 517 (2006); Steve Cohen, On Tort Reform, It’s 
Time to Declare Victory and Withdraw, FORBES (Mar. 02, 2015, 9:59 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevecohen/2015/03/02/on-tort-reform-its-time-to-declare-
victory-and-withdraw. 
2. See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 438, 441, 446; Cohen, supra note 1. 
3. Sample Legislation, AM. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, 
http://www.acep.org/Content.aspx?id=33178 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
4. Id. 
5. See Cohen, supra note 1. 
6. Cohen, supra note 1; Sample Legislation, supra note 3. 
7. Cohen, supra note 1. 
8. FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2), (4) (2014). 
9. 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014). 
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are applied in wrongful deaths cases but not personal injury.10  If Florida 
chooses to continue tort reform and creates a distinction between medical 
practices, like its sister state Georgia, it would encounter many hurdles in 
establishing a rational basis for the distinct treatment.11  The biggest hurdle 
for tort reformers to overcome is the Florida Constitution because it is unique 
from other states, as it provides equal protection and guarantees its citizens 
access to the courts.12 
Setting aside the issue of whether caps on damages in malpractice 
cases are constitutional under equal protection, this Comment will discuss 
the following question:  Will Florida be able to follow Georgia in its tort 
reform and increase the burden of proof in emergency care cases?13  Part II 
will introduce a brief history of modern tort reform that leads to the issue 
today of targeting tort reforms towards medical malpractice.14  Part III will 
analyze the national modern attempts to encourage tort reform in medical 
malpractice.15  Part IV will discuss Georgia’s reasoning behind an increased 
burden of proof.16  Part V will discuss the individuality of Florida law and 
the change after Estate of McCall.17  Finally, Part VI will conclude with how 
Florida is unable to follow Georgia in its path towards reform.18 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN TORT REFORM 
A. What Is Tort Reform? 
The area of tort law in civil litigation was created to provide justice 
and to compensate those who have been injured due to negligence or with 
purposeful intent.19  The purpose of tort law is to place the victim, who 
suffered a loss, in the same position before the breach of duty.20  Tort law, 
majorly based on common law, imposes legal liability on an individual who 
deviates from the norm and compensates the victim with monetary awards.21  
																																																								
10. Id. at 899. 
11. See id. at 914; Greg Roslund, The Medical Malpractice Rundown:  A 
State-by-State Report Card, EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS MONTHLY (July 21, 2014), 
http://www.epmonthly.com/departments/subspecialties/medico-legal/the-medical-malpractice-
rundown-a-state-by-state-report-card. 
12. See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 21; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 933. 
13. See infra Part V. 
14. See infra Part II. 
15. See infra Part III. 
16. See infra Part IV. 
17. See infra Part V. 
18. See infra Part VI. 
19. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2000). 
20. Hubbard, supra note 1, at 440. 
21. DOBBS, supra note 19, at 2. 
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Tort law’s quick adaptation to legislative enactments due to various interests 
from insurance companies, corporations, and legal practitioners makes it a 
dynamic area of law open to criticism.22  Tort reform is often defined as a 
movement that limits the ability and award that a plaintiff can attain when 
pursuing a civil tort lawsuit in order to address a series of crises.23  Tort 
reform often involves distinct actors, such as the American Medical 
Association or State Farm Insurance, with multiple interests but who share a 
common goal for efficiency.24  Other times tort reform is part of a political 
movement, which is subject to economic needs.25 
Critics often debate whether some of these reforms violate 
constitutional principles, such as those of due process, and whether this 
constant adaption to social policies opens the floodgates for courthouses over 
the country with frivolous lawsuits.26  Supporters of tort reform propose 
changes to the judicial system to decrease costs in the economy, as insurance 
premiums rise and medical innovation expands.27  It is frequently deemed as 
a controversial area of law because tort reform often aims at limiting the 
amount of recovery a victim can receive for his or her injury. 28   The 
reasoning behind such limitations is the increase in high insurances, but often 
the effect goes beyond limiting the compensation system and is done at the 
cost of guaranteed constitutional rights.29 
B. Modern Tort Reform in the 1970s 
In order to understand whether states, such as Florida, can adopt 
other states’ standards in medical malpractice cases, it is essential to give a 
brief historical introduction to important tort reforms that have lead to the 
common practice today.30  While tort law is considered common law and was 
introduced in the United States as early as the 1800s, the true identity of 
reform began in the 1970s when the insurance market quickly rose.31  As a 
result, physicians petitioned legislators to make changes in personal injury 
cases.32  In 1975, California enacted its famous medical malpractice statute 
																																																								
22. See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 438–39, 471. 
23. Id. at 438, 472. 
24. Id. at 472. 
25. See id. at 475–76. 
26. Id. at 474, 523. 
27. See Scott DeVito & Andrew W. Jurs, “Doubling-Down” for Defendants:  
The Pernicious Effects of Tort Reform, 118 PA. ST. L. REV. 543, 549 (2014). 
28. See id. at 544. 
29. See id. at 543–44, 596. 
30. See id. at 543, 546, 549. 
31. Id. at 551; see also Hubbard, supra note 1, at 439. 
32. DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551. 
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that placed a cap on non-monetary awards on pain and suffering, therefore, 
slowing the price increase of medical malpractice premiums.33 
The movement of tort reform in the 1970s focused on placing an 
economical focus on civil litigation and limited the amount of damages that 
could be awarded.34  A decrease in the number of carriers and increase in the 
number of claims caused premiums to rise and created an air of distrust 
towards the court system.35  Subsequently, the medical community blamed 
the judicial system and lobbied the legislature to place limitations on 
recoveries for plaintiffs.36  Nevertheless, many insurers were slow to increase 
and adjust their rates because of the uncertainty of the constitutionality of 
these limits.37 
C. The 1980s and the Reagan Administration 
In the 1980s, the increased tort reform in the United States boosted 
the demand for insurance coverage, and many critics claim that this is a 
cause of the tort reform itself.38  The Reagan Administration blamed the 
insurance crisis of the 1980s on tort reform.39  Groups were formed, such as 
the Tort Policy Working Group, who believed that a doubling in the 1970s of 
lawsuits and an increase in award damages in medical malpractice suits 
would cause individuals to experience a high increase in insurance 
premiums.40  The group recommended for the first time placing caps on 
damage awards and increasing the burden of proof.41 
The Reagan Administration’s Republican platform consisted of 
preventing insurance from rising and blamed the civil suits for the high costs 
of insurance and lack of healthcare available.42  The movement to limit civil 
trials in the courtroom and to decrease costs began to increase momentum 
when many states in the 1980s began a reform to adopt legislation to limit 
recovery on claims.43   As well, many states focused on the abolition or 
																																																								
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 333.2(a)–(b) (West 2015); FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY 
M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 117 (2008). 
34. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 216 (expanded ed. 2003). 
35. DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 549–50. 
36. Id. at 550. 
37. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 33, at 97. 
38. See DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551; Hubbard, supra note 1, at 438. 
39. DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1988:  
AN AMERICAN VISION: FOR OUR CHILDREN AND OUR FUTURE (1988), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25846. 
43. See Devito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551–53. 
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limitation of joint and several liability.44  In joint and several liability, each 
tortfeasor is held liable for damages, and each defendant must then prove that 
they were not the sole proximate cause of the injury.45  The plaintiff may 
elect from the group of defendants which one to seek payment from, but joint 
and several liability is often critiqued in that it entices plaintiffs to seek 
judgment from the wealthiest defendant.46 
Between 1986 and 1987, thirty-five states quickly adapted to tort 
reforms, within them abolishing the common law theory of joint and several 
liability. 47   However, some states, such as Arizona, adopted a slower 
approach by merely limiting joint and several liability.48  Other states, such 
as Florida, moved towards completely abolishing it and received popular 
opposition in its tort reform movements.49  The Supreme Court of Florida 
held that the complete abolition of joint and several liability did not violate 
the U.S. Constitution nor the Florida Constitution under equal protection, due 
process, and access to the courts.50  However, the court ruled that caps on 
non-economic damages violated the Florida Constitution because they deny 
the plaintiff’s access to the courts.51 
III. MODERN ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE TORT REFORM IN MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE 
Tort reform is often looked at as an answer for the insurance crisis.52  
Therefore, because of the connection between insurance companies and 
medical malpractice, this then becomes an area of law often targeted by 
legislators and companies. 53   A second Republican attempt to limit tort 
reform occurred in 2000 with the Bush Administration after a repeated 
insurance crisis.54  The Bush Administration proposed further tort reform by 
imposing a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice 
																																																								
44. See Mike Steenson, Recent Legislative Responses to the Rule of Joint and 
Several Liability, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 482, 485 (1987). 
45. See James J. Scheske, Comment, The Reform of Joint and Several 
Liability Theory:  A Survey of State Approaches, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 627, 635 (1988). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 642. 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 642–43. 
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9, 21; Smith v. Dep’t. 
of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1091 (Fla. 1987); Scheske, supra note 45, at 643. 
51. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1095. 
52. See Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails:  A Realistic Remedy for 
the Medical Malpractice “Crisis”, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 478 (2012). 
53. Id. at 480–81. 
54. Id. at 482–83. 
206
Nova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/1
2015] EMERGENCY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM 191 
suits, in response to premium increases in insurance rates.55  However, the 
rise in insurance premiums was due to the rise in medical costs, recovery 
attempts for lost profits, and insurer’s lack of ability to reserve profits for 
down periods.56  None of the factors that caused the higher premiums were 
due to an increase in medical malpractice cases.57  Often politicians have 
mistakenly looked towards tort reform as a solution to resolve the crisis in 
making insurance available to the public; however, repeatedly, this method 
has not worked.58 
A. National Movement for Medical Tort Reform 
Distinct states are each slowly continuing their independent tort 
reform in limiting the ability for plaintiffs to pursue litigation in exchange for 
lower insurance premiums.59  In 2003, Texas enacted an emergency care 
provision requiring a showing of willful and wanton negligence for an 
emergency care provider to be held liable for malpractice.60  In the same 
year, Florida created a strict cap on non-economic damages, making the 
distinction between a cap of $150,000 for emergency care providers versus 
$500,000 for general practitioners.61  Subsequently, Georgia followed the 
distinction in the standard of evidence for malpractice claims between 
emergency physicians and general practitioners. 62   Georgia changed the 
required standard of proof from preponderance of the evidence to a higher 
clear and convincing standard but only when a practitioner has shown a 
standard of gross negligence. 63   Utah, Arizona, and North Carolina 
subsequently followed but with only a heightened clear and convincing 
standard of proof.64 
Increasing the burden of proof and placing caps on the claim amount 
questions whether these methods are constitutional and whether lower 
premiums are paid at the expense of patients who suffer injuries that can be 
																																																								
55. Id. 
56. Alec Shelby Bayer, Comment, Looking Beyond the Easy Fix and Delving 
into the Roots of the Real Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 111, 
118 (2005). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 115–16. 
59. See Sample Legislation, supra note 3. 
60. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.153 (West 2003). 
61. Sample Legislation, supra note 3. 
62. See id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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avoided.65  Protection to insurers and health care providers is justified by the 
fear that practitioners will leave the state due to malpractice suits and a 
common objective to reduce defensive medicine. 66   However, with the 
relatively small number of malpractice claims that make it to court, the 
effectiveness of these restrictions becomes questionable. 67   Are patients 
being limited their rights in order to achieve affordable care?68  Will other 
states, such as Florida, with their unique state constitutions be able to follow 
political tort reform to increase efficiency and diminish costs by restricting 
fundamental rights?69 
IV. INCREASING THE BURDEN OF PROOF RATIONALE 
A. Introduction to the Emergency Room Malpractice 
Generally, in civil actions, including medical malpractice, the 
plaintiff has the duty to prove every element of the case by a preponderance 
of evidence.70  Preponderance of evidence means that the plaintiff, in a more 
than probable standard, can establish a persuasive chain of causation between 
the injury and the defendant.71  The evidence must show that it is more 
probable that the practitioner caused the plaintiff’s injury; however, 
causation can often be difficult to prove.72  Defendants in medical claims 
have the ability to blame the injury on many external factors and on the 
plaintiff’s previous medical history. 73   In medical cases, the breach is 
determined in accordance to what the physician should have done 
differently; however, it is not conclusive.74  Emergency claims are made 
even more difficult for a plaintiff when emergency practitioners are not 
required to follow the same standard as the general profession and are 
allowed to use their best judgment.75 
																																																								
65. Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
1201, 1253–54 (2012); Jason R. Graves, Note, State of Emergency:  Why Georgia’s Standard 
of Care in Emergency Rooms is Harmful to Your Health, 45 GA. L. REV. 275, 293 (2010); see 
also Bayer, supra note 56, at 131. 
66. Graves, supra note 65, at 280. 
67. See id. at 291. 
68. See id. at 280. 
69. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Graves, supra note 65, at 281. 
70. Stein, supra note 65, at 1217. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. See id. at 1215–17. 
75. See Stein, supra note 65, at 1212. 
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Emergency care, unlike general care, focuses on the immediate care 
provided to a patient in times of emergency.76  Unlike general practitioners, 
emergency doctors do not have extensive knowledge of the patient’s medical 
history or any prior relationship to the patient, and they must rely on split-
second decisions.77  An emergency physician is responsible for providing 
diagnosis and care to episodic illness.78  Emergency physicians are often 
liable for a broad area of medical expertise unlike other practitioners who are 
able to specialize in a specific area.79  Some states have even allowed other 
medical specialists to serve as expert witnesses against an emergency 
physician.80 
Part of the reasoning behind why many states have taken the 
approach to make a distinction with emergency room practitioners involves 
the fast pace they encounter daily and the distinct regulation from general 
practitioners.81  A greater portion of the population is relying significantly 
more on emergency room services than a clinic with a general practitioner, 
even in situations where an emergency is not warranted.82  As a result, a 
conflict arises in determining what is a true emergency and to what standard 
an emergency practitioner will be held liable.83  Emergency practitioners 
often treat conditions that are not critical but that patients seek because of 
lack of health care based on their financial situation.84 
B. Georgia and Its Reform to Heightened Burden of Proof 
In 2005, the Georgia General Assembly, in Senate Bill 3, reasoned 
that liability insurance caused the state at the time to suffer a crisis that 
affected the quality of health.85  Therefore, the assembly believed that the 
regulation of civil action in the healthcare would resolve the crisis and result 
in stability and predictability in the economy.86  As a result of healthcare 
problems and the individuality of emergency physician malpractice, the State 
of Georgia enacted section 51-1-29.5 of the Georgia Code, establishing that 
no emergency physicians shall be held liable for negligence unless it is 
																																																								
76. RICHARD M. PATTERSON, HARNEY’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 569 (5th ed. 
2011). 
77. See Graves, supra note 65, at 279. 
78. PATTERSON, supra note 76, at 569. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See Stein, supra note 65, at 1212. 
82. Graves, supra note 65, at 298. 
83. PATTERSON, supra note 76, at 569–70. 
84. See Graves, supra note 65, at 298. 
85. Id. at 284; S. 3, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ga. 2005). 
86. See Graves, supra note 65, at 284; Ga. S. 3 § 1. 
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proven with a higher clear and convincing standard and with a showing of 
gross negligence.87 
Georgia’s healthcare is unique because most physicians are covered 
by one insurer, MAG Mutual Insurance Company, and therefore, the high 
premium insurance crisis is more evident when there is not much diversity in 
the insurance market for physicians. 88   Besides lacking competition in 
insurance, another cause of the health care crisis was affirmative duty 
statutes that required public hospitals to treat all patients who seek care in 
emergency rooms.89  Georgia’s affirmative duty to treat all patients often led 
to hospitals being over-occupied with higher traffic, forcing emergency 
physicians to work at a faster pace. 90   While Georgia blamed medical 
malpractice cases for the lack of affordability in insurance, distinct factors 
accelerated the insurance crisis in Georgia.91  For example, competition with 
one of the greatest health insurance companies, St. Paul Insurance Company, 
ultimately caused competition to rise to the point where premium rates 
dropped rapidly until insurance companies were no longer capable of 
providing coverage at such low rates.92 
The Georgia General Assembly introduced Senate Bill 3 with the 
purpose to lower healthcare costs and make healthcare more accessible.93  
However, Senate Bill 3 raised much opposition from individuals, such as 
Senator David Adelman, who commented that by raising the burden of proof, 
it would, as a result, become difficult for those patients who suffer from 
injury or even death to seek justice in the law.94  When the legislators raised 
the standard of proof to clear and convincing, they made it nearly 
impossible—or at least almost to the criminal standard of a beyond a 
reasonable doubt—for a plaintiff to bring a successful claim against an 
emergency physician.95  Not only has the legislature raised the standard, but 
it has also changed the negligence norm to a gross negligence standard, 
which is almost a “mission impossible for plaintiffs.”96 
																																																								
87. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) (2015). 
88. Graves, supra note 65, at 284, 301. 
89. See Williams v. Hosp. Auth. of Hall Cty., 168 S.E.2d 336, 337 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1969); Graves, supra note 65, at 301. 
90. See Williams, 168 S.E.2d at 337; Jade Hindmon, E.R. Overcrowding, 
WTVM, http://www.wtvm.com/story/4710750/er-overcrowding (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
91. See Graves, supra note 65, at 299–300. 
92. Id. at 301. 
93. Id. at 284; see also S. 3, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 1(a), 8(c) (Ga. 
2005). 
94. See Ga. S. 3 § 8(c); Graves, supra note 65, at 287. 
95. See Graves, supra note 65, at 287, 289. 
96. Graves, supra note 65, at 287. 
210
Nova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/1
2015] EMERGENCY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM 195 
1. Georgia’s Conflict with Clear and Convincing 
The Supreme Court of Georgia’s ruling in Gliemmo v. Cousineau,97 
faced public backlash after the passing of Senate Bill 3, when a medical 
malpractice action was filed questioning the constitutionality of Georgia’s 
heightened burden of proof and the raised standard of gross negligence.98  
Plaintiffs in this case alleged that the distinction between emergency room 
and general medical malpractice cases violated Georgia’s Constitution 
because it provided a special laws clause, which made any law that is not 
applied uniformly, unconstitutional.99  Due to the uniqueness in the Georgia 
Constitution, the court held that a gross negligence and heightened burden of 
proof was constitutional because it was not a special law, and it did not deny 
equal protection and due process.100 
The plaintiffs in Gliemmo alleged that because section 51-1-29.5(c) 
only applies to some emergency physicians, it is considered a special law 
that discriminates against practitioners outside the emergency room and thus, 
is in violation of the Georgia Constitution.101  The court reasoned that the 
statute is not a special law because it is applied uniformly to all claims in 
emergency care and without a specific time frame. 102   The General 
Assembly’s legislative intent behind the distinct treatment showed that both 
emergency and general practitioners are having great difficulty affording 
insurance, and because emergency care is distinct from general care, it is 
sufficient to heighten the burden of proof to reach those goals.103  However, 
the court and the legislature do not discuss doctors who are not emergency 
physicians but who undergo similar emergency situations, and patients with 
severe injuries and yet do not qualify for a heightened burden of proof.104  
This argument will be discussed further in depth later in this Comment.105  
Subsequently, the court then cites to State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 
																																																								
97. 694 S.E.2d 75 (Ga. 2010). 
98. Id. at 77; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) (2015); S. 3, 148th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005). 
99. Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 77 (emphasis added). 
100. Id. at 79–80; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. IV(c). 
101. Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 77; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. IV; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c). 
102. Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 78–79; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. 
IV(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c). 
103. Gliemmo, 694 S.E. 2d at 79. 
104. See id. 
105. See infra Section V.A.2. 
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v. Five Transportation Co.,106 which held that treatment that is not uniformly 
identically applied does not necessarily offend the Georgia Constitution.107 
V. IN FLORIDA’S CASE 
A. Florida’s Tort Reform Direction 
1. Introduction 
Tort reform is becoming a popular new movement, which all states 
are taking part in but that many face conflict with because of the 
individuality of each state’s constitution.108  In order to understand whether 
Florida can continue its tort reform path, it is essential to understand the case 
law and special constitutional provisions that do not allow Florida to 
continue tort reform like its sister state, Georgia. 109   In Georgia, the 
legislature has successfully enacted statutes that increase the standard of the 
proof that makes it close to impossible for a victim to successfully bring a 
case to court.110  Contrastingly, the effectiveness of tort reform in states such 
as Florida becomes questionable when Florida still has some of the highest 
insurance premiums in the country even when it has different cap amounts in 
place and expert witness reform.111 
a. 1986 Florida Reform 
The Medical Malpractice Reform Act, one of Florida’s earliest 
reforms in 1975, was enacted in order to diminish the cost of medical 
insurance to patients at a time when the state began to suffer through a health 
care crisis, and the cost of insurance was excessively gross.112  In Florida, the 
tort reform movement did not become recognized until a move from the 
contributory negligence standard to the comparative negligence norm 
occurred in Hoffman v. Jones, 113  to adopt a more equitable system of 
																																																								
106. 271 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 1980). 
107. Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 79; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 271 S.E.2d at 
848; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. IV. 
108. See Roslund, supra note 11. 
109. See supra Section IV.B; infra Sections V.A.1.a–c, V.A.2. 
110. See Roslund, supra note 11. 
111. See id.; Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 934 (Fla. 
2014). 
112. Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, ch. 75–79, 1975 Fla. Laws 13; 
see also Thomas Horenkamp, Comment, The New Florida Medical Malpractice Legislation 
and Its Likely Constitutional Challenges, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2004). 
113. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). 
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relief.114  Notably, the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 demonstrated 
that Florida’s aim to move towards comparative fault in negligence cases.115  
This would be the first attempt to slowly abolish the doctrine of joint and 
several liability in Florida.116  Subsequent reforms followed the passage of 
section 768.81, such as allocating fault to the plaintiff and removing joint 
and several liability to a defendant who has a less percentage of fault, which 
changed medical malpractice law.117  The 1986 reform was based on the 
legislature’s attempt to decrease insurance premiums and as a result, 
implemented insurance profit laws and insurance rate rollbacks.118 
b. Republicans Make the Change 
In 1996, Florida gained a Republican majority controlling the 
Florida House and Senate, which caused the legislators to aim their focus on 
improving business relations in Florida.119  The changes in office began a 
movement to change the civil court system in order to increase prosperity for 
insurance companies. 120   The legislators gained wide support for the 
limitation of litigation; they claimed that the floodgate of civil cases in the 
courthouses was causing insurance companies and the market to fail in 
Florida.121  Despite the fact that in 1996 Florida’s economy was strong as the 
gross state product rose by 19.5%, the unemployment rate fell by 4.9%, and 
Florida ranked third in greatest number of new businesses, legislators still 
blamed the small percentage of civil cases in Florida for a non-existent 
decline.122  Further statistics in the 1990s show that medical claims were not 
the culprit because when the 1986 reform was passed negligence cases only 
consisted of 8.9% of civil cases, and they have been in decline since 1990.123  
																																																								
114. Id. at 438. 
115. Michael S. Hooker & Guy P. McConnell, Joint and Several Liability in 
Florida:  Are Reports of Its Demise Greatly Exaggerated?, FLA. B. J., Dec. 2006, at 10, 12; 
see also FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2014). 
116. Hooker & McConnell, supra note 115, at 12; see also FLA. STAT. § 
768.81. 
117. Hooker & McConnell, supra note 115, at 12; see also FLA. STAT. § 
768.81. 
118. Kenneth D. Kranz, Tort Reform 1997–98:  Profits v. People?, 25 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 161, 163–64 (1998). 
119. Id. at 165. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. See id.; Robert S. Peck et al., Tort Reform 1999:  A Building Without a 
Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 433 (2000). 
123. Kranz, supra note 118, at 176–77. 
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The only increase that has occurred in civil cases is due to the standard 
population increase of Floridians.124 
c. House Bill 775 
In 1999, Florida once again made changes to tort law with the 
passage of House Bill 775 that reformed joint and several liability, punitive 
damages, statute of repose, and vicarious liability in motor vehicle cases.125  
The doctrine of joint and several liability was further limited in the 1999 
reform when a plaintiff’s economic losses were limited to a total of a one 
million dollar cap, but it only applied when the defendant was more than 
fifty percent at fault. 126   Significantly, under the new reform, multiple 
defendants could not be held to be joint and severally liable for more than 
one million dollars.127 
A common method used by tort reformists in order to gain public 
support for the limitation of the civil litigation system was the reference to a 
fictitious tort tax to the public.128  Reference to the tort law system as a tax 
on civilians was used to quickly gain negative opposition against individuals 
who brought claims to court. 129   Vice President Dan Quayle made a 
statement to a group of business leaders that the tort litigation system costs 
Americans three hundred billion dollars, a figure that has no statistical 
support but that quickly gained momentum. 130   Fictitious information, 
negative terminology, such as tort tax, and company lobbyists have falsely 
led the tort reform in Florida when no accurate information demonstrates that 
civil litigation burdens Florida’s economy in any manner.131  Other costs, 
such as natural disasters—specifically hurricanes—have caused a decline in 
Florida’s economy, but are not accounted for when the legislature looks for a 
culprit in the downfall of the economy.132 
																																																								
124. Id. at 177. 
125. H.B. 775, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1999) (Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, 
ch. 99-225, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400); Peck et al., supra note 122, at 406. 
126. Peck et al., supra note 122, at 409. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 421. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 421–22. 
131. See Peck et al., supra note 122, at 422. 
132. Id. at 426. 
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2. Medical Malpractice Reform Gains Momentum 
In 2003, the legislature focused its attempts on medical malpractice 
cases by placing statutory caps on non-economic damages.133  The medical 
malpractice reform also enacted provisionary steps to protect consumers 
from medical negligence, such as allowing insurance companies to avoid suit 
by tendering the limit of the defendant’s policy in two hundred ten days.134  
The 2003 legislature also expressed that the new cap on non-economic 
damages would be on an aggregate basis, and in cases where there were 
several plaintiffs, the cap would be even lower. 135   As a result, section 
766.118 of the Florida Statutes was enacted to limit the amount of non-
economic damages a plaintiff could receive to five hundred dollars per 
claimant.136  The statute aimed at limiting frivolous lawsuits and enforcing 
mediation before trial in order to protect insurance companies from excessive 
claims.137  In order to pass the Statute, Senate Bill 2-D provided several 
legislative findings, many are no longer presently applicable.138 
Overall, the 2003 Florida Legislature for Senate Bill 2-D found that 
Florida was in the middle of a medical malpractice crisis and that it caused 
decreased availability of healthcare for Floridians.139  The legislature claimed 
that Florida is one of the states with the highest medical malpractice 
insurance and therefore reasoned that this was why medical practitioners 
were leaving Florida.140  The legislature reasoned that it could not provide its 
citizens with access to proper healthcare when doctors were leaving the state 
to practice somewhere else with lower insurance premiums.141  As a result, 
the legislature publicized a correlation between the numbers of doctors 
leaving the state; nonetheless it was only anecdotal data that was merely 
implied.142 
Organizations, such as the American Medical Association, have 
blamed the American jury system for the increase in insurance premium 
																																																								
133. Tracy S. Carlin, Medical Malpractice Caps Move from the Legislature to 
the Courts:  Will They Survive?, FLA. B. J., May 2004, at 10, 10. 
134. See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1290–91. 
135. See S.B. 2-D, 2003 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Fla. 2003); Horenkamp, supra note 
112, at 1289. 
136. FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2)(a) (2014); Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1290. 
137. See FLA. STAT. § 766.118; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1289, 1291. 
138. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 913 (Fla. 2014) 
(discussing that in Florida there no longer exists a healthcare crisis to provide a rational basis 
for caps); Fla. S.B. 2-D; infra Part V.C. 
139. See Fla. S.B. 2-D; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1299–1300. 
140. Fla. S.B. 2-D; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1298. 
141. See Fla. S.B. 2-D; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1298–99. 
142. Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1302. 
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costs and the limitation of accessibility to healthcare.143  Tactics to support 
the allegation of excessive jury awards include placing emphasis on 
individual high jury awards and claiming that the award system is the true 
culprit.144  Insurance companies repeatedly claim that litigation and excessive 
awards are responsible for the national crisis and high costs of healthcare, 
however, significant data shows otherwise.145  In 2001, a total of 1303 claims 
were made against doctors in Florida that totaled to $361.1 million.146  If 
insurance companies claim that medical malpractice suits are driving doctors 
out of Florida and are excessive, the numbers of the amount of cases that 
actually make it to court do not match the allegations.147 
Other arguments made by tort reformers are that jurors are often 
sympathetic to plaintiffs because they only see the injuries caused and that 
often the medical standard is too complex for them to understand, even with 
expert testimony.148  Tort reformers argue that medical malpractice is too 
complex for jurors because it involves multiple parties, difficult medical 
issues, and a complex method to award appropriate damages.149  However, 
all these legislative findings on the need for tort reform in the medical 
malpractice area do not discuss how insurance premium costs have increased 
due to the losses in the reserve amount of negligent doctors and the lack of 
proper management of healthcare companies in the industry.150 
In 2004, further reforms continued as Florida passed the Three 
Strikes Rule, also referred to as Amendment 8, which became section 456.50 
of the Florida Statute.151  The Act focused on preventing physicians who 
have repeatedly committed malpractice from maintaining or obtaining a 
physician’s license. 152   While the Act may at first seem to benefit the 
plaintiff, the Act also heightens the standard of proof required to deny a 
license to a physician to a clear and convincing standard if the act or acts are 
not part of the Amendment 8 list.153  This standard is the same standard of 
proof required in Georgia against emergency physicians, with the exception 
																																																								
143. Id. at 1305. 
144. Id. at 1306–07. 
145. See id. at 1305–07. 
146. Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1307. 
147. See id. at 1306–07. 
148. Edward L. Holloran, III, Comment, Medical Malpractice Litigation in 
Florida:  Discussion of Problems and Recommendations, 26 NOVA L. REV. 331, 335–36 
(2001). 
149. Id. 
150. Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1312. 
151. FLA. STAT. § 456.50 (2014); Dinah Stein, Florida’s “Three Strikes” 
Legislation:  A Defense Perspective, 29 TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2010, at 22, 22. 
152. FLA. STAT. § 456.50(2); Stein, supra note 151, at 22–23. 
153. See FLA. STAT. § 456.50; Stein, supra note 151, at 22–23. 
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that in Florida, physicians must have committed three malpractice acts or 
their license will be removed.154  This heightened standard makes imposing 
strikes almost impossible and a finding of ordinary negligence would not be 
sufficient to impose a strike on a practitioner under section 456.50.155  A 
greater standard of evidence required to remove a physician’s license is 
argued because the right to practice medicine is seen as valuable property, 
and removal of a license limits a basic right, which would deprive doctors of 
due process.156  The right to practice medicine is recognized as a federal 
constitutional property right that the Florida Legislature cannot limit under 
the Supremacy Clause.157  However, a plaintiff’s right to access the courts 
and be able to seek redress for their injury is an equally protected right under 
the Florida Constitution.158 
B. Access to the Courts 
In accordance with the Florida Constitution, “[t]he courts shall be 
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be 
administered without sale, denial or delay.” 159   Although the U.S. 
Constitution does not expressly provide access to the courts, it is implied 
through the Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.160  Often 
Florida’s access to courts is one of the main criticisms of tort reform, but it 
raises the main question of who should bear the responsibility to compensate:  
the aggrieved individual, the tortfeasor or the taxpayers?161  Further, conflict 
arises when society is forced to pay for the wrongdoers’ actions. 162  
Therefore, because of the access to courts provision, Florida is more 
susceptible to challenge any new tort reform that may deny citizens their 
right to redress.163 
																																																								
154. Compare FLA. STAT. § 456.50(1)(h), with GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) 
(2015). 
155. See FLA. STAT. § 456.50; Stein, supra note 151, at 23. 
156. Stein, supra note 151, at 23, 26. 
157. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Stein, supra note 151, at 26. 
158. See FLA. CONST. art. I § 21. 
159. Id. 
160. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
161. See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1292. 
162. Id. 
163. See id. 
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1. Kluger v. White 
As established by Kluger v. White,164 access to the courts is given to 
Floridians as a fundamental right in their constitution and can only be 
removed in two circumstances:  (1) when there is a reasonable alternative to 
protect the right to redress for injuries or (2) “an overpowering public 
necessity for the abolishment of [the] right, and [that] no alternative method 
of meeting [the] public necessity can be shown.”165  However, protection 
under access to the courts is only extended to rights that existed at common 
law, such as personal injury claims.166  The holding of Kluger was essential 
to bring awareness into Florida on whether the tort reform was violating an 
individual’s access to the courts by increasing the difficulty for a plaintiff to 
seek relief.167  The Supreme Court of Florida addressed that the legislation 
cannot abolish the right to access the courts without providing an alternative 
to guarantee an individual a way to redress.168 
2. Mitchell v. Moore and Defining an Overpowering Public Necessity 
Denial of an individual’s access to the courts includes burdening or 
restricting an individual’s access right to redress.169  In Mitchell v. Moore,170 
a prisoner sought his petition to be reviewed by the appellate court; however, 
his petition was denied unless he filed various copies of the pleadings.171  
The petitioner stated that this was a violation of his access to courts 
guaranteed by the Florida Constitution because it was unduly burdensome in 
his condition as a prisoner to provide additional copies.172  The Supreme 
Court of Florida agreed that the statute requiring him to provide extensive 
copies only provided difficulty and delay with no possible alternative to 
access the courts for the prisoners.173  Therefore, if a fundamental interest is 
being taken, then the statute must meet the rational basis test and strict 
scrutiny test.174  The court in Mitchell held that the compelling government 
interest is equivalent to the overpowering public necessity and, therefore, the 
statute was to be held under a strict scrutiny analysis instead of a lower 
																																																								
164. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). 
165. Id. at 4 (emphasis added); see also FLA CONST. art. I § 21. 
166. See Fla. Const. art. I § 21; Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. 
167. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 10; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1292–93. 
168. Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. 
169. Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001). 
170. 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001). 
171. Id. at 523–24. 
172. See id. at 524; FLA CONST. art. I § 21.  
173. Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 525. 
174. Id. at 527. 
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rational basis standard. 175   However, this all applies if the legislature’s 
finding to limit access to the courts is current, and in cases where legislative 
findings do not parallel the present findings, the court has the ability to 
correct them.176 
C. Estate of McCall Changes Florida’s Justification for Tort Reform 
One of the most recent Supreme Court of Florida cases, Estate of 
McCall, directly addresses the alleged medical malpractice crisis in 
Florida.177  In Estate of McCall, a woman named “Michelle McCall received 
prenatal medical care [from] a United States Air Force clinic” when she was 
diagnosed with severe preeclampsia.178  The patient was treated by the family 
practice department instead of the required obstetrics-gynecology.179  Since 
the Air Force hospital was unavailable, the patient was transferred to the Fort 
Walton Beach Medical Center where she delivered the baby. 180   Dr. 
Archibald, the obstetrician in charge of the procedures, left after the delivery, 
but he was called after the family practitioner could not remove the placenta, 
and the patient had already lost a great amount of blood.181  The practitioners 
informed Dr. Archibald of the blood loss; however, forty minutes thereafter, 
a nurse attempted to draw blood from Ms. McCall.182  As a result, Ms. 
McCall underwent cardiac arrest and never regained consciousness.183  The 
district court awarded a total of $2,000,000—$500,000 for her son and 
$750,000 for each of her parents.184  However, with the application of section 
766.118(2), the cap on wrongful death cases, the case was limited to 
$1,000,000.185  The petitioners then appealed the case on the basis that the 
cap violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution, was an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment, 
and was a violation of Florida’s right of access to the courts, the right to jury 
trial, and equal protection under the Florida Constitution.186 
																																																								
175. Id. at 528, 531. 
176. See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1294. 
177. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 897 (Fla. 2014). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 898. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 898–99. 
182. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 898–99. 
183. Id. at 899. 
184. Id. 
185. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2014); Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 899. 
186. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§§ 2, 21–22; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 899. 
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1. Why Estate of McCall Matters 
Although Estate of McCall is a wrongful death case that discusses 
the constitutionality of caps on medical malpractice claims, for the purposes 
of this Comment we will only discuss the effect Estate of McCall has on 
medical malpractice claims in Florida, and the continuation of further tort 
reform.187  The court in Estate of McCall ruled that the statutory cap on 
wrongful death cases violates the Equal Protection Clause under the Florida 
Constitution because there is no longer a rational basis reasoning for a 
legitimate state objective behind it.188  Where the importance of the recent 
case is the court’s explanation and reasoning behind why the caps are 
unconstitutional; the court analyzes the present day situation in Florida with 
the alleged medical malpractice case.189 
In Estate of McCall, the court addressed the responsibility given 
under Warren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.190 to assure 
that the statute that was passed serves a legitimate government purpose and 
therefore, obligates itself to analyze the alleged insurance crisis.191  The court 
discussed the reasoning that the Florida Legislature has utilized in order to 
enact statutes limiting malpractice liability; the Florida Legislature Task 
Force has alleged that Florida has such a high cost of insurance premiums 
that it has forced medical practitioners to leave the state. 192   The court 
dismissed this finding and asserts that in 2003, “the United States General 
Accounting Office [(“GAO”)] found that from 1991 to 2001, [the amount of 
physicians] grew from 214 to 237 in metropolitan areas.”193  This is contrary 
to the Task Force’s findings that malpractice litigation was driving 
practitioners out and limiting the availability of health care to 
practitioners.194  As well, the alleged increase of jury verdicts statement by 
the Task Force has been exaggerated—a study revealed that only 7.5% of 
malpractice cases actually involve a jury trial verdict, and most of the cases 
were resolved in settlements.195  Therefore, as the court stated, the Task 
																																																								
187. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§§ 2, 21–22; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 899. 
188. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 905, 914–15. 
189. Id. 
190. 899 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2005). 
191. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 905–06; Warren, 899 So. 2d at 1095. 
192. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906; JOHN C. HITT ET AL., GOVERNOR’S 
SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE LIABILITY INSURANCE XVII (2003). 
193. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906. 
194. See id.; Hitt et al., supra note 192, at XVII. 
195. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906; Hitt et al., supra note 192, at 64. 
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Force’s findings that jury awards in medical malpractice cases were the 
culprits for the increased costs of insurance are deemed most questionable.196 
The court quotes the opinion of Joanne Doroshow, Executive 
Director of the Center for Justice and Democracy, who claims that: 
[T]his so-called crisis is nothing more than the underwriting cycle 
of the insurance industry, and driven by the same factors that 
caused the crises in the 1970s and 1980s . . . .  [W]ith each crisis, 
there has been a severe drop in the investment income for insurers, 
which has been compounded by sever[e] under-pricing of 
insurance premiums . . . .  [D]uring years of high interest rates or 
excellent insur[ance] profits that are invested for maximum return, 
the insurance companies engage in fierce competition . . . .  
[W]hen investment income drops . . . the insurance industry 
responds by sharply increasing premiums and reducing coverage.  
[T]ort reform changes in the 1980s . . . was caused instead by [the] 
modulations in the insurance cycle throughout the country.197 
The court acknowledged that the reason for the insurance crisis in 
Florida was due to the increases in the amount of money that insurance 
companies place for reserve. 198   The allegation that insurance is driving 
practitioners out of Florida is not supported because the practitioners are 
leaving to other states, such as North Carolina, that have the same crisis with 
high malpractice insurance rates.199  The alleged statement that the number of 
frivolous lawsuits has allegedly increased in Florida is contradicted by the 
deputy director of Florida Office of Insurance Regulations who confirmed 
that there is no evidence of an increase in the number of frivolous lawsuits or 
excessive jury verdicts.200 
In accordance with the GAO, some providers have even purported 
that because of the medical malpractice suits, physicians are forced to cut 
back on services that are seen as high risk.201  However, the GAO debunked 
that allegation as unrepresentative of the physician population as the surveys 
only had a twenty percent response rate. 202   The American Medical 
Association claimed that twenty-four percent of physicians stopped 
performing these procedures but failed to mention that responses for the 
																																																								
196. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906; HITT ET AL., supra note 192, at 64. 
197. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 907–08 (alteration in original) (emphasis 
added); see also HITT ET AL., supra note 192, at 64. 
198. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 908. 
199. Id. at 909. 
200. Id. at 908. 
201. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: 
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 20 (2003). 
202. Id. 
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survey were only ten percent.203  States with caps on non-economic damages 
claim that they have lower premium rates because of this; however, they 
exclude many factors such as hospitals and nursing homes.204  Other factors, 
such as the manner in which plaintiffs are permitted to collect damages, alter 
the award amount depending on whether the plaintiff files claims for 
multiple defendants together or individually.205 
Today, even if Florida was in the same medical crisis as it was in the 
1980s, a crisis is not a permanent condition.206  The court emphasizes that, 
“even if section 766.118 may have been rational when it was enacted . . . it 
will no longer be rational where the factual premise upon which the statute 
was based has changed.”207  Florida courts have a duty to evaluate both data 
before a statute is passed and its constitutionality after. 208   Further data 
contradicts any allegations of lack of access to healthcare when there are 
more active physicians in Florida than in the past, while, at the same time, 
the Office of State Courts Administrator reports that medical malpractice 
cases in Florida have decreased from 5829 to only 2491 in 2012.209  In 2003, 
the 5829 medical malpractice cases only constituted 3% of civil actions, and 
later the actions filed for medical malpractice decreased by more than 60% in 
2012.210 
As a result of the court’s findings, the Supreme Court of Florida 
established that there is no current medical malpractice crisis in Florida and 
that if there was in the past, it was no longer practical.211  The lack of a 
present medical malpractice crisis denies any rational basis reasoning to 
impose caps by section 766.118 and any legitimate state purpose to limit 
litigation, equal protection, and access to the courts.212  Nonetheless, the 
court decided not to answer any of the remaining questions regarding access 
to the courts because Estate of McCall was a wrongful death case, which is 
not considered common law or a statute protected by the Florida 
Constitution.213 
																																																								
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 30. 
205. Id. at 37. 
206. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 907, 913 (Fla. 2014); 
see also HITT ET AL., supra note 192, at 64. 
207. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913. 
208. See id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 21; 
FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2014). 
213. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 915. 
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2. No Alternative Method 
With Estate of McCall proving that there no longer exists a rational 
basis for medical malpractice reform, it is even more prevalent that any new 
reform in Florida would violate the Florida Constitution’s right of access to 
the courts and equal protection.214  In University of Miami v. Echarte,215 the 
court held that mandatory arbitration and monetary caps on non-economic 
damages in medical malpractice claims are not unconstitutional because they 
“are necessary to meet the medical malpractice crisis” even when they limit 
an individual’s access to the courts. 216   In Echarte, the court states that 
monetary caps on non-economic damages, known as the Medical 
Malpractice Reform Act, satisfies both the overpowering necessity and no 
alternative method of the Kluger test when a party is forced to request 
arbitration first.217  Nonetheless, Echarte denies a plaintiff the right to access 
when they force a plaintiff to receive a lower amount of damages if they 
deny arbitration.218 
The arbitration option enforced in Echarte is no longer constitutional 
because under the new findings, it does not pass the Kluger test.219  The 
legislature can no longer show an overpowering public necessity for 
abolishment of a right and no reasonable alternative without limiting access 
to the courts.220  In this situation, the plaintiff is undercompensated both 
when they choose arbitration and decide to go to trial, even though it is at the 
benefit of the defendant.221  Not only is the plaintiff limited from being able 
to bring their claim to court as guaranteed under the Florida Constitution, but 
they are also denied full compensation with no legitimate rational reasoning 
behind it.222  Florida’s Malpractice Act allows jurors to use the caps of non-
economic damages and leave a plaintiff undercompensated when they 
																																																								
214. See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 21; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913. 
215. 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993). 
216. Id. at 197–98. 
217. Id. at 194–97; Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 766.207(7)(b). 
218. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 197; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; FLA. STAT. § 
766.207; Jessica Fonseca-Nader, Comment, Florida’s Comprehensive Medical Malpractice 
Reform Act:  Is It Time for a Change?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 551, 565–66 (1996). 
219. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914; Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 197; 
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4; Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 565–66. 
220. Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 563; see also Estate of McCall, 134 So. 
3d at 914; Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 197. 
221. Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 558. 
222. Id. at 561–62; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 
194. 
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suffered an incredible loss. 223   The arbitration option and other medical 
malpractice reforms punish the plaintiff when they do not seek arbitration 
because they wish to take their case to court.224  Further medical tort reform, 
such as increasing the burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard 
when treated by emergency physicians, would further punish and delay the 
plaintiff’s right to redress.225 
3. North Broward Hospital District v. Kalitan 
Estate of McCall opens the door to future litigation when it questions 
the constitutionality of non-economic caps and when it completely exposes a 
no longer present need for limitations on plaintiffs based on their injuries.226  
In the recent Fourth District Court of Appeal case North Broward Hospital 
District v. Kalitan, 227  a patient brought an action against a hospital for 
medical malpractice when she suffered a catastrophic injury. 228   The 
plaintiff’s injuries consisted of an induced coma for several weeks, upper 
body pain, mental disorders, and loss of independence.229  The jury found in 
favor of the plaintiff and determined that the plaintiff had suffered a 
catastrophic injury and awarded a total of $4,718,011 in total damages as 
well as a total of $4,000,000 in non-economic damages.230  The trial court 
then moved to limit the amount of non-economic damages to $2,000,000 
under section 766.118(2) of the Florida Statutes and was furthered capped 
under sovereign entity to $1,300,000.231 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal then moved to reference Estate 
of McCall to analyze whether section 766.118 of the Florida Statutes applies 
to both personal injury and wrongful death cases.232  The court determined 
that, as established under Estate of McCall, if there is no longer an objective 
for the statute, then there is no longer a legitimate state objective to which 
the caps can rationally relate.233  Although Estate of McCall specifically 
refers to wrongful death cases, when the statute’s objective as a whole is 
																																																								
223. Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 564; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7) 
(2014). 
224. Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 565. 
225. See Stein, supra note 151, at 22–23. 
226. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913. 
227. 174 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
228. Id. at 405. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 406. 
231. Id. at 407; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2) (2014). 
232. Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2)(a); Estate of 
McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 915 (Fla. 2014). 
233. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901; Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411. 
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discredited then reference to personal injury cases applies as well.234  It is a 
violation of equal protection when non-economic caps discriminate and 
allow claimants with little non-economic damages to claim all the damages, 
while claimants with serious injuries are capped.235  In Kalitan, the court 
demonstrates the intention to limit tort reform after Estate of McCall brought 
to light the lack of rational basis for distinction among medical malpractice 
plaintiffs.236  The Kalitan court decided not to address the statute’s violation 
to access to courts or jury trials because Estate of McCall rationale applies to 
medical malpractice actions in general.237 
4. Florida Cannot Continue in Its Tort Reform 
What makes Estate of McCall so essential to today’s tort reform in 
Florida is the assertion that Florida is no longer in a medical malpractice 
insurance crisis; therefore, the court’s findings question the constitutionality 
of past reforms and any future attempts.238  Estate of McCall sets a distinct 
precedent for future cases and legislative actions; it limits any possibility of 
Florida continuing tort reform.239  Unlike the state of Georgia that overcame 
the equal protection hurdle in order to enact a heightened burden of proof 
when the legislature increased the standard, a similar reform would not pass 
Florida’s scrutiny.240  Florida’s case law, such as Kluger, Estate of McCall, 
and now Kalitan, note that there is no longer an overpowering public 
necessity and rational basis to place any more limitations on a plaintiff.241  
There no longer exists a compelling reason for unequal treatment towards 
plaintiffs with different injuries—whether wrongful death or personal 
injury.242  Florida no longer has legislative findings to prove that it is still in a 
medical crisis.243 
Nevertheless, because Florida under Kluger requires a test of 
overpowering necessity, it will be unsuccessful in enacting and justifying any 
further tort reform.244   The legislature is now unable to provide rational 
																																																								
234. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 897; Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411. 
235. Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411. 
236. See id. at 409, 10; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901. 
237. FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 21–22; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901; 
Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411. 
238. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913. 
239. See id. at 931. 
240. Id. at 916; Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 694 S.E.2d 75, 80 (Ga. 2010). 
241. See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4–5 (Fla. 1973); Estate of McCall, 134 
So. 3d at 901, 936; Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411. 
242. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901, 916. 
243. Id. at 906. 
244. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4 (emphasis added). 
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reasons for the different treatment for those individuals who suffer serious 
near death injuries caused by negligence, but who are forced to cap their 
damages.245  In contrast, plaintiffs in wrongful death cases have unlimited 
damages.246  The legislature also cannot pass the first part of Kluger with a 
reasonable alternative when the alternative is to go to arbitration.247  Even if 
arbitration is no longer mandatory, rather voluntary, it becomes mandatory 
when the plaintiff’s non-economic damages are capped even further.248  The 
alternative arbitration creates a greater burden on the plaintiff, and it 
discourages the parties from settling.249 
Florida already places caps on emergency practitioners and limits the 
award of non-economic damages available to plaintiffs who underwent 
medical care by an emergency physician to $150,000.250   Increasing the 
burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard and gross negligence, like 
Georgia, would potentially deny an individual the right to access the courts, 
equal protection, and a full recovery.251  If Florida attempts to continue tort 
reform by increasing the standard of proof, the plaintiff in an emergency 
practitioner claim would have to undergo arbitration, show negligence by a 
clear and convincing standard, and then be forced to limit the amount of 
damages.252  The plaintiff will also have to prove by a clear and convincing 
standard to a lay jury who may have trouble with medical terminology 
comprehension.253 
A plaintiff can no longer be labeled in accordance to the injury he or 
she suffered.254  A clear and convincing standard proposal in Florida will be 
subject to strict scrutiny because a justification for limitations would no 
longer exist, as malpractice claims are not the cause of high cost of 
insurance.255  As established by the court in Estate of McCall, “[h]ealth care 
policy that relies upon discrimination against Florida families is not rational 
																																																								
245. Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 563–64. 
246. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 915. 
247. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4; Fonseca-Nader, 
supra note 218, at 560–61, 565. 
248. See Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 560–61, 564–65. 
249. See id. at 560–62. 
250. FLA. STAT. § 766.118(4)(a) (2014). 
251. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; GA. CODE ANN. § 
51-1-29.5(c) (2015); Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001) (denying or 
burdening an individual’s access to the courts violates the Florida Constitution). 
252. See FLA. STAT. §§ 766.118(4)(a), .207(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) 
(2015). 
253. Holloran, III, supra note 148, at 343–44. 
254. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 914–15 (Fla. 
2014). 
255. Id. at 914; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c); Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 
527; Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). 
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or reasonable when it attempts . . . to create unreasonable classifications.”256  
Making a distinction between patients who were treated in an emergency 
room, in contrast from those who were treated in a clinic, makes the same 
unreasonable classification.257  Forcing a plaintiff to demonstrate a showing 
of the clear and convincing standard of gross negligence based on which 
hospital door they entered would substantially burden and restrict a 
plaintiff’s right to redress.258 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, Florida can no longer justify any new tort reforms, 
especially in the area of medical malpractice.259   There no longer exists 
legislative reasoning to limit the right of access to the courts and equal 
protection; the legislature can no longer enact statutes that limit the 
plaintiff’s right to sue malpractice doctors.260  A statute like Georgia’s statute 
that increases the burden of proof would violate Florida’s unique right of 
access to the courts clause because it would almost make it impossible for a 
plaintiff to bring a claim to court against an emergency physician when there 
is no source of rational reasoning or need for such limitation.261  Historically, 
Florida has always been a state leading in tort reform; nonetheless, the new 
findings force the courts to reevaluate the constitutionality of statutes that 
reflect the needs of the state at the time they were enacted.262  Doctors are not 
leaving the State of Florida anymore and so ensuring access to medical care 
is not reasoning behind further reform.263  Moreover, the arbitration option as 
an alternative to limit access to the courts works towards the detriment of the 
plaintiff by capping them at an even lower rate when they already have caps 
in place at court.264  Arbitration is not a good alternative; it penalizes a 
plaintiff for seeking justice in the law and it does not penalize a party who 
does not want to settle.265 
Florida healthcare is at a high rate, and many individuals seek care 
from emergency rooms because of their financial situation.266  However, the 
																																																								
256. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 915. 
257. See id.; Graves, supra note 65, at 293. 
258. See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527; Graves, supra note 65, at 293. 
259. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914. 
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of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914. 
262. See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1287, 1292. 
263. See id. at 1302. 
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number of medical claims is not the cause of the healthcare problem.267  
Florida needs to note that it is not in the same medical crisis as it was in the 
1980s, and it must address all the limitations it has placed on plaintiffs who 
are denied their access to the courts and equal protection when they suffer an 
injury from medical practitioners.268  The Equal Protection Clause is violated 
when patients with different injuries are treated differently with no rational 
basis for discrimination.269  In the case of emergency practitioners, it is noted 
that they undergo distinct exposure from those practitioners in the normal 
practice, and it may seem logical that other malpractice suits may arise from 
this.270  However, the type of environment that emergency practitioners are 
involved and trained in does not give rational reasoning to limit basic Florida 
constitutional rights.271  The right of access to the courts in article I, section 
21 of the Florida Constitution cannot be expressed any more clearly; it is not 
a right dependent on the practice or the environment that a tortfeasor may 
encounter.272  The right to access the courts is unique and absolute, and any 
form of further reform in the area of medical malpractice will not survive 
Florida scrutiny. 273   As expressed in Mitchell, “[t]he right to access is 
specifically mentioned in Florida’s Constitution.  Therefore, it deserves more 
protection than those rights found only by implication.”274 
																																																								
267. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 914 (Fla. 2014). 
268. See id.; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1287. 
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